UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE, JANUARY 2009

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000089 DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, IO ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE, JANUARY 2009 REFS: A) 08 KHARTOUM 1810 B) 08 KHARTOUM 1726 C) 08 KHARTOUM 1694 D) 08 KHARTOUM 1670 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The big news in UNAMID deployment for January 2009 was the successful movement, with strong Embassy support especially from the Defense Liaison Office (DLO),of Rwandan troops and equipment by the U.S. Air Force. The movements went flawlessly with full cooperation by the GoS and UNAMID. Several weeks earlier, UNAMID successfully met its 31 December objective of 60 percent deployment, but is unlikely to me%t its March 31 oal of 0"Percent detloymeoD.!0Fov#tje bIvst,4amE,syjm"5NB}KD/u@mnsg0dnb f%0z}]QIb(&\cbs/z#mkRQ"1;oDlp|i(p(Qn,Gx})zQ}nY+ O>rqhe1Q`Ogk,F"-:C]iQQkx,.dfadd additional troops before the next rainy season. However, with 60 percent troops and Ethiopian helicopters due to arrive within several months, UNAMID should focus on fulfilling its mandate and actually improving security in the region, not just deployment for its own sake. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) On January 6-12 Poloff spoke with senior UNAMID officers and staff. These included: General Martin Luther Agwai, UNAMID Force Commander; Colonel Noddy Stafford, Chief of Military Plans UNAMID; Lt Col Andrew Moeti, Staff Officer for Operational Plans; Ian Divers, UNAMID Logistics Officer; Col. Hussein Al Hasan, Formed Police Unit (FPU) UNAMID Coordination Officer; Col Shweta Ayman, FPU Coordinator Sector South; Superintendent Kamal Singh Bam, Commander of the Nepalese FPU; David Gatwick, UNAMID Contingent Owned Equipment Unit; Stephen NSubunga Chief, Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC); and Tony Mundell, JLOC Supervisor. They informed Poloff that on December 31 UNAMID's force strength was 12,374 troops or just over 62 percent of its total mandated force strength. The breakdown of personnel on that date was 373 staff officers, 175 military observers, 72 military liaison officers and 11,754 military personnel from TCCs. However, UNAMID will not reach 80 percent prior to March 30 due to the fact that several of the battalions scheduled for deployment in 2009 are not prepared to deploy (UNAMID does not have the load lists and shipment of contingent-owned equipment has not yet begun.) During 2009, the following battalions are confirmed for deployment: Egyptian Battalion 2, Ethiopian Battalion 2, a Thai Battalion and a battalion from Burkina Faso. ¶3. (SBU) UNAMID has scheduled the following movements for the next three months: January: The Senegalese Infantry Battalion will rotate from Um Barru with 650 personnel departing and 800 arriving. Load lists have been delivered to DPKO and COE is anticipated to arrive around March 15. The Egyptian Infantry Battalion 2 is anticipated to deploy a 200-person advanced party to Ed Al Fursan in Sector North. February: The South African battalion is expected to bring in an additional 175 troops. However, COE load lists have not yet been provided to DPKO. March: The Bangladeshi Sector Reserve Unit plans to deploy 150 troops to Nyala on March 31. ¶4. (SBU) These additions will only raise the number of troops to 13,249, or approximately 68 percent of UNAMID's authorized force strength. Stafford offered some options to meet the 80 percent target: 1) Deploy three more battalions without COE and place them in the super camp, or 2) Deploy advance parties of 200 troops each from three or four battalions and place them in the super camps without COE. However, Stafford acknowledged that there is simply no realistic way for UNAMID to meet the 80 percent target by the end of March. The main problem is that there are not enough troops ready to deploy in the pipeline. (Comment: Several TCCs delayed deployment last year while UNAMID went through its growing pains, and now must be reconfirmed for deployment this year. There is a risk that they will not be ready to deploy before the rainy season, which means UNAMID may not reach 80 percent or greater deployment until the end of 2009. Under such a scenario, and with Ethiopian helicopters expected to arrive within several months, UNAMID should focus on improving its operational capacity and