PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SAYS NEW MILITARY ACTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000083

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SAYS NEW MILITARY ACTION
AGAINST JEM WILL OCCUR IN COMING WEEKS

REF: KHARTOUM 0075

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a January 22 meeting with CDA Fernandez,
influential Presidential Advisor Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail
acknowledged a tactical mistake on the part of the SAF for
failing to intervene quickly against JEM in recent clashes
with the forces of Minni Minnawi (reftel). He admitted that
the SAF's inaction gave the appearance of weakness or even
collusion with JEM, but asserted that it would rectify the
situation by launching strikes against JEM in the coming
weeks. With regard to Minni Minnawi, Ismail told CDA that it
was "painfully obvious" from his January meetings in
Washington that the USG has decided to abandon Minnawi and
the DPA, citing former SE Williamson's dismissal of Minnawi
during meetings in Washington and enthusiastic declaration
that JEM is "the real force" in Darfur. Ismail also asserted
that the announcement of the ICC indictment against President
Bashir in July had derailed regime plans to deal with Ahmed
Haroun and Ali Koshayb, as well as other strategic steps
designed to bring Sudan closer to the West. "All of that fell
apart with the indictment, because it would be seen as
betraying the President," he said. End Summary.


2. (C) On January 22, CDA Fernandez met with Presidential
Advisor Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail at his offices in Khartoum.
Ismail claimed to CDA that in the lead up to JEM's incursion
into Muhajiriya, Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Hussein
approached former rebel leader Minnawi with an offer to come
to his direct aid militarily. Minnawi allegedly refused, and
consequently the SAF did not intervene. Ismail admitted that
this was a fateful mistake on the part of the SAF. "We ended
up with Khalil controlling a new area... And he's our enemy,
while Minni is not." Ismail further acknowledged that the
SAF's passivity made it look weak and also gave the mistaken
appearance of collusion with JEM. But he promised that this
would soon be rectified. "(The SAF) is currently planning
military action against JEM" in the coming weeks, he said.
"Though unfortunately, this will be difficult to do without
affecting civilian populations as JEM always uses them as
cover." CDA responded that any mass dislocation of civilians
from Muhajiriya caused by regime action will certainly be
condemned by the US, especially since "you've done this
before" (note: in October 2007, SAF used the Darfur rebel
attack on the nearby AMIS base in Haskanita to attack and
partially destroy Muhajiriyya, assaulting both their peace
partner Minnawi and SLA/Unity units in the area. End note).
CDA urged that the SAF show restraint with vulnerable
civilian populations, be transparent in its actions and take
all possible steps to ensure minimum effect on civilians, "if
you don't explain what you are doing, others will do so for
you".


3. (C) In discussing the difficult position in which Minni
Minnawi has found himself, Ismail recounted to CDA his
January 2009 trip to Washington to accompany FVP Salva Kiir
for meeting with USG officials. "It was painfully obvious
there that the U.S. has decided to drop Minni Minnawi (and
the DPA)," he said, noting that SE Williamson was dismissive
of Minnawi and hailed Khalil Ibrahim's JEM as "the real force
in Darfur." Ismail told CDA that he relayed this information
to Minnawi upon his return. "I warned Minni. I told him 'Your
American friends have betrayed you,'" he said. Ismail
sarcastically added that JEM's Washington visit to meet
senior Bush Administration officials was highly ironic in
that "they had just massacred several hundred people in Umm
Jaras, Chad, two days before," referring to JEM's violent
repression of Meidob African tribesmen on January that has
ignited a blood feud between them and the Zaghawa-dominated
JEM.


4. (C) Ismail also told CDA Fernandez that prior to the
announcement of the ICC indictment against President Bashir,
the NCP had been engaged in planning a series of strategic
steps designed to bring Sudan closer to the West, beginning
with the handover of Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kushayb to the ICC.
Other steps being discussed were having someone else run for
President other than Bashir in 2009, or having him retire
after one more year (in 2010). These steps all fell apart, he
said, when the arrest announcement was issued in July 2008.
There was no way the NCP could follow through with those
steps without being seen as betraying the President, he said,
and consequently, they all fell through. "Those of us who

KHARTOUM 00000083 002 OF 002


want to really close the gap politically with the West are at
a low ebb."


5. (C) Ismail said that the NCP has decided to continue, as
much as possible, with business as usual on CPA
implementation and on Darfur. "We will not trifle with the UN
as long as they obey their current mandate." He noted the
excellent cooperation now taking place between UNAMID and the
GOS but he warned that Darfur has now become all but
intractable. "We can't do the other things you want, like
compensation and development, without a peace deal and all
the rebels are holding out for a better deal." He noted that
tribalism has returned with a vengeance in Darfur and the
regime cannot move against heavily-armed Arab tribes, even
though it would prefer to disarm them. CDA Fernandez agreed
that GOS-UNAMID cooperation is much improved "but it took you
over a year to decide to do so, and no one is going to give
you much credit for that now." He wryly noted that "surely
those who armed these Darfur Arab tribes in the first place
knew what they were doing."


6. (C) Mustafa said that he intends to intensify NCP outreach
with the Democrats in February. He was able to meet with
figures such as Congressman Donald Payne and John Prendergast
and wants to continue this dialogue. CDA welcomed dialogue
but noted that there is no substitute for action, especially
before the ICC, and there is much Sudan could be "doing,
rather than saying" in Darfur, and on CPA implementation.
For example, the adversarial relationship with INGOs and with
IDP camps continues, although it has been worse in the very
recent past. "By the way, whatever happened to the
perpetrators of the (August 25, 2008) Kalma IDP camp
massacre? Ismail noted that all these issues are solvable if
there is trust between the US and Sudan, "if we have
confidence in your intentions, we can work on all these
things."


7. (C) Comment: It remains unclear whether the GOS was
complicit in JEM's attack on Minnawi's forces, but it is
benefiting from the fighting and the carnage in Muhajiriya
provides it with a perfectly defensible public justification
to launch fresh attacks against JEM which could create
thousands of new IDPs in the near future. With JEM reportedly
holed up around the town of Muhajiriya, any aerial
bombardment or other attack will most almost assuredly have
civilian casualties. With Minnawi's forces weakened (on the
verge of collapse, according to some accounts) and JEM
perhaps soon to be on the run, the GOS has somehow in the
short run come out on top, whether by Machiavellian design,
sheer luck or some combination of both. The smooth-talking
Mustafa always argues persuasively but the regime really
hasn't altered its way of operating much. It pragmatically
does improve cooperation or raise new obstacles, as
circumstances dictate, and right now it is in "full
cooperation mode" with UNAMID but it has not substantively
changed its policies and remains ready to negotiate with
anyone, rebels or Americans, or delay, deceive and lash out
ruthlessly against vulnerable populations - whatever best
suits its core goal of remaining in power in Sudan. End
comment.
FERNANDEZ