NCP UNHELPFUL ON ABYEI, SPLM RELUCTANT ON ELECTIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000903 DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E, DRL NSC FOR MGAVIN DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM EPET SOCI SU SUBJECT: NCP UNHELPFUL ON ABYEI, SPLM RELUCTANT ON ELECTIONS ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In separate meetings with visiting Deputy Chief of Mission Mark Asquino, USAID Mission Director William Hammink, and Washington-based staff; senior Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) officials expressed frustration with the National Congress Party's (NCP) response to the Abyei ruling and expressed pessimism about the prospects of elections taking place. GOSS officials expressed wariness of the NCP's offer of an electoral alliance, which lacks political appeal, but may be essential to securing Khartoum's cooperation on key issues, including the referendum. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - GOSS: ABYEI DECISION ACCEPTABLE, NCP REACTION UNHELPFUL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) Senior SPLM and GOSS officials expressed satisfaction with the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal's resolution of the Abyei area's borders, but noted deep disappointment and concern over the NCP's response to the ruling. GOSS President Salva Kiir Mayardit, speaking before a July 30 Martyrs' Day audience of ministers, soldiers, donors, and Juba citizens, reaffirmed his acceptance of the Abyei ruling and clarified that it protects Misseriya grazing rights and does not, in itself, effect Abyei's secession. He announced that he had invited Ngok and Misseriya leaders to Juba to discuss their misgivings about the ruling. ¶3. (SBU) Kiir noted, however, that "some people are trying to cause unnecessary problems." In a private meeting, Minister of Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng, described President Bashir's response to the ruling as pandering to the Misseriya and seeking a larger voting role for the tribe in the Abyei referendum than the Abyei Protocol prescribes. Biong Deng argued that Bashir's response had deeply damaged the prospects of the parties' cooperation on other issues, including in the trilateral talks with the U.S. Special Envoy. ¶4. (SBU) GOSS officials projected confidence in public and private that the North-South Boundary Commission will conclude that oil-rich Heglig and other disputed areas belong in the South. Biong Deng urged the U.S. to participate actively in the border-resolution process; however, and noted that he expects that some of the contested areas may require additional arbitration in The Hague. ¶5. (SBU) On the issue of Abyei-derived oil revenues, GOSS Ministry of Finance sources told ConGen Juba that they, their Government of National Unity (GNU) counterparts and Norwegian oil experts, are making estimates of how the South's share of future and previously remitted oil revenues will change in response to the Abyei ruling. This process of netting the parties' obligations to each other will be complex, and it is difficult to tell which side will be owed money when the analysis is complete. Minister of Regional Cooperation, Oyai Deng Ajak, doubted that the GNU's finances would allow it to pay any arrears owed to the South, should the balance be in GOSS's favor. (It would presumably be the same if the South owes arrears to the North.) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ELECTIONS LESS LIKELY, UNLESS ON NCP TERMS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) GOSS officials agreed that the NCP badly wants the boost of a national electoral victory, and they argued that this is driving its calculations on other key aspects of CPA implementation. Biong Deng argued that if the NCP were to have an election on terms that would protect its position, "everything else would be fine." He stated that the NCP's intransigence in negotiations on the referendum law is a tactic to secure SPLM's electoral cooperation, although SPLM Deputy Secretary General Anne Itto argued that the NCP was most interested in the negotiation of post-referendum arrangements. ¶7. (SBU) Biong Deng and Deng Ajak reported that the NCP has offered an electoral alliance to the SPLM. Deng Ajak argued that there was no political gain to be had from such a pact, which he said would do grave damage to the SPLM's image. Biong Deng argued that SPLM members who "would have been happy to help Bashir" may have changed their mind after the NCP's response to the Abyei ruling, which he said is pushing SPLM toward other parties. ¶8. (SBU) The national elections in particular pose problems for the SPLM. Deng Ajak stated that Kiir is not keen on standing for the national presidency, but that it was unclear how the party could nominate someone other than the party chairman for the highest office in Sudan. The minister stated that he expected Kiir to convene the SPLM's Political Bureau and National Liberation Council KHARTOUM 00000903 002 OF 002 to deliberate on the party's approach to elections, possibly as early as this month. ¶9. (SBU) Southern officials were openly ambivalent about the likelihood and desirability of elections, at least at the national level. In his Arabic remarks at Martyrs' Day, Kiir reportedly reassured the audience that the referendum would take place even if the elections do not. Itto noted that voters polled by SPLM were excited about the prospect of elections, but she and Deng Ajak each declared in private that the elections may not happen. All of the officials agreed that the critical obstacles to the elections are political, not logistical. Itto expressed doubt that restrictive laws would be sufficiently reformed to produce a free and fair election, and she and Biong Deng insisted that political agreement on how to use the census results would be a prerequisite for elections. ¶10. (SBU) The officials were uncertain what might be the impact of not holding elections, other than insisting that the referendum must not be affected. Deng Ajak argued that the parties would still be able to agree on many issues in the absence of elections. He conceded, though, that implementing some CPA provisions - including popular consultations with elected governments in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan - would be difficult. He noted that the party is discussing proposals for a more modest approach to elections, including holding elections only at the GOSS and southern state level. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - TRILATERAL TALKS AND OTHER FORUMS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) Deng Ajak reported that discussions between GNU Second Vice President, Ali Osman Taha, and GOSS Vice President, Riek Machar Teny, concerning post-referendum issues have been under way for some time. Deng Ajak expressed some impatience at not having received a report of what had been agreed between Taha and Machar, and he recommended that the process be coordinated with the U.S.-facilitated trilateral talks[U1]. Biong Deng reported that a recent two-day conference for SPLM leaders hosted by Chatham House on post-referendum issues had also been helpful. He called for active U.S. involvement in these issues as well. ¶12. COMMENT. The SPLM leadership is flirting with decisions that could have longer-term negative impact upon timely CPA implementation. Both sides have agreed to respect the January 1, 1956 border line outside of Abyei, and it is unlikely that the NCP will be flexible on Heglig or other disputed areas if they lie north of this line. Arbitration would be time consuming to the point of threatening the implementation process, which has only 17 months to go. In a similar vein, SPLM "cherry picking" of CPA milestones that it wants - the referendum - while pulling back from those it does not favor - elections - is not likely to sit well with the NCP. END COMMENT. WHITEHEAD [U1]Mark, I didn't have this in my notes verbatim but recalled Oyai indicating it. I wanted to cross-check with your recall.