effectiveness using the assets currently at its disposal, while it continues to push ahead with deployment. End comment.) KHARTOUM 00000089 002 OF 003 Equipment Needs -------------- ¶5. (SBU) UNAMID Force Commander General Agwai voiced familiar concerns over the lack of Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and inadequate facilities. A status slide shown during the Force Commander's briefing revealed that less than half the current Canadian APCs are serviceable. New APCs coming from Russia and China have been delayed for reasons that are unclear (apparently due in part to delays in shipping them from their country of origin and further transportation delays) but should be arriving in the coming months. The contract for Canadian-provided maintenance expired in December, but the Canadians have agreed to continue their support until the new APCs arrive. Contingency Plans -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Agwai said that while the withdrawal of UNAMID is not anticipated, contingency planning remains a priority in expectation of an ICC arrest warrant for Sudan's president. Under an evacuation scenario, the plan is to consolidate troops from field sites to sector and battalion headquarters and from there to the super camps in El Fasher, Nyala, and El Geniena. The final step is to evacuate to Entebbe, Uganda, though some units in West Darfur may evacuate to Chad if necessary. Trip wires for activating the contingency plan are being developed by UNDSS in conjunction with DPKO and have yet to be finalized. As troops are withdrawn from field sites, those sites are abandoned and would not be re-occupied. IDPs Concerned That UNAMID Might Withdraw -------------- ¶7. (SBU) IDPs are concerned that UNAMID may depart and leave them defenseless. Poloff visited Abu Shouk IDP camp outside of El Fasher and spoke with community leaders Hussein Sajo and Ahmed Abu Al Basher. Sajo explained that IDPs of Abu Shouk are increasingly worried about the potential consequences if President Bashir is indicted by the ICC. He is also concerned about SAF military exercises apparently being carried out in preparation for the ICC announcement. (Note: On January 1, Sudanese Independence Day, the Western Area Military Command Headquarters in El Fasher staged a military parade exhibiting weaponry including heavy artillery and air assets. End Note.) Sajo is concerned UNAMID will not be able to protect them from GoS-supported militias, so they are maintaining contact with rebel leaders from the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdel Wahid faction (SLA/AW) to intervene if they are targeted. SLA/AW has a "base" 50 km west of El Fasher (though SLA/AW has very few operational vehicles.) Abu Al Basher said that IDPs are aware of the UNAMID evacuation plans and voiced disappointment that UNAMID would consider "leaving us in a helpless situation." Abdul Basher added, "UNAMID was established to protect us, not to escape when the real time for protection comes." FPU Issues -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Poloff met with Colonel Al Hasan, the new UNAMID FPU Coordinator, recently-arrived from Jordan, where he was in charge of security for the diplomatic corps in Amman. He declared that UNAMID is "fully committed" to the goal of accommodating the mandated 19 FPUs in Darfur this year to provide protection for the IDP camps and UNAMID installations. Current staffing stands at 700 officers from 4 FPUs from Nigeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Nepal. Al Hasan anticipates that two FPUS from Egypt and one from Jordan will arrive before June, 2009. The goal is to have seven FPUs by June 2009. (Comment: The goal of reaching 19 FPUs by the end of 2009 is probably unrealistic, as UNAMID has yet to line up solid commitments for the remaining 12 FPUs, though they exist on paper. The cost of equipping and deploying an FPU is prohibitive, and FPU-contributing countries will likely need encouragement and assistance. End comment.) ¶9. (SBU) Al Hasan plans to focus on training for incoming personnel, including scenario-based training focusing on checkpoint control, patrolling methods in camps, and IDP escorts. He also plans to implement monthly workshops for FPU commanders to share best practices. COE Movement Status in Detail -------------- ¶10. (SBU) UNAMID has made good progress in recent months moving COE into Darfur from both