ABYEI ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE DUE TO LACK OF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000091 DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID SOCI KPKO UNSC SU SUBJECT: ABYEI ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE DUE TO LACK OF FUNDING AND OTHER SUPPORT REFS: A) KHARTOUM 50 B) KHARTOUM 22 C) 08 KHARTOUM 1824 D) 08 KHARTOUM 1786 E) 08 KHARTOUM 1767 F) 08 KHARTOUM 859 SUMMARY - - - - ¶1. (SBU) According to Administrator Arop Mayok, the Abyei Interim Administration (AIA) has made little progress in securing funding since Mayok's meeting with CDA Fernandez in early December (ref A). Four months after it was established, the Government of National Unity (GNU) still has provided the AIA with only one million Sudanese pounds (appx. USD 500,000) to carry out its work. As a result, some Administration officials have threatened to resign from their posts. Despite Administrator Mayok's persistence in tracking down top Presidency and Ministry of Finance officials to resolve the funding problem, the regime seems reluctant to provide the financial and logistical support it promised when the June 2008 Abyei Roadmap was signed (ref B). Mayok believes the NCP agreed to the Abyei Roadmap only under severe international pressure but now does not have the intention of implementing it. Another explanation is that the GNU, which is now experiencing a liquidity crisis, is delaying all disbursements as long as possible. Mayok warns that without money to rebuild Abyei and provide basic services to its people (including returnees),the thousands displaced during the Abyei fighting in May 2008 will be discouraged from returning, and local resentment against the AIA will build. End summary. STATUS OF THE AIA'S FUNDING LACKS CLARITY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) On December 28, Abyei Interim Administrator Arop Mayok lamented to USAIDoff that the Presidency had missed the December 17 deadline for approving the Abyei area budget. This has paralyzed the AIA at a time when residents' expectations are high. The delay continued through January 14, causing Mayok to travel to Khartoum to meet with Government of National Unity (GNU) Ministry of Finance officials. In Khartoum, Mayok also met with GNU First Vice President (FVP) Salva Kiir Mayardit, who was there for an ICC Crisis Management Meeting, to highlight the problem. Subsequently, Kiir discussed the issue with GNU President Al-Bashir and urged that the Finance Ministry release the funds to the Administration. On 15 January, Kiir told CDA Fernandez that Bashir ordered the Ministry of Finance to release the Administration's initial budget and the two percent of oil revenue devoted to the Ngok Dinka on 14 January (ref C),but Kiir could not confirm that the funds had actually been released. ¶3. (SBU) In Khartoum, Mayok received mixed messages about the status of the Administration's funding. On January 14, an official at the Ministry of Presidential Affairs told Mayok that seven million Sudanese pounds (SDG) had been deposited into the Administration's account for the Ngok Dinka (part of the two percent of Abyei oil revenues provided to the Ngok Dinka under terms of the Abyei Roadmap). He also was told that the Presidency had submitted a letter to the Finance Ministry to release the Administration's initial budget and ten vehicles. When Mayok checked the account, he found that only one million SDG had been deposited (of the two million SDG initial budget). On January 19, the Under Secretary for the Finance Ministry told Mayok that the AIA now would receive only one million SDG (rather than the two million promised) and that the Administration would not manage the two percent of oil revenue devoted to the Ngok Dinka. Although the Abyei Roadmap stipulates that the Administration should be the guarantor of the Ngok Dinka money, the Finance Ministry Under Secretary claimed that the Administration has no right to the revenue because it is for the development of the area. ¶4. (SBU) Mayok told emboffs on January 20 that he fought back about the two percent for the Dinka, telling the Under Secretary that it should not be part of the national budget, but should instead be safeguarded by the AIA until the Dinka tribal chiefs decide how the money should be utilized. (Comment: Oje reason it is so easy for the GNU to delay payment of the two percent of Abyei oil revenues for the Ngok Dinka is that the CPA does not state clearly to whom the two percent should be paid - whether tribal chiefs or an administrative body such as the AIA. End comment.) Despite his reasoning, Mayok said that the Under Secretary was "insistent" that the AIA should not receive the Dinka community development funds. Mayok also said that the AIA's 2008 emergency budget (requested at seven million SDG) and its full 2009 budget (requested at 285 million SDG) were not discussed and have likely not been decided upon by the GNU. ¶5. (U) The GNU Presidency promised that it would transfer the KHARTOUM 00000091 002 OF 004 following financial and operational support when the AIA was established: (1) ten vehicles to deploy to Abyei and two million Sudanese pounds (SDP) for operations to initially set up the administration (decided upon between the Presidency and the AIA in September 2008;) (2) two percent of Abyei oil revenue for the Ngok Dinka community (as stipulated in the CPA;) (3) an emergency budget for 2008, consisting of funding for salaries and operations as stipulated in the Abyei Roadmap+ and (4) a full budget for 2009. The Abyei Administration developed and submitted the emergency budget request (seven million SDG) for 2008 and the full budget request (285 million SDG) for 2009 to the Presidency in late November. (Comment: The 285 million SDG budget reportedly includes funding for law enforcement, a function now carried out by the Joint Integrated Police Units. This may be one reason why this budget has not yet been approved - in addition to the fact that the GNU is having serious liquidity problems. End