Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KIGALI279
2009-05-08 06:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kigali
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR RICE: RWANDA UN ISSUES

Tags:  PREL UNSC MOPS PHUM PINR RW 
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P 080615Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
SECSTATE WASHDC 6055
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000279 


USUN FOR AMBASSADOR RICE FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: PREL UNSC MOPS PHUM PINR RW
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR RICE: RWANDA UN ISSUES

REF: A. KIGALI 237

B. 08 KIGALI 292


Classified By: Ambassador Stuart Symington for reasons 1.4 (b, c, d)

Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000279 USUN FOR AMBASSADOR RICE FROM AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019 TAGS: PREL UNSC MOPS PHUM PINR RW SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR RICE: RWANDA UN ISSUES REF: A. KIGALI 237 ¶B. 08 KIGALI 292 Classified By: Ambassador Stuart Symington for reasons 1.4 (b, c, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Summary and Introduction: I am delighted you will participate in the UN Security Council's May 17-18 visit to Rwanda. The Mission staff and I look forward to assisting you during your visit. Your participation underscores the importance of our relationship with Rwanda and our support for peace and security in the region. As you may have already heard, your remarks on the eve of the 15th anniversary of the genocide were warmly received here. We are Rwanda's largest aid donor, and Rwanda looks to the U.S. to continue to support its efforts on regional security, peace-keeping, economic development and the health of its people. ¶2. (C) Since the 1994 genocide, the Government of Rwanda (GOR) has had a conflicted relationship with the United Nations. The ruling Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and President Paul Kagame have long asserted that the United Nations failed the Rwandan people, not once but twice. First, during the genocide itself, through inaction. Second, during the vicious late-1990s insurgency conducted by the remnants of the genocidal forces, who fled and then camped on Rwanda's western border. In Rwandan eyes, the UN paid greater attention to refugee camps in eastern Congo, camps filled with genocidaires bent on Rwanda's destruction, than to Rwanda; a shattered nation desperately trying to rebuild itself and establish essential security for its people. Such perceptions of the U.N. inform public opinion here to this day. ¶3. (C) Nevertheless, Rwanda works productively on many fronts with the UN. Its participation in UN peacekeeping in Sudan has been exemplary; Rwandan forces there have performed outstandingly, setting a high standard for others to follow. President Kagame wants clear USG and UN support for the command slot at UNAMID in Darfur. Rwanda seeks continued UNSC sanctioning of the genocidal forces still camped in eastern Congo. The GOR does not have a high opinion of MONUC and believes it has not done an adequate job. The GOR is working to achieve the transfer of genocide suspects held in Arusha by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). End summary and introduction. D
ARFUR and the UMAMID Command Slot -------------- ¶4. (C) Rwanda fields four battalions to UNAMID in Darfur, plus several hundred headquarters troops for UNMIS in Khartoum. Rwandan General Karenzi Karake has just completed his term as UNAMID deputy commander. Rwandan troops are widely regarded as by far the best in the field, and Karake won uniform praise for his leadership and military acumen. Rwanda thinks -- given the number of Rwandan troops on the ground and their exemplary service -- that it has earned the UMAMID command slot. With the approaching mid-June end of Nigerian General Agwai's term of service, Rwanda has nominated Lt. General Patrick Nyamvumba for the command position (ref A). Post strongly endorsed this nomination in the referenced cable. Nyamvumba is a resourceful, courageous and experienced field commander (he is currently the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) logistics chief and president of the military court). Rwandan expectations are high that Nyamvumba will be appointed. Local contacts assert that during Secretary General Ban ki-Moon's March visit here, he assured Kagame that he would appoint a Rwandan to the command Qassured Kagame that he would appoint a Rwandan to the command slot. President Kagame may raise this issue in meetings with the UNSC team. ¶5. (C) French and Spanish indictments of Rwandans for alleged wartime abuses produced anger and dismay among senior military and civilian officials here. Rwanda has mounted a concerted campaign in various international fora, particularly within the African Union, against extra-territorial jurisdiction, calling it "double standard" justice. The Spanish indictments are regarded by the Rwandans, with considerable justification, as intemperate and as containing offensive reinterpretations of the genocide and its aftermath (ref B). When there was a move last year within the UN to shorten Karake's term as UMAMID Deputy Commander, the GOR considered pulling its troops out of Sudan if Karake were removed. As noted (ref A),some unsubstantiated allegations exist against General Nyamvumba. Rwandans will react strongly if those allegations are given credence by the UN. Somalia -------------- ¶6. (C) Rwanda warily eyes a larger potential role in Somali peace-keeping. Recently, several Rwandan officials have indicated that they were approached by Somalia's new government to provide training for its security forces. Rwanda has done this in the past and is willing to do so again. In addition, if the Somalia peace-keeping operation became a UN effort, the GOR might consider favorably a request for peace-keepers. However, the Rwandans are very cautious of being overextended. They have asked for information-sharing on the Somalia situation. Comment: Rwanda will not send a token peace-keeping force. It is unlikely Rwanda will send a large peace-keeping force unless its other security concerns -- particularly the situation in the DRC and in Darfur -- evolve favorably. End comment. FDLR Sanctions List -------------- ¶7. (C) The UNSC recently sanctioned four members of the Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR),the remnants of the genocidal forces who fled Rwanda in 1994 and who still hold out in the vast forests of the eastern Congo. The USG sanctioned five, one of whom was previously sanctioned by the UN. Rwanda submitted many more names for consideration than were ultimately accepted by UNSC members, due mainly to lack of sufficient biographic "identifiers." Rwandans continue to urge the sanctioning of additional FDLR field commanders, as well as those in leadership positions in Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. The GOR voices considerable frustration at the lengthy sanctioning process. The Rwandan Mission in New York declined to put forward the list of four names for sanctioning, as it considered the list to be too short. The Embassy continues to work with the GOR on obtaining proper identifiers for additional individuals. MONUC and Eastern Congo -------------- ¶8. (C) The joint Rwandan/Congolese January 20 - February 25 military operations in eastern Congo achieved both military and political objectives. Militarily it reduced the FDLR's operational capacity to threaten Rwanda's security and to hold Congolese populations in its power. Politically it demonstrated a remarkable and unexpected step toward forging a new partnership between the two nations, and helped to reduce long-standing suspicions between the two governments and peoples. The UN peace-keeping operation in Congo, MONUC, provides essential logistics support for the Congolese armed forces (FARDC). MONUC, in Rwandan eyes, has been far less effective than it could and should have been. The recent joint GOR/DRC operations and MONUC's increasingly active cooperation with the FARDC has, to some degree, improved the GOR's opinion of MONUC. MONUC continues to provide extensive logistics support to newly invigorated FARDC units (bolstered by the integration of renegade Congolese General Nkunda's now-disbanded National Congress for the Defense of the People -- CNDP -- military forces). ICTR -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite tensions in earlier years, Rwanda has productive relations with the ICTR. It has accepted the decisions of the Tribunal in the various prosecutions to date, applauding long prison terms for the main architects of the genocide, while expressing some disappointment at several dismissals for lack of evidence. The ICTR and Rwandan prosecution services have collaborated closely on many cases. The ICTR prosecutor has expressed his support for and sought Q The ICTR prosecutor has expressed his support for and sought to achieve a key GOR goal -- the transfer of suspected genocidaires held at the ICTR in Arusha for trial here in Rwanda. To date, requests &QQat@5trengthen witness protections, for example providing for video testimony for witnesses located overseas. Another UN Tribunal, the Special Court in Sierra Leone, has recently signed an agreement with the GOR to house some of its convicted prisoners in a special VIP wing set up at a local prison to house high-profile prisoners. The ICTR has also signed an agreement to send convicted prisoners to Rwanda to serve out their sentences. New Rwanda PermRep -------------- ¶10. (C) President Kagame just named Ambassador Eugene-Richard Gasana as Rwanda's PermRep in New York. Gasana most recently was Rwanda's ambassador to Germany (with accreditation to several other European countries). Prior to serving in Berlin, Gasana was Rwanda's PermRep in Geneva; he is well-versed in multilateral issues and diplomacy. While in Berlin and Geneva, he asserted a leadership role within the African Group and will likely do the same in New York. He is close to President Kagame and will take issues directly to him rather than go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is fluent in English, French and German. Bilateral Issues -------------- ¶11. (C) We continue to urge Rwanda to be more tolerant of dissent and criticism from the media. Rwanda's recent decision to bar the BBC's Kinyarwanda news service undescores GOR sensitivities about "divisionist" discourse it claims is harmful to national unity and reconcilation. The use of broadly worded criminal statutes sanctioning "divisionism" and genocide ideology concern the human rights community. Over one million suspected genocidaires have gone before the "gacaca courts" (a traditional justice system modernized and expanded by the GOR). The USG has been supportive of this effort to bring to justice those responsible for the genocide, but the the process has attracted criticism from human rights groups on due process grounds. Most of those convicted of genocide-related offenses have either served their sentences or have been released under community service or suspended sentence provisions. They are again living in their communities, often near neighbors who were survivors or victimes. Less than 30,000 remain in prison on genocide charges or convictions. The gacaca courts were the GOR's principal means to achieve justice and reconciliation -- a difficult policy balance. It will likely take years to assess the trials on national reconciliation. It is clear, however, that not all those who were convicted of crimes are repetant. Resolving lingering animosity and hatred is likely to take several generations. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security are actively investigating Rwandans resident in the U.S. suspected of involvement in the genocide who may have falsified their involvement to obtain immigrant, refugee, or American citizen status. ¶12. (C) Presidential elections will be held in 2010. Kagame will likely seek a second (and final) seven-year term. There are no effective opposition parties. Most parties participate in a coalition led by the Rwanda Patriot Front (RPF). Donors, including the U.S., have been working with the electoral commission on a new electoral code. In 2009, a U.S.-funded program to build political party capacity succeeded in sparking unprecedented dialogue among political parties and message formulation. Those efforts may have a lasting effect improving partisan political activity. Bilateral Assistance -------------- ¶13. (SBU) In 2008, the United States was Rwanda's largest bilateral donor, working in the areas of democracy and governance, economic development and health: Democracy and Governance Programs: USG programs focus on local government and reconciliation. We are supporting decentralized governance through an innovative program to achieve health and governance objectives by acting to improve local government's capacity to manage funds and deliver high Qlocal government's capacity to manage funds and deliver high quality health services. This program is complemented by capacity building programs for local civil society organizations. On rule of law issues, we are helping the Ministry of Justice and other government officials to improve the quality of draft legislation. We also support provision of legal aid services to the poor and other vulnerable groups, helping to ensure equitable access to justice. We fund youth radio for peace and reconciliation through a Great Lakes regional initiative. That enables youth to take an active role contributing to peace and reconciliation in their communities. A new project implemented by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) is working with political parties to build their capacity for the 2010 elections. Millennium Challenge Corporation Country Threshold Program: Rwanda was selected in 2006 for the Threshold program. The GOR Country Plan was approved by the MCC Investment Committee in July 2008; the final agreement was signed in October 2008. USAID is in the process of procuring four projects (supporting the police, strengthening the media, aiding civic participation, and developing the justice sector) to implement the three-year, $25 million Threshold Country Program. The Program is intended to improve Rwanda's scores on three MCC Ruling Justly indicators: civil liberties, political rights and voice and accountability. Economic Development and U.S. Investment: In February 2008, President Bush and President Kagame signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty aimed at encouraging investment and trade between the United States and Rwanda. In March 2009, American energy company Contour Global signed a $325 million project with the government to extract methane gas from Lake Kivu to provide 100MW of electricity to the national grid. This is the largest foreign private sector investment in Rwanda's history and promises to significantly improve the availability and cost of electricity. Other American investments include interest in tea, coffee, and mining. Over the past eight years, the USG has invested an estimated $12 million in promoting and developing the Rwandan coffee industry, building and rehabilitating coffee washing stations, training farmers and "cuppers" (coffee tasters), organizing cooperatives, encouraging banks to lend to Rwandan investors to build coffee washing stations, and improving rural infrastructure. Today, Rwandan coffee has become known as one of the "best of the best" coffees in the world. Rwanda exported 4,200 tons of specialty coffee in 2008. Global Health: Rwanda is one of 15 "focus countries" under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The national HIV prevalence rate is approximately 3.0 percent (3.6 percent for women, 2.3 percent for men). A 2005 survey suggests that women are contracting HIV/AIDS at a younger age than men, and that for both sexes prevalence in urban areas is approximately three times higher than in rural areas. Through PEPFAR and Global Fund support, Rwanda has increased the number of facilities offering services for prevention of mother-to-child transmission from 53 to 318, and voluntary counseling and testing from 44 to 3345. Rwanda has achieved 70 percent coverage of those in need of anti-retroviral treatment. This is one of the highest rates in sub-Saharan Africa, and can be directly linked to the significant geographic expansion of HIV/AIDS services. Rwanda has also completed a national roll-out of performance-based financing as an incentive for improved health care delivery, and built the capacity of local organizations to manage and implement HIV/AIDS programs. FY08 PEPFAR funding for Rwanda exceeded $123 million. FY09 funding is expected to be at similar levels. The RDF has been a leader in HIV/AIDS programs for military forces in Africa, and has several innovative programs underway to protect its men and women. Malaria: In addition, Rwanda is a President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) country. In 2006, the number of uncomplicated malaria cases treated in public sector health facilities was 1.3 million. By mid-FY08, it decreased to 900,000 cases. Given this reduced incidence malaria has now dropped down to second place as the leading cause of morbidity and mortality among children under five in Rwanda. Much of this success is attributed to the use of indoor-residual spraying and insecticide-treated bed nets funded by USAID. During FY08, a spraying campaign treated 200,000 houses or more than 900,000 people (approximately 10 Q200,000 houses or more than 900,000 people (approximately 10 percent of the population). PMI funding for in FY08 was $17 million; FY09 funding is expected at similar levels. The Mission also implements successful programs in child survival, maternal and child health, reproductive health and family planning. These programs have annual budgets of $11.8 million. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Rwanda engages extensively with the UN on a number of issues, while keeping a weather eye out for any perceived new failings on the UN's part. Be it cautious behavior by MONUC in the Congo, attempts to thwart Rwandan candidates for peace-keeping slots in Sudan, or unwillingness to pursue sanctions against a wide array of genocidaires active in Africa and the West, Rwanda will assert the correctness of its policies and the appropriateness of its actions with firm and concerted advocacy in multilateral fora. Today, Rwandans have reason to be optimistic. Their recent rapprochement with the DRC is absolutely essential to Rwanda's own long-term ecnomic growth and to the prospects of all Rwandans and their neighbors. Economic growth and social justice are vital for lasting national reconciliation. Rwanda will continue its close relations with the USG, and look to us to continue serving as, perhaps, its mosts significant partner in regional security, peace-keeping, health and economic development. End comment. ¶15. (U) Ambassador W. Stuart Symington Bio Begin Text: Ambassador W. Stuart Symington was nominated by President George W. Bush and confirmed by the United States Senate as Ambassador to Rwanda on August 1, 2008. Ambassador Symington presented his credentials to President Kagame on November 3, ¶2008. Ambassador Symington was raised in Missouri, earned a bachelor,s degree from Brown University and a Juris Doctorate from Columbia University. He clerked for the Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Missouri, then litigated and practiced corporate law in New York, London, Paris, and St. Joseph, Missouri, before becoming a Foreign Service Officer in 1986. After beginning his diplomatic career tracking protests and politics in Honduras, he moved to Spain and worked on economic issues before serving as the Ambassador,s aide during Desert Shield and Storm. In Mexico, Stuart cultivated the political opposition, worked anti-drug issues, helped congressional visitors looking at NAFTA, and reported from Chiapas during the Zapatista revolt. At the State Department, he worked for the Under Secretary for Political Affairs on Latin American and African issues, backing up as his aide for Bosnia. During a yearlong Pearson Fellowship, he served on the staff of Congressman IKE Skelton studying U.S. military joint operations and education. He later traveled to Sudan and North Korea on teams negotiating to free American captives before finishing the year as an aide to Ambassador Bill Richardson, then the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN. As a political officer in Ecuador, Stuart forged ties to the political opposition, indigenous leaders, military commanders, and other government and private sector leaders. He joined efforts to end the century-old Peru/Ecuador border conflict, helped negotiate the agreement establishing an anti-drug Forward Operating Location, and, after protests toppled Ecuador,s president, he pressed for a return to civilian rule. From 2001-2003, he served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Niger, West Africa, dealing with military mutinies, terrorist threats, and civil unrest; he mounted an outreach effort to Muslims leaders, fostered anti-terrorism cooperation, and buttressed Niger,s democracy with a key food security program. He then returned to the State Department as the Deputy Director of West African Affairs in the Africa Bureau, working on the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative, humanitarian and development issues, and challenges to security and democratic stability. From October 2004 to February 2005, he worked for Ambassador Negroponte in Iraq on the election process and political issues, managing pre-election political reporting from around the country and visiting reporting officers in six of our ten regional offices during the run-up to the election. On Election Day, January 30, 2005, based in Baqubah, Stuart observed voting there and in other cities of Diyala province in the Sunni Triangle. He taught at National Defense University,s Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, where he worked with military officer students and staff to see how America,s diplomats and warriors can cooperate best to advance U.S. interest abroad. From 2006-2008, Stuart served as Ambassador to Djibouti. His interagency U.S.G. team advanced regional economic integration, defused humanitarian crises, and promoted democratic development and regional security. Qdemocratic development and regional security. End text. SYMINGTON

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