El Obeid and from Port Sudan. UNAMID's order of priority for moving COE is: 1) Nigerian Level 2 Hospital, 2) Ethiopian Infantry APCs, 3) Ethiopian COE, 4) Nigerian FPU COE. UNAMID expects to complete these four priorities by early February. ¶11. (SBU) The Chinese Engineers have moved almost all of their 256 COE units to their final destination in Nyala with only two KHARTOUM 00000089 003 OF 003 containers left in El Obeid. ¶12. (SBU) The Egyptian Engineers are moving 42 pieces of equipment to El Fasher. Three trucks will move the remaining equipment by convoy which is estimated to arrive in Nyala on January 18. ¶13. (SBU) The Egyptian Battalion 1 Advanced Party is moving 41 containers and two vehicles to Um Kadada. Twenty-nine containers and two vehicles have already arrived in Um Kadada. A convoy has been scheduled consisting of 20-30 trucks to move the rest of the equipment. Estimated completion date for material movement is January 20. ¶14. (SBU) The Egyptian Battalion 1 "Main Body" has received almost all of its 385 pieces of equipment in Um Kadada. ¶15. (SBU) The Egyptian Transport Company has received all of its 183 containers and 258 vehicles in Nyala. Only a 35-ton forklift is in Port Sudan. UNAMID is collaborating with DPKO to determine if the forklift can be used at the port and Egypt can send two smaller fork lifts for Nyala and Um Kadada. ¶16. (SBU) The Ethiopian Infantry Battalion is split between operations in El Geneina and Kulbus. All containers and 258 vehicles have been sent to El Geneina. Ninety-eight additional vehicles including 17 APCs are in transit by the Sudanese Railroads to Nyala where they will require a military/UN escort to El Geneina. Thirty-seven containers and five vehicles were delivered to Kulbus. Seven containers remain in transit to Kulbus. (Note: The Ethiopian Battalion at Kulbus has gone for almost four months without electricity as generator parts are still in-bound. This delay was caused when the Ethiopians combined the COE for four separate units, which then had to be sorted out in El Obeid. End Note.) ¶17. (SBU) The Pakistani Engineer Company is slowly receiving its 356 pieces of equipment with 142 pieces of equipment having already been delivered to El Geneina. Thirty-five containers are in transit and the rest of the equipment still in El Obeid. Sixteen containers arrived with Level III hospital equipment. ¶18. (SBU) The Bangladeshi Multi-Role Logistics Unit has received almost all of its 413 pieces of equipment in Nyala. ¶19. (SBU) The Nigerian Level II Hospital has received over half of its 65 pieces of equipment in El Geneina. Currently no equipment is in transit. Five containers including 12 water tanks and three communications towers are in El Obeid and are anticipated to be received in Nyala in mid-January. ¶20. (SBU) The Senegalese COE is still in El Obeid and is being loaded onto trucks for Um Barru in North Darfur. The Senegalese will then move it to Tine. FPU Movement Status in Detail -------------- ¶21. (SBU) Indonesian FPU: Of the 191 pieces of equipment scheduled for delivery to El Fasher, almost all have been received. ¶22. (SBU) Nigerian FPUs 1 and 2: The equipment contract is being handled by the Mercur Company and almost all of its COE has arrived in Zalingei and El Geneina except for seven trucks that await escort. Comment: -------------- ¶23. (SBU) With the December 31 goal of 60 percent deployment now behind it, UNAMID needs to re-prioritize its goals. The first goal should be to seek to fulfill its mandate with the assets currently deployed and actually improve security for vulnerable populations. The second goal should be to quickly prepare for remaining deployments including the long-delayed Ethiopian helicopter company. Third, UNAMID and DPKO must aggressively demand load lists and begin shipments now for incoming battalions and units, otherwise significant additional deployment will not occur until late 2009 after the rainy season. UNAMID has a long way to go before it becomes fully operational. However, an invigorated focus on verification and monitoring as part of a ceasefire plan, along with enhanced protection of IDPs with the arrival of additional FPUs, should allow UNAMID to make a greater contribution to providing security and protection to the people of Darfur if the peacekeeping operation can demonstrate the initiative and leadership needed to do so. End comment. FERNANDEZ