UNAMID DISCUSSES CEASEFIRE PLANS AND SOUTH DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000085 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, IO, AF/SPG, AND AF/C ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019 TAGS: ASEC KPKO PGOV PHUM PREL UN AU SU SUBJECT: UNAMID DISCUSSES CEASEFIRE PLANS AND SOUTH DARFUR FIGHTING REF: A. KHARTOUM 83 ¶B. KHARTOUM 75 ¶C. KHARTOUM 13 KHARTOUM 00000085 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 22, Rodolphe Adada, the Joint Special Representative (JSR) of the United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID,) told CDA Fernandez that UNAMID continues to draft its ceasefire plans. Adada stated that UNAMID's plan will be flexible and applicable in both the near and long term, will accommodate the USG's proposed Darfur Monitoring Team (DMT),and will not require a formal ceasefire but only an "oral agreement" between the rebels and the GoS. Adada also discussed UNAMID deployment (including its need for helicopters) and the recent fighting in South Darfur between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi (SLM/MM.) END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) CDA Fernandez, PolChief and Poloff met with JSR Adada, UNAMID's Political Affairs Chief Abdul Muhammad, and UNAMID Spokesman Noureddine Mezni in Adada's home in Khartoum on January 22. Adada had just returned on January 20 from a visit to Paris. UNAMID'S PLANS FOR A CEASEFIRE MECHANISM - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Adada stated that UNAMID continues to revise its plans for a ceasefire mechanism, and promised to send an electronic copy of UNAMID's latest draft to Embassy Khartoum. (Note: When received, Post will forward this document to AF/SPG and USUN. End Note.) Abdul Muhammad then quickly jumped in and said that the USG's proposed Darfur Monitoring Team can be accommodated into UNAMID's plan. "There is room for your plan and we hope that our proposal will be comprehensive enough to have immediate and long term utility," stated Muhammad. According to Muhammad, the USG's proposed DMT will play the "critical role of boosting UNAMID's capacity." He added that UNAMID's plan will not initially require a formal ceasefire agreement between the rebels and the Sudanese Government. "If all of the parties agreed to the general idea and said so in public statements to the media, that would be enough to start the ceasefire mechanism," stated Muhammad Mohammad said this informal agreement is particularly important, as it would be "miraculous" if Bassole brokered a formal or comprehensive ceasefire in the next few weeks. Muhammad noted that he believes both JEM and SLA/Abdul Wahid will be amenable to such an informal arrangement, but that SLA/Unity will require more convincing. JEM, of course, still wants to be the sole counterpart to the GOS in peace talks. Adada stated that the GOS is also committed to the idea of a ceasefire, and that Intelligence Chief Salah Al-Gosh even told Adada in a recent meeting that JEM "can stay where they are as long as they stay in Darfur and there is a ceasefire - that way they will be under our control." CDA Fernandez responded that Minni Minnawi will not accept JEM's presence in his areas in South Darfur and that he will demand a return to the status quo ante before agreeing to any ceasefire (though Mannawi's views will likely not be taken into account, since he is technically part of the GNU and he is now greatly weakened by the latest fighting in South Darfur). CEASEFIRE MUST INCLUDE NON-MILITARY SUPPORT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) CDA Fernandez stated that we strongly supports UNAMID's work on the ceasefire mechanism, but that UNAMID will need to carefully address the issue of non-military logistical support. He added that the past Ceasefire Commission broke down over this issue, that without this form of support rebels will resort to banditry to sustain their movements, and that legal restrictions on possible donors such as the US and EU on supporting armed movements complicates this issue, "this is not DDR since they would still be armed". He cautioned that these key mechanics of an effective mechanism need early and full international buy-in. Abdul Muhammad agreed and said that rebel movements (especially local commanders in the field) need to be recognized as bringing a peace dividend to their fighters, and that the Darfur Peace Agreement provides a relatively good model for a ceasefire mechanism and one form of non-military logistical support. JSR Adada claimed that UNDPKO is "on board" with most of UNAMID's plan but that it does not understand the need for non-military logistical KHARTOUM 00000085 002.5 OF 003 support and that "The UN will not pay For thas, so we will r%ally need support from the donor countries for this." HeQ said that UNAMID will likely call a meeting in the near future with the P3 or P5 to discuss their ceasefire plans. CDA encouraged UNAMID to specifically detail how it wants to deal with non-military logistical support. UNAMID AIR ASSETS QND RELATIONSHIP WITQ GOS - - - - - - - - - - - - -ed a`out the latest developmajts in UNAMID's much-needed combat and transport helicopters. JSR Adada blithely dismissed any concerns aNd stated that constru#tion for the helicopter pads and allocation of land for helicopters "should not be a problem" and that UNAMID had already finished construction on one helicopter skirt in its supercamp iN El-Fasher. With respect to the donation of the actual helicopters,Adada staded that "this is a military matter" and that "if the Friends of ENAMID want to speed this up they should