SPECIAL ENVOY DISCUSSES BILATERAL ISSUES WITH NCP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000861

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SE GRATIQ, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E
NSC FOR MGAVIN
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY DISCUSSES BILATERAL ISSUES WITH NCP

KHARTOUM 00000861 001.4 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Robert Whitehead, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (c)


1. (C) Summary: At the request of the National Congress
Party (NCP),Special Envoy Scott Gration met with select
members of the NCP trilateral negotiating team for 90 minutes
on July 19 to discuss bilateral issues. The substance of
issues raised by the NCP was all too familiar, although the
tone of the meeting was positive. Dr. Ghazi Salah al Deen,
titular head of the NCP delegation, objected to USG
references to genocide in Darfur, rejected what he called
&personalized8 attacks on President al Bashir, asked if the
USG was supporting military procurement in the South, and
once again called for a review of the various US sanctions
regimes targeted at Sudan. On a positive note, he admitted
Sudan,s mistakes in its 2003-2005 Darfur policy, and said
that the NCP wanted to meet with its detractors in Washington
as well as its friends. SE Gration replied to each point.
He urged the NCP to take the policy decisions required to
guarantee the stability of Sudan on the ground, and thus
permit the turning of a new page in GOS/USG relations. End
Summary.

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Singing the Same Old Song
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2. (SBU) Dr. Ghazi thanked SE Gration for hosting the June
2009 Forum of Supporters Q the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
in Washington, as well as arranging side meetings for the NCP
delegation, which he said would have been unthinkable six
months earlier. Ghazi said that the NCP/Government of Sudan
(GOS) hoped to build on this foundation, possibly in the
context of thQUNGA meetings this fall. He and his
colleagues realized the need to make friends and reduce
enemies in Washington and were open to all parties, including
those traditionally most hostile toward the NCP-dominated
Government of National Unity (GNU).


3. (C) Dr. Ghazi continued that given the positive tone of
the Washington visit, the NCP had been surprised by President
Obama,s reference to Darfur and genocide in the Accra speech
on Africa. The NCP objected to such terminology because, in
their view, it is not true. The NCP was willing, he added,
to accept blame if it was responsible for admitted policy
mistakes in Darfur in 2003-4, but these actions did not meet
the standard for genocide. No country other than the US had
used this term, a UN mission dispatched to Sudan did not find
grounds for a declaration of genocide, and even the
International Criminal Court had stepped back from
prosecuting Sudanese officials on these grounds. Ghazi said
that the NCP/GOS perceived the use of genocide terminology as
a direct, personalized attack on al Bashir, and &if we
weaken Bashir, we weaken ourselves.8 He expressed his hope
that that the reference to genocide would not be repeated.

4. (SBU) Ghazi said that to improve ties with Washington, the
NCP knew that it needed to approach the US Congress and work
through the U.S. business community. He noted that sanctions
made this difficult. The GOS could obtain licenses to
purchase US agricultural commodities, for example, but was
not able to buy agricultural equipment or spareQarts.
Despite long and deep ties between Sudanese and US academic
institutions, sister university programs remained off
limits. Sudan needed to hire lobbyists to explain its
positions, he said, but this too had been thwarted by
sanctions.

5. (C) He noted that Sudan had welcomed a July 2009 US trade
delegation to the South, but had been disappointed to learn
that two well-known producers of advanced military systems
had participated. The NCP was aware that the Government of
Southern Sudan (GoSS) was actively seeking to purchase
advanced anti-aircraft and other weapons systems, a bad omen
for successful partnership between the SPLM and NCP in the
GNU. The final and most crucial test of USG willingness to
deal fairly with Sudan would be Sudanese removal from the
U.S. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism. MFA Undersecretary
Mutriff Sidiq chimed in on the question of frozen assets. A
medical doctor/businessman complained about restrictions on
travel to the US by medical researchers, as well as the
blockage of spare parts for MRIs and other advanced medical
equipment, which he claimed had created a crisis in the
health sector.
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But with a Happier Tune
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KHARTOUM 00000861 002.5 OF 002




6. (SBU) Dr. Ghazi said that despite the remaining problems
in the bilateral relationship, Sudan was encouraged by
continued dialogue. The more the two sides talked, the more
the NCP perceived that there was no hidden agenda on the
American side. Due to this, the NCP/GOS was ready to reach
out and seek meetings with its greatest detractors in
Washington, including those in Congress. The GNU was
prepared to invite "Save Darfur" officials and others to
visit Darfur and see first hand the realities on the ground.


7. (C) SE Gration repliedto the NCP on each point. As far
as genocide terminology was concerned, he said the past could
not be changed. Legal experts had determined this term had
been applicable earlier in the Darfur conflict, and this was
a reality, as the US puts together a new strategy on Darfur.
He said that at this time, the essential point is to move
beyond the past. Sudan should create conditions on the
ground that would convince everyone that genocide in Darfur
was a thing of the past and no longer a salient issue. The
GOS could help achieve this by encouraging the unity of rebel
groups in Darfur, engaging them in Doha, and resolving the
proxy conflict with Chad. On the ground in Darfur, the GOS
could remove all obstacles to the full and effective delivery
of humanitarian assistance. It should move toward recovery
by creating security conditions that would encourage the
voluntary return of IDPs to their places of origin. The GOS
especially needed to redouble its efforts to achieve a
rapprochement with Chad that would take all proxy rebels
forces on both sides out of the field.

8. (C) SE Gration continued that in addition to moving ahead
on Darfur, the NCP needed to implement the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) with the South. Over the past 100 days
the trilateral consultations had helped break a number of
CPA-implementation logjams, but the final test would be
actions rather than words. As far as sanctions were
concerned, the Special Envoy said that the U.S. was
examining the various regimes to see where it might make
sense to unwind certain provisions. SE Gration noted that it
was essential that the NCP realized, however, that the
imposition of sanctions had taken place over a long period.
He cautioned that it was unrealistic to expect that it would
not take time to unwind even those sanctions that might no
longer apply.

9. (C) SE Gration referred briefly to Ghazi's allegation of
USG support for rearmament of the South, noting that the two
US companies in the Juba trade delegation had been seeking
respectively the sale of a computer system and contracts for
construction projects, not arms sales. Language in the
Congressional Foreign Assistance legislation prevented the
USG from providing lethal weaponry to any party in Sudan, and
the USG was neither privy to nor engaged in other outside
sales to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS),including
that of tanks. The SE observed that it was his view that the
GoSS could best use the bulk of its resources for development
and the betterment of the population in the South. A legal
expert on the SE,s team addressed misperceptions on the NCP
aside about the Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC)
licensing requirements, especially as they pertained to
obtaining legal counsel in the US or purchasing parts for
medical equipment.

10. (C) Comment: The NCP remains stuck in a Mobious loop as
far as sanctions and genocide terminology are concerned, and
some of its members continue to harbor suspicions that
regime-change in Khartoum is the USG,s ultimate goal.
However, the NCP would like to put its Darfur and Southern
problems behind it. NCP insiders wish to see Sudan, at some
point, rejoin the community of nations as a full-fledged
member. They see the USG as the key to breaking the cycle in
which they have been turning, and the positive tone of their
interaction with the SE reflects this desire.

11. (U) This cable was cleared by SE Gration.
WHITEHEAD