SRSG QAZI WARNS UNMIS UNABLE TO QUELL A MAJOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000819

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E
NSC FOR MGAVIN
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC KPKO UNSC AU SU
SUBJECT: SRSG QAZI WARNS UNMIS UNABLE TO QUELL A MAJOR
OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE IN ABYEI

Classified By: CDA Robert E. Whitehead, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. UNMIS will be able to quell localized
incidents of unrest in Abyei, but it cannot guarantee the
maintenance of order and the protection of all civilians if a
major outbreak of violence occurs following the decision by
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA),UN SRSG Ashraf Qazi
told CDA Whitehead in a meeting on July 8. Ultimately, the
SAF and the SPLA must maintain control over proxy militias
and other rogue elements outside of Abyei and the cohesion of
Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) within, he said. He asked that
the USG urge both sides to take up defensive positions North
and South of Abyei to keep out troublemakers. Qazi also
lamented that neither the NCP nor the SPLM have followed
through on verbal commitments to ease the situation on the
ground through extensive public outreach to their respective
local communities. End Summary.


2. (C) One day after returning from Abyei, UN Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ashraf Qazi
briefed CDA Whitehead on security preparations in advance of
the anticipated July 22 ruling from the PCA in the Hague on
the region's boundaries. UNMIS has beefed-up its presence in
Abyei as well as its operating bases in Difra and Agok, he
said, noting the increased visibility of UNMIS Armored
Personnel Carrier (APC) patrols in all three locations. There
are approximately 600 UNMIS personnel in Abyei, of which
300-plus are combat troops, he said. There are also UNMIS
companies of 120 troops each in Difra and Agok, putting the
total number of UNMIS combat troops in the