PROMINENT PPRD PARLIAMENTARIAN ON KIMIA II, SGBV,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001071 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KWMN MOPS KPKO KDEM CG SUBJECT: PROMINENT PPRD PARLIAMENTARIAN ON KIMIA II, SGBV, MONUC, AND ELECTIONS Classified By: William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting with polcouns, Jean Mbuyu Luyongola, a prominent PPRD parliamentarian, stressed that sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) was a societal problem in the DRC. Ill-disciplined FARDC and police aggravated SGBV, as did the culture of impunity. Creating n effective and disciplined military would be a big step to combat SGBV, in Mbuyu's opinion. Mbuyu vociferously defended the military pressure that the Kimia II operations had put on the FDLR, but he also opined that to definitively "deal with the FDLR," ultimately, Rwanda would have to accept a political opening to non-genocidaires FDLR and the DRC would have to agree to resettlement of some FDLR on its territory. Mbuyu said a lack of adequate financing was the main obstacle to holding local elections, which, in his opinion, would not take place before 2011. He maintained that there needed to be a minimum 12-month gap between local and national elections for logistical reasons, pushing national elections out to 2012 or 2013. End summary. ¶2. (U) During a November 30 meeting with polcouns, Jean Mbuyu Luyongola, a prominent PPRD (leading party supporting President Kabila) parliamentarian and former GDRC Great Lakes Envoy discussed Kimia II, sexual and gender based violence (SGBV),an eventual MONUC withdrawal, and the timing of local and national elections. SGBV: A Societal Problem -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Mbuyu broke down SGBV into two separate, but related areas: the traditional view of women in Congolese society; and how armed conflicts have exacerbated SGBV. Mbuyu said that, especially out in the countryside, young girls are often forced to marry at the age of 12-14 and soon afterward begin bearing children. With high morbidity rates of newborns in rural areas, women are encouraged to have as many children as possible. This is a fact of Congolese society, Mbuyu lamented, which needed to be addressed at the state and family levels. Acknowledging that it was a huge and long-term challenge, Mbuyu said that the GDRC needed to provide better educational and work opportunities for young women. Just as importantly, Mbuyu added, was to emphasize equal rights for women at a grass roots level. ¶4. (C) According to Mbuyu, the FARDC very often exhibited the same lack of discipline that is common to rebel groups. They both prey on the local population, exacting commercial gains and perpetrating SGBV. Combatants believe they are immune to any persecution. And, although the police are somewhat better disciplined, in Mbuyu's opinion, the civilian population still harbors a negative image about the police's ability to administer justice. Related to this is the question of impunity, which is rampant and "limitless", especially in the interior of the DRC. ¶5. (SBU) To fight SGBV, Mbuyu stressed that it would be crucial to create "an effective and disciplined" army. It was therefore advisable for the GDRC and donors to put their full efforts behind SSR. Implementing mandatory and effective garrisoning of troops was also key, as well as strict regulations on when troops could carry arms. Mbuyu argued that accelerated decentralization, especially in the justice sector, would also help fight impunity. Finally, Mbuyu suggested that local police should be empowered, as QMbuyu suggested that local police should be empowered, as they know their communities. National police, by contrast, are always armed and are frequently stationed outside of their home communities. According to Mbuyu, they are therefore much more likely to commit crimes, including SGBV, than are local police. Kimia II -------------- ¶6. (C) Mbuyu strongly backed the Kimia II military operations against the FDLR, whose capacity had been greatly reduced. It was a "good decision," Mbuyu maintained, to launch the operations. Now, however, we needed to take stock of the situation, Mbuyu said, recognizing that the military operations cannot last forever. Accepting that military pressure should continue against the FDLR in the short-term, Mbuyu opined that more should be done on the political level. Specifically, Mbuyu suggested that Rwanda should, at some point, accept an inter-Rwandan political dialogue between the regime and the non-genocidaires in the FDLR. The GOR KINSHASA 00001071 002 OF 002 considers the younger generation of FDLR fighters, Mbuyu opined, as more acceptable as potential political actors than the old guard. Mbuyu also pointed to resettlement of some FDLR elements in the DRC as critical to longer-term efforts to deal with the rebel group. The GDRC, Mbuyu said, should be more willing to accept this. Mbuyu pointed to northern Katanga as an example of a region where FDLR elements had successfully and informally integrated into local communities. MONUC -------------- ¶7. (C) Mbuyu put forward an interesting argument why MONUC's presence in the DRC was no longer necessary. According to him, MONUC had given the GDRC some "breathing space," ensuring that, during the period of strained relations between Kinshasa and Kigali, Rwanda or its surrogates could not overthrow the GDRC. Now, with markedly improved relations between the two governments, MONUC was no longer needed. MONUC, Mbuyu continued, had been too unwieldy, primarily because of the logistical headaches of running field operational decisions to Kinshasa, New York, and foreign capitals and back. Noting that President Kabila had just publicly invited MONUC to begin plans for an eventual withdrawal, Mbuyu said that any withdrawal would be staggered, perhaps lasting as long as three years. Elections -------------- ¶8. (C) The biggest obstacle to holding local elections, according to Mbuyu, was the lack of financing. Mbuyu claimed that local elections would cost around $300 million (Comment: While not improbable, this amount is at the upper end of the range. Many observers believe $200 million is a more accurate estimate. End note). Mbuyu claimed that the GDRC's 2010 draft budget does not contain a line-item for local election expenses, and that the IMF would not accept any extraordinary spending for local elections in the 2010 budget (Note: the draft budget contains 20 billion Congolese Francs ($22 million at current exchange rate) for "2011 elections" under emergency and exceptional expenses. End note). Nevertheless, Mbuyu noted that Kabila's recent statement that local elections would be held was a political necessity. ¶9. (C) Mbuyu said most experts agree that it would be logistically impossible to hold local and national elections simultaneously. Furthermore, Mbuyu maintained that there would need to be a minimum 12-month separation between the two elections for administrative and logistical reasons. With no funds budgeted for local elections in 2010, Mbuyu said that the earliest local elections would happen would be in 2011. Thus, national elections would slip to 2012 or 2013. ¶10. (C) Comment: Mbuyu's analysis of the SGBV problem in the DRC was candid, highlighting the multi-faceted dimension of the problem. We fully agree with him that achieving some success on SSR would be a big first step towards reducing the incidence of SGBV. Although Mbuyu voiced the government line on Kimia II, he was forward leaning (perhaps too much so) in his recommendations to promote an inter-Rwandan political dialogue and resettlement of some FDLR in the DRC. Both ideas may ultimately be unacceptable, however, to the GOR and GDRC. Mbuyu's comments about timing for the local and national elections were probably sequentially correct. On that issue, while we should not condone endless delays in holding the elections, our primary objective should be to Qholding the elections, our primary objective should be to ensure free and fair elections, not simply perfunctory voting exercises. End comment. GARVELINK