Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KIGALI33
2009-01-22 15:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kigali
Cable title:
SUPPORTING THE JOINT CONGOLESE AND RWANDAN EFFORT
how-toVZCZCXYZ0004 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHLGB #0033 0221546 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 221546Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5848 INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0379 RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0477 RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 1291 RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2067 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0624 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0393 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1399 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0655 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0194
C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000033
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR P AND AF
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/201
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINS PINR RW
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE JOINT CONGOLESE AND RWANDAN EFFORT
REF: 08 KIGALI 875
Classified By: Ambassador Symington for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000033
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR P AND AF
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/201
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINS PINR RW
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE JOINT CONGOLESE AND RWANDAN EFFORT
REF: 08 KIGALI 875
Classified By: Ambassador Symington for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (C) As the international community awaits details of
the joint Congolese/Rwandan military effort in the Kivus,
it is essential we keep in mind what a sea change this
joint operation represents. After many ups and downs, and
often sharp disagreements on what has been happening in
the eastern Congo and what to do about it, the two
governments have -- through intense negotiations at many
levels -- reached a common understanding on the way forward.
Both now agree that the FDLR, as the root cause of
instability
in the Kivus, should and will be the focus of these joint
operations. In Kigali, Kabila's decision to work
in tandem with Kagame on these joint operations is seen as
a forthright and courageous affirmation of the new
partnership between their two governments.
2. (C) This partnership and the resultant joint military
operations have already redefined the political and security
landscape in the region. At a minimum, a significant
reduction in the FDLR's authority, independence and
operational
capacity may result. These operations may also have a
profound
impact on other destabilizing elements, such as the CNDP,
in the eastern Congo.
3. (C) We should not focus heavily on ascertaining the
exact numbers of RDF troops now in the Congo, or the exact
operational details or timelines, or on public or private
comments by either government on these and other varying
details. Rather, we must keep our attention focused on the
efforts of the two leaders who are now working in partnership
to achieve their respective security and humanitarian
objectives.
The international community encouraged Kagame and Kabila to
address these issues. Now is the time to assist this
unprecedented opportunity to increase collateral good, and
reduce
collateral damage.
SYMINGTON
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR P AND AF
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/201
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINS PINR RW
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE JOINT CONGOLESE AND RWANDAN EFFORT
REF: 08 KIGALI 875
Classified By: Ambassador Symington for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (C) As the international community awaits details of
the joint Congolese/Rwandan military effort in the Kivus,
it is essential we keep in mind what a sea change this
joint operation represents. After many ups and downs, and
often sharp disagreements on what has been happening in
the eastern Congo and what to do about it, the two
governments have -- through intense negotiations at many
levels -- reached a common understanding on the way forward.
Both now agree that the FDLR, as the root cause of
instability
in the Kivus, should and will be the focus of these joint
operations. In Kigali, Kabila's decision to work
in tandem with Kagame on these joint operations is seen as
a forthright and courageous affirmation of the new
partnership between their two governments.
2. (C) This partnership and the resultant joint military
operations have already redefined the political and security
landscape in the region. At a minimum, a significant
reduction in the FDLR's authority, independence and
operational
capacity may result. These operations may also have a
profound
impact on other destabilizing elements, such as the CNDP,
in the eastern Congo.
3. (C) We should not focus heavily on ascertaining the
exact numbers of RDF troops now in the Congo, or the exact
operational details or timelines, or on public or private
comments by either government on these and other varying
details. Rather, we must keep our attention focused on the
efforts of the two leaders who are now working in partnership
to achieve their respective security and humanitarian
objectives.
The international community encouraged Kagame and Kabila to
address these issues. Now is the time to assist this
unprecedented opportunity to increase collateral good, and
reduce
collateral damage.
SYMINGTON