SA WOLPE IN KINSHASA 3/3: BOSCO, GOMA II, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001064 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV CG SUBJECT: SA WOLPE IN KINSHASA 3/3: BOSCO, GOMA II, AND CONFLICT MINERALS--A VIEW TO THE EAST REF: A)KINSHASA 957 B) KINSHASA 1056 C) KINSHASA 1061 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Special Advisor for the Great Lakes Howard Wolpe met with GDRC leaders and key foreign ambassadors as part of his November 13-17 salutatory visit to Kinshasa in which he outlined USG objectives and initiatives in the region (reftels B and C). In meetings with former GDRC Vice President Ruberwa and recently ousted President of the National Assembly Vital Kamerhe, SA Wolpe discussed the situation in Eastern DRC, prospects for peace, and perspectives on stability. This is the third of three cables regarding Dr. Wolpe's official visit to Kinshasa. End summary. Who is in Control of the Kivus? -------------- ¶2. (C) Kamerhe said Kinshasa has not fulfilled obligations under the Goma Accords to integrate National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and various Mai-Mai militia into the DRC armed forces (FARDC) at the appropriate rank and with a regular salary. The Kabila government instead placed CNDP commanders in charge of FARDC units--comprised of mostly former CNDP soldiers--in the Kivus, in a reverse integration that leaves the CNDP in control of the region. Lack of pay and provisions contributed to subsequent atrocities by the nominal FARDC units (i.e. 213th Brigade). ¶3. (C) Ruberwa, a former rebel leader from the East who joined the government as part of a power-sharing deal, said President Joseph Kabila brokered a deal to end hostilities with current CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda. Exact terms of the agreement are in question, but seem to consist of Bosco's joining the FARDC in return for a de facto pardon. Kamerhe believes Kabila would not turn over Bosco to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the short-term; however, a later betrayal of Bosco might be possible. While Bosco is a capable military leader, according to Ruberwa, he is not a proficient political organiser--a failing which, combined with international arrest warrants, impede Bosco from pursuing any grander ambitions. ¶4. (C) Ruberwa said Bosco's predecessor is more popular than Bosco in the Eastern DRC, but his well-known association with Rwandan President Kagame will ensure Laurent Nkunda's continued political exile in Kigali. Ruberwa said Kagame was "a man of his word" who would not violate his agreement with Kabila to keep NKUNDA under wraps. Since 2003, the GDRC avoided discussions with western diplomats on security-sector reform problems, such as difficulties with CNDP integration. Ruberwa said the GDRC limits contact with western governments fearing the appearance of losing sovereignty. This reluctance to engage diplomatically in turn led to a lack of transparency that prevented international assistance from going where it should. Ruberwa said a visible result of misappropriated funds from foreign aid and national coffers are new buildings in Kinshasa built by FARDC generals (on a salary of $100 per month) and construction in Kigali and Goma funded by illegal trade in minerals. The solution, Ruberwa proposes, is professional military education for the FARDC, and sanctions on minerals (see paragraph 7). Integrating the Displaced -------------- ¶5. (C) According to Ruberwa and Kamerhe, former combatants living in the East fall into three broad categories: those Qliving in the East fall into three broad categories: those nominally integrated into the military (e.g. the CNDP), refugees who wish to return to their homes but are prevented by fears of persecution (e.g. Rwandan exiles),and those who returned to their homes and live in squalor (i.e. due to a paltry resettlement stipend in an area of limited economic opportunity). Ongoing difficulties in returning Rwandan refugees stem from Rwandan fears of potential land claims, ethnic prejudices, and the preconception that all Rwandans in DRC participated in the genocide. Kamerhe recommended the ICC in Rwanda try those resident in the Congo and complicit in the genocide. Publicly naming those wanted by the court would separate fugitives from refugees, thereby encouraging local communities which are home to the accused to turn them in and allowing true refugees to return to Rwanda. Kamerhe said former militants in Ituri are unemployed and ripe for KINSHASA 00001064 002 OF 002 militia recruitment. He suggested an agricultural works program to not only occupy those with idle hands but also to contribute to regional economic development and combat malnutrition. He specifically suggested cattle breeding and cultivation of consumption crops such as corn, beans, manioc, and potatoes. Failure to settle the regional issues of former combatant integration and refugee resettlement would lead to a resurgence in violence in the coming year, said Ruberwa. A Call for Goma II -------------- ¶6. (C) Both Kamerhe and Ruberwa noted that the GDRC signed the Goma Accords nearly one year ago but has not honored the terms of the agreement regarding integration of CNDP and Mai-Mai into the FARDC. Kamerhe called for a Goma II--at which he and Ruberwa would participate--to evaluate progress, identify obstacles, and determine the next steps to achieve a lasting peace in the East. (Note: The UK Ambassador to Kinshasa suggested the same idea in meetings with SA Wolpe and in other local fora. End Note.) Conflict Minerals -------------- ¶7. (C) SA Wolpe's interlocutors said Eastern DRC is a target for international and internal conflict because of the concentration of deposits of precious ores and minerals. An informal triad formed by GDRC leaders, the para-military Forces for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR),and multi-national corporations (MNC) foments and illegally profits from the lack of stability in the region. Kamerhe said the local Congolese head of police and a regional FARDC general are business partners with the FDLR, which is the target of the ongoing Kimia II military operations. He said a typical scenario in which military operations threatened certain mining interests involved the Congolese commander alerting his FDLR contacts when their locations would be targeted thereby giving them time to abandon their positions. Kamerhe pointed toward the presence in Kigali of MNCs which export minerals not found naturally in Rwanda as proof of tacit complicity by the international community. Kamerhe suggested the most recent addition of 3,000 troops to MONUC be established as a special unit to control the mining areas and introduce a resource tracking system such as that used for conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone. ¶8. (C) Comment: Although Kamerhe and Ruberwa both have political aspirations which fuel their critiques of the GDRC, their experiences and contacts in the East give credence to their interpretation of GDRC actions regarding former CNDP leaders Bosco and Nkunda, and potential problems with integrating former warring factions. Curiously, their support of professionalization of the military and international support in stemming the flow of natural resources mirror statements of serving GDRC officials. The center in Congolese politics appears well established. End comment. ¶9. (U) Special Advisor Wolpe cleared this message. GARVELINK