comment.) FRUSTRATION MOUNTS - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) In a 20 January meeting with emboffs, a dejected Mayok likened the Administration's task to setting up a farm without any tools. "How can you clear the land and prepare it without even one garden hoe?" he asked. When poloff asked Mayok what the AIA would do with the meager one million SDP in its account, Mayok said if he had known that the Finance Ministry would only transfer that amount, he would have stopped the transfer from occurring. "For reasons unknown to us, they only transferred one million pounds," he said. ¶7. (SBU) Mayok explained that the AIA is supposed to handle the IDP return program, but that it lacks the money to do so adequately. People are returning on an individual basis, which is causing many problems, said Mayok. "Nothing is organized" because neither the AIA nor the relief agencies have the full funding to set up an organized program. "I have told the relief agencies to do the best that they can for now," said Mayok. "If the returnees do not get good services, it will discourage others from returning," he explained. "For us [the AIA], there is a lot of frustration. We have been working for four months without any money from the Presidency," said the Administrator. The Presidency is "idle," complained Mayok. ¶8. (SBU) Mayok said he doubts the Presidency's (meaning, of course, Bashir and Taha, not Salva Kiir) sincerity and seriousness in implementing the Abyei Road Map. He believes that the CPA signatories were pressured to sign June 2008 agreement, but that the GNU is not interested in implementing the agreement. He explained to emboffs that there "must be a political agenda" behind the the GNU's refusal to finance the Administration. "If there has been a change of heart by one of the partners (NCP or SPLM),then we need to talk about it," said Mayok. Mayok said he hoped GoSS VP Riek Machar and GoSS Minister for Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng would travel to Khartoum on January 21 to pursue the issue. However, ConGen Juba poloffs confirmed that Machar and Biong Deng were in Juba on 21 January, and that neither planned to travel to Khartoum to discuss Abyei with their NCP counterparts. Biong Deng remarked to poloff that as far as he is concerned, "mechanisms for fund transfer are clear, and that there need be no discussion about it; only implementation" of what was agreed. ¶9. (SBU) Emboff asked Mayok whether the GNU's declining oil revenues (ref. D) contributed to its failure to fund the AIA. "Even if oil prices are down, why are others still getting their budgets and we are not?," Mayok replied, repeating that the funding delays reflect a political agenda. "If this is the issue, then it would have to be made clear that this is the case. Furthermore, cuts could not be applied selectively, but would have to be made proportionally," he said. ¶10. (SBU) The Administrator remarked that the AIA is only working at a policy level (not an implementation level) due to its lack of funds. "We cannot recruit staff because we haven't received a budget," he said. According to Mayok, the AIA currently is receiving administrative help from volunteers. Despite the overwhelming challenges, Mayok said that the AIA has not yet "given up." While rumors of administration officials saying they are going to resign continue in the media, Mayok said "it will be a personal decision for our members - whether they choose to stay or leave." Mayok said he had spoken with Administration members and asked them not to leave (and also not to make statements to the media about resigning even if they were thinking of doing so.) Mayok told staff that their resignations would demonstrate that the NCP had won. SITUATION ON THE GROUND - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) Mayok said that with the help of unpaid volunteers, the KHARTOUM 00000091 003 OF 004 AIA has created an IDP-returnee reception center. At first, the returnees were allowed to stay for one to two weeks at the center, but due to the AIA's lack of resources, returnees are now taken straight to their villages after arriving at the center. Mayok said that 800 IDP families returned to the Abyei area in December 2008. He added that another convoy of returnees was on its way to the area as of 20 January. He confirmed to emboffs that thousands of IDPs from the Abyei area still remain in Agok. ¶12. (SBU) Mayok told emboff that the AIA has managed to get the Abyei Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) relocated outside of Abyei town (ref E). Currently, only the Joint Integrated Police Unit (JIPU) remains in the town center. "I am not happy with the JIU; it has always been a source of insecurity for the area," Mayok asserted. He told emboffs that there is still tension between the JIU and JIPU following their violent December 12 clash (ref F). Arop described the SAF/SPLA forces within the JIU as "just mixed," rather than integrated. "You can clearly see the line of division in the force, and this is very dangerous," he continued. Proper integration is a process that requires joint training, he added. (Comment: UNMIS has provided joint training for the JIUs, but in reality it will be very difficult to fully merge SAF and SPLA forces. End comment.) SAF STILL IN DIFRA, SPLA STILL IN AGOK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (SBU) Mayok said that a small SPLA logistical unit remains in Agok, and some SAF troops were still in the oil-rich town of Difra. According to Mayok, the UN has asked SAF to redeploy out of Difra, and SAF Headquarters have ordered this unit to withdraw. On January 21, the UN head of Office for Abyei told econoff that the two sides had agreed in principle to a mutual withdrawal. 