challenge the Government by making another offer that the GOS will not be able to refuse. If we can't fet helicopters from the AU, then it will have to come from outside of Africa." The GOS has never been presented with such a choice of accepting or rejecting Western helicopters. Adada said that overall the GOS has been "very cooperative, we have no complaints now" and that the January 19 Tripartite Committee is one example of the improve` coordination between the UN, AU, and GOS. (COMMENT: Overall, Adada and Abdul Muhammad did not appear well informed about the st`tus of Ethiopian helicopters and deflected the CDA's question. This is particularly unfortunate given the intelligence and operational gaps created by the absence of these helicopters. END COMMENT.) FIGHTING IN SOUTH DARFUR - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) JSR Adada said that the becent fighting between JEM and SLM/MM is "very concerning." According to Adada, the GOS told hii that it offered military support to Minnawi, however Minnawi rejected this offer and Minnawi's stronghold of Muhajarriya subsequently fell to the JEM attack. According to Adada, JEM likely has many goals in attacking Minnawi'sQ positions in South Darfur. First, JEM has publicly deblared that it intends to attack Kordofan and the Government's oil fields. Establishing a position in South Darfur close to these areas will allow both access and a staging ground for these attacks. Second, JEM, while rich in vehicles and material resources, lacks fighters and the incursion into SLM/MM areas was likely part of recruitment campaign. Adada sTated that UNAMID learned that most of JEM's vehicles were "essen4ially empty" with only four or five fighters per vehicle, and were ready to be filled by newly recreited fighters. (Note: A fully loaded, combat ready landcruiser can acckmmodate at least ten fighters. Adada did not say whether UNAMID acquired this information through direct observation, indirect sources, or the GOS. End Note.) SLM/MM's areas present an attractive field for recruitment fgr JEI, stated Adada, given their shared Zaghawa ethnicity, JEM commanders' recent defectaon &rom SLM/MM, and JEM's overall historic ties to Minnawi's troops and areas. Adada Stat%d that JEM is also approachijg and trying to recruit ?~Qvr dvJgR(.0exuosuo40t}0 5aq"m%Y`3$6`c@GnvukQ~u/$uQe`EhU(LU!|m|Nw`#iQl OV&Qx*wQiZfDlQ+@e&wQ}{KNE[cqQQ{auwJqV[o RQc@I{QOd for fighters, Adada read a UN report (from Chad) citing a JEM kidnapping of child in a refugee camp in Eastern Chad. He noted that while JEM's foot soldiers may be Masalit or Meidob, all the commanders remain Zaghawa. ¶Q. (C) A third JEM objective, according to Adada, is to acquire territory prior to negotiations and present itself asQ the only major movement in Darfur (similar to the SPLM in the South). (Note: JEM previously only had territory ij Jebel Moon in West Darfur along the Chadian border, and many rival rebel leaders and GOS odficials often discounted JEM, calling it a Chadian movement. This has changed since JEM's attack on Omdurman ij May of 2008. End Note.) Fourth, Adada and Abdul Muhammad asserted that JEM seeks to be the "top dog" in Darfur and that SLM/MM presented an "easy target" as Minnawi is still a part of the government and considered "a traitor" to many rebel movements. Adada summed up his analysis, stating that JEM's actions are both ruthless and rational and have the potentaal to create an even more chaotic and violent KHARTOUM 00000085 003.4 OF 003 region, involving rebels, janjaweed and the regime's regular forces in confused fighting featuring shifting, interim alliances. He noted that senior GOS officials recently admitted to him that the rebel groups (principally JEM and SLA/Unity) "are better and more maneuverable on the ground" than SAF in Darfur and that only airpower enables the regime to equalize the balance of power in the region. COMMENT - - - - ¶8. (C) The power dynamic within UNAMID's senior leadership was fascinating to observe on January 22. Abdul Muhammad spoke as much (if not more) than Adada, guided the meeting's agenda, and directly asked whether the USG supports UNAMID's plans. However, Abdul Muhammad's personal conflict with Chief Mediator Bassole and the JMST, and his failure to be entirely forthcoming with Embassy leadership, make him a personality not to be trusted. Case in point was the apparent presentation of UNAMID's plan as "close to final" when in fact we have heard from USUN that DPKO rejected UNAMID's initial ceasefire plan because it re-created the problematic Ceasefire Commission that fell apart due to non-payment of subsistence allowances. Nonetheless, in order for UNAMID's ceasefire plans to succeed, UNAMID, UN headquarters, and the donor committee must come to agreement on the important and difficult issue of non-military logistical support sooner rather than later. While donors and the UN will likely avoid the issue of non-military support to the rebels, due to legal constraints, there is little doubt that providing such assistance will be critical to ensuring a successful security mechanism and eventual ceasefire. Rebel groups are not going to allow themselves to wither on the vine as happened to SLM-Minnawi. UNAMID's view of JEM rings true as the predatory and ruthless Khalil Ibrahim-led movement seeks to capitalize on international developments and its May 2008 raid on Omdurman to destroy or absorb other rebel groups and present itself as the logical counterpart to GNU negotiators. It is unclear whether JEM's ambition and strategic vision is matched by their actual ability on the ground to implement it. FERNANDEZ