DRC: ASSESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000163 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/RSA Chris Pommerer, INL/AAE Aaron Alton, and DS/T/ATA Tony Gonzalez E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV SOCI KCRM ASEC CG SUBJECT: DRC: ASSESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The key challenges facing the GDRC's non-military security apparatus is the corruption, limited capacity, and lack of resources prevalent in all Congolese security and governmental services, rendering them ineffective at best and predatory on the population at worst. They are, broadly speaking, incapable of addressing key regional challenges to state authority and drivers of instability, such as resource theft, smuggling, and trafficking in persons. The national army (FARDC) is responsible for suppressing illegal armed groups operating in the eastern DRC. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The illegal exploitation and export of natural resources, including those which finance armed groups, remains a significant source of instability and lawlessness in the eastern DRC. A UN Group of Experts report published in December 2008 documented how armed groups in eastern DRC finance their activities through the exploitation of natural resources, and provides evidence of the collaboration and support of both Rwandan authorities and the GDRC. A significant amount of the exported minerals from eastern DRC to neighboring countries remains unreported. ¶3. (SBU) Donors, including the USG, have supported research and other initiatives under the Trading for Peace program to better understand cross-border trade flows in minerals, and seek support among traders and government officials to stem the illegal flow of natural resources. In addition, the DRC became a candidate country in 2008 for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),a multi-stakeholder effort to increase transparency in transactions between governments and companies in the extractive industries. Though the GDRC has taken some positive steps under EITI, including establishment of a National EITI Committee, implementation of necessary steps toward validation has been slow to date, mirroring law enforcement and anti- corruption efforts in other sectors. ¶4. (SBU) The response capacity of the DRC non-military sectors to drivers of instability, such as the illegal exploitation and exportation of natural resources, is limited due to the broad problem of corruption and a legacy of predation on local populations. Officials in these sectors receive little or no training, do not receive salaries in a timely fashion, if at all, and operate with antiquated equipment. Within the National Police (PNC),a fundamental knowledge of laws and law enforcement principles and techniques is lacking, in addition to basic infrastructure such as vehicles and adequate administrative and detention facilities. ¶5. (SBU) The judicial system is hamstrung by a critical shortage of magistrates, clerks, and other administrative officials. The training requirements of the judicial sector, focusing on the Ministry of Justice, High Council of Magistrates and Ministry of Interior, are broad and include the following: basic understanding of Congolese and international law, human rights protection, anti-corruption (including judicial ethics),human resource and financial management, and administrative management. There is a dearth of human capacity, organizational structure, and material resources, which increases as one moves into the rural areas away from the capital and urban centers. ¶6. (SBU) The shortage of personnel is further complicated by the fact that many judicial staff approach or have exceeded retirement age, but there are few replacements being trained or recruited. As noted in the 2008 Democracy and Governance Assessment, "to function at the appropriate level, a minimum of 5,000 magistrates -- judges in the lowest level of courts -- are needed for the civilian courts. In practice, according to several judicial officials, there were only 2,080 total magistrates in the country when the team was conducting its research, including both civilian and military magistrates, the overwhelming majority of whom were in the capital, Kinshasa. This personnel problem was exacerbated when President Kabila removed several dozen magistrates in early 2008. Outside Kinshasa, the presence of the courts is limited almost exclusively to major cities, and even there it is grossly inadequate. Civilian magistrates have not been appointed since 1998. In most places, judicial salaries are paid irregularly and even when paid are inadequate. Of the 180 courts in existence - which is fewer than the number needed - only 53 are currently functioning." ¶7. (SBU) The GDRC is a willing recipient of USG assistance. Its willingness, however, is mitigated by low capacity to carry out assistance programs, especially in the provinces, where support is most needed. Accountability within GDRC offices remains an issue within a culture of pervasive corruption. Many lawyers and judges prefer to stay in the capital and travel infrequently to the provinces, where work is less lucrative and resources are lacking. Incentives are needed to overcome the stigma of working in remote areas. The 2006 Constitution calls for the establishment of a series of new judicial institutions within the next year -- the High Council of Magistrates, the Court of Appeals, the Administrative Oversight Body, and the Constitutional Court. The High Council of Magistrates is the cornerstone to an independent judiciary, but faces resistance from the other government branches that oppose increased powers for the judiciary. These new institutions will need significant resources to function. ¶8. (SBU) A number of international partners, notably the UK, France, and the EU, have been providing police training capacity and assistance in codifying the legal basis for the institutional structure of the Congolese police services. In February 2008 the Ministry of the Interior established the Police Reform Monitoring Committee as a consultative body for assistance coordination and training standardization between the GDRC and international partners. A similar GDRC-donor coordinating body exists for judicial sector reform, although its effectiveness has been marginal. France has trained judicial personnel and helped modernize the DRC's Penal Code. REJUSCO, an EU-Belgium-Netherlands joint project, has rebuilt courts and prisons in Eastern DRC and initiated judicial training. ¶9. There is currently no non-military regional security training center in the DRC. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) envisions a recently-completed border police training center in Bukavu as a possible site for regional training courses. The EU, UK and Sweden plan a joint effort to create a national training institute for judicial personnel. There are also discussions regarding the establishment of a national magistrate's institute, but there are no concrete plans yet. ¶10. (SBU) Comment: DRC needs for USG law enforcement and judicial sector assistance are broad and reflect the government's lack of capacity, at all levels, to enforce the law, serve justice, and carry out penal sentences. The national police need training in basic law enforcement principles and techniques, in addition to extensive infrastructure, equipment, and human resource needs. The judicial system needs are equally fundamental, and, in the wake of legislation creating essential judicial oversight bodies, present a timely opportunity for partners to assist in the activation of these bodies. Recruitment and training of magistrates is critical to providing increased access to justice, but this access is dependent on administrative and infrastructure support. Progress in the establishment of democratic institutions and the rule of law has been slow but steady since the 2006 elections, and there is a clear need for continued USG assistance in these sectors to support further consolidation. End comment. ¶11. (SBU) Point of contact information: Embassy point of contact for future correspondence and coordination is Pol-Mil Officer Jeffrey Means, meansjs@state.gov. Secondary contact is PolOff Michael Obryon, obryonms@state.gov. GARVELINK