21 SAF soldiers had withdrawn from Difra on January 20. After initially claiming that the remaining ten soldiers would stay behind until stores could be removed, the SAF then said that they would remain until the SPLA had completely evacuated Agok. UN monitors planned to confirm the SPLA withdrawal, then press the SAF to follow suit. STATE MINSTER HAROUN PAINTS A DIFFERENT PICTURE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶14. (SBU) On 25 January, Assessment and Evaluation Committee (AEC) Chairman Ambassador Derek Plumbly told emboffs that GNU State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs Ahmed Haroun (also the NCP's chief negotiator on Abyei and an ICC indictee) offered him a rather upbeat assessment of the AIA funding issue during the week of 18 January. During Plumbly's meeting with the notorious janjaweed recruiter turned GNU official, Haroun claimed that the Ministry of Finance's delay in providing the AIA's budget was attributable to the length of time it had taken to agree the composition of the AIA and the lack of experience of those appointed when it came to drawing up budgets. According to Haroun, a work team was set up in Khartoum at the request of the Presidency to help Administrator Arop draw up budget bids. Minister Haroun told Plumbly that he expects final figures for the AIA budget to be available within the next two weeks. ¶15. (SBU) When Plumbly pressed Haroun harder on the budget delay, Haroun claimed that two million SDP and ten vehicles had already been allocated to the AIA on an emergency basis. Furthermore, the Presidency had instructed GNU ministries to draw upon their own funds to initiate projects in the Abyei area, he said. The State Minister provided the AEC Chairman with a list of proposed GNU actions on Abyei, which include provisions for the ministries to use Unity Fund resources to implement programs in Abyei, such as for the Ministry of the Interior to provide cars for the police. Haroun told Plumbly that "things are moving," and that the donor community would see action on some of these issues by 23 or 24 January. Plumbly told Haroun that these difficulties would have been mitigated if the money allocated to the Dinka and the Misseriya under the wealth sharing arrangement in the Abyei Road Map had been transferred to the AIA. Minister Haroun said that instructions had been issued for these monies to be paid to the interim administration, in the case of the Dinka 2 percent, and to a fund for the development of the Misseriya in Western Kordofan to be administered by the Governor of Southern Kordofan. (Comment: If the GNU intends for national ministries to receive Unity Fund resources in order to contribute to the rebuilding of Abyei, there is significantly less of a chance that Abyei will receive the full funding it was allotted. End comment.) ¶16. (SBU) Haroun's attitude on the Abyei funding issue contrasted starkly with GNU Minister of Foreign Affairs Deng Alor's analysis of the problem. Alor told Plumbly on 22 January that "there is no breakthrough" on the Abyei funding crisis and "the idea is to let you believe something is happening." OTHER POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS KHARTOUM 00000091 004 OF 004 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶17. (SBU) UN mapping of Southern Kordofan shows many other conflict points along the North-South border in addition to Abyei. In December 2008, USAIDoff and UN staff overlaid maps of contested border areas with maps of oil concessions and recent SAF and SPLA military buildups. Not surprisingly, all three line up very closely. In the west of Southern Kordofan state and along the southern border of Darfur, where oil concessions extend, there is a high concentration of SPLA and SAF soldiers on either side of the border. The volatile Higlig/Kharasana areas between Southern Kordofan state and Abyei Area present the same situation. The SAF and SPLA are also heavily deployed in the eastern section of southern Kordofan state, extending into Upper Nile state as far as the western corner of Blue Nile state. And, of course, JEM's interest in expanding its operations to the oil fields is well known. COMMENT - - - - ¶18. (SBU) Administrator Mayok was visibly less optimistic than in his meeting with the Charge on December 6. The GoS' continued failure to transfer the oil revenues promised in the Roadmap agreement prevents the AIA from functioning and threatens to damage its fragile credibility with the local population. The NCP is treating the Abyei Administration in the same shoddy manner it treats other bodies created through similar, nationally-brokered agreements, which it does not take seriously, leaving well-intentioned local leaders to be undermined slowly as they fail to deliver. That being said, GNU official Haroun claimed that progress is being made on the transfer of finances to the AIA and that GNU ministries are being instructed to contribute to the rebuilding of Abyei. While senior NCP officials within the GNU must be pressed to disburse the necessary funds, Mayok must also move forward with his work with the one million SDG (USD $500,000) that he has secured. This should at least allow for the payment of modest salaries to AIA officials. Rather than looking ahead to how he can use the money once it is received (in part or in full),he seems more caught up with the principle of receiving all that was promised instead of moving forward with what the Administration has already obtained. The SPLM also must engage more fully in pressing the NCP on the question of the two percent of Abyei oil wealth for the Ngok Dinka. If Salva Kiir does indeed want this money transferred to the AIA, he should state that publicly and press for its disbursement at a time when the NCP is "on its best behavior" as it seeks SPLM cover for a united front against the ICC. Meanwhile Mayok and his administration had better begin planning for projects on which to lavish hundreds of millions of SDG, in consultation with the Ngok Dinka chiefs. Post will continue to press GNU and NCP officials to release the funds, while encouraging the SPLM to press clearly and publicly on the two percent issue. Washington policy-makers must continue to raise Abyei in any substantive discussions with Khartoum as one of a long list of unfulfilled agreements by the NCP. End comment. FERNANDEZ