RWANDAN-CONGOLESE COOPERATION IN THE WAKE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000142 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2018 TAGS: MOPS PGOV PHUM PREF PREL RW CG SUBJECT: RWANDAN-CONGOLESE COOPERATION IN THE WAKE OF OPERATION UMOJA WETU REF: A. KINSHASA 190 ¶B. KIGALI 0124 (NOTAL) ¶C. 08 KIGALI 0741 (NOTAL) Classified By: CDA Sim for reasons 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The conclusion of Operation Umoja ("Our Unity) and the withdrawal of Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) troops from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have set the stage for further concerted bilateral Rwanda-Congo cooperation in the Kivus and beyond. Operations in South Kivu, with probable Rwandan support, will likely commence as soon as a review of North Kivu operations is completed. The formal establishment of diplomatic ties, the reinvigoration of the Economic Community for the Great Lakes (CEPGL) as a mechanism for regional engagement and growth, and continuing bilateral discussions on a host of topics, should accelerate the cooperative ties between the two nations. There are risks, including the possible unraveling of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) integration into the ranks of the FARDC, and the ultimate fate of renegade Congolese General Laurent Nkunda. The FDLR still exists as a sizable military force capable of destabilizing areas of eastern Congo. However, prospects for progress between the two countries that lead to regional stability have never been brighter. End summary. ¶2. (C) With Phase One of Operation Umoja completed and all RDF troops reportedly out of North Kivu, Rwanda and the DRC have entered a new stage in their bilateral relationship. The rigor with which the two governments arrived at their joint military operation plan and its execution largely confounded their respective critics and those beholden to assessing developments in the Great Lakes region through the prism of conventional wisdom. This is not to say that henceforth all will be smooth sailing between these governments, but rather their current rapprochement has led to a higher degree of confidence and trust than seen in recent history -- for example, the bilateral "Four-plus-Four" talks continue, with the next session reportedly scheduled for March 12-14 in the DRC. For the first time in years, the Rwandans see an improved security situation on the Congo side, and believe there is a cooperative way to move forward. With both governments assessing the results of this exercise, it is time to reflect on what was accomplished over the past three months. Taking Stock of Military Ops -------------- ¶3. (C) The GOR and RDF were fully cognizant of the risks the operation posed domestically to President Kabila. Entering the DRC at Kabila's invitation and departing prior to the February 28 end-date demonstrated to the GDRC, the FARDC, the Congolese population, and the international community that Rwanda would honor its pledge to assist the GDRC by sending in troops, but only at the express request of the Congolese authorities. The first contingent of Rwandan troops departed the DRC at the conclusion of the Goma ceremony on February 26 (ref b). According to the RDF, some 1,300 troops returned to Rwanda, although Embassy Kigali DATT and others counted closer to 1,700 -- a total which included ceremonial and logistics troops present to assist at the parade. The withdrawal of combat troops is now reportedly complete (we understand some intelligence and liaison officers remain, in close coordination with Congolese counterparts). Over the course of the operation, there was heavy focus on how many RDF troops were in Congo. Most observers placed the number at approximately 4,000 - well above the two-to-three battalions briefed to the press by both the DRC and GOR sides. A senior RDF officer confided at the departure ceremony that at one point seven RDF battalions had been present in the DRC, with full DRC support and knowledge, when it became clear that the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) could not provide the support needed to conduct the operation. According to the same officer, the RDF began to withdraw troops well in advance of the February 26 ceremony. ¶4. (C) Rwandan and Congolese staff officers have now begun a thorough review of their joint operations in North Kivu. RDF personnel have emphasized to us the primacy of the relationship between the two military establishments. RDF officers have urged us not to focus on numbers of FDLR captured or killed, or FDLR units propelled deeper into the jungle; rather, concentrate on the high level of RDF-FARDC cooperation achieved and the future prospects for more. Given the exemplary nature by all accounts of Rwandan operations in the field, with apparently minimal impact on local populations (due in part to the FDLR's reluctance to confront the RDF directly),the possibility of future joint operations -- including in South Kivu -- appears high. ¶5. (C) Enhanced security in North Kivu is now the responsibility of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC),as bolstered by the newly-integrated CNDP battalions. RDF officers believe security gains in North Kivu, secured by opening roads, taking over mines and farms, and expelling FDLR forces from their normal areas of operation, could be sustained by the FARDC, particularly with the close cooperation of RDF intelligence sources and advisors in the field. ¶6. (C) After the disruption and dispersal of FDLR units and gutting of several headquarters, the number of surrendering FDLR now at the Rwandan demobilization camp continues to climb. On March 2, registered combatants totaled 442, an increase of over 100 combatants at the camp in one week, and well over 300 since the operation began. "More are on the way," the camp director told us. This is the largest number of demobilized combatants at the camp since August 2004 (these numbers lag behind some quoted figures from the DRC side, as rigorous screening occurs at several stages of demobilization). The repatriation of several thousand Rwandan civilians (FYI: the most recent UNHRC figures for January-February total just over 3,900 returnees. End FYI), held captive or closely associated with the FDLR, deprives the FDLR of means of support and a base for recruitment. Moving Beyond Mil Ops -------------- ¶7. (C) Cooperation on military/security issues has increased the prospect for successes on the diplomatic and development side. Ambassadors will be exchanged and diplomatic missions reopened by the end of April. The Executive Secretary of the CEPGL told us on March 2 that he expects the Congolese appointees to the Commission staff to arrive in Gisenyi to take up their duties "this week." An American corporation, Contour Global, signed a 300 million dollar-plus Lake Kivu methane gas development project with Rwanda this week (septel),and is interested in exploring a similar deal with the Congolese on their side of the lake. Rwanda tourist revenue continues to soar, including mountain gorilla trekking just this side of the Virungas transnational park area, a significant revenue stream the Congolese could benefit from should security continue to improve. Rwandans continue to remind us that their vision of Rwanda as a peaceful entrepot of effective government and ever-greater integration into the regional economy depends upon a Congo able to govern itself, provide security, and make mutually-beneficial deals (ref C). Risks Remain -------------- ¶8. (C) There are risks. A revived FDLR could move back into areas vacated by the Rwandan troops, successfully challenging the FARDC, and perhaps sowing havoc among the local population (FYI: a St. Egidio priest in regular contact with FDLR leadership told us that that Secretary General Callixte Mbarushimana and others are claiming a "great victory," because the FDLR was not destroyed by the joint operations. End FYI). The ultimate fate of Congolese CNDP General Laurent Nkunda may be a source of friction between the two governments. Rwanda has agreed to return him, but the details of this return could be contentious and drawn out with Rwanda mindful of the reaction of its own people to the initial reports that the RDF had Nkunda in custody (Note: the first meeting of the technical team handling Nkunda's return to the Congo apparently occurred March 2; as yet we have no readout). Some Rwandans worry that the "mixage" of CNDP into FARDC is far from an accomplished task; should it unravel (for non-payment of salaries, or command and control disagreements, or sympathy for a returned Nkunda mistreated by the Congolese),the security situation could deteriorate quickly, with Rwandan interests also damaged. Ethnic politics can be explosive in the Kivus, and the purported return of prominent Rwandaphones to senior positions at several levels of government could have a downside in the days ahead. ¶9. (C) Comment. The two governments have determined their mutual interests require cooperation in the eastern Congo and beyond. We expect these mutual interests will continue to guide their future interactions. Rwanda believes it has shown it can be a reliable partner on security issues, and remains willing to be consulted and invited for future operations. Beyond cooperation on essential security issues, many areas of joint cooperation remain to be explored, in economic, diplomatic, humanitarian and other fields. Although there are significant risks, if the security situation can come right, the prospects for future progress in Rwandan/Congolese relations, and a better future for both nations, are infinitely brighter than they were just three months ago. End comment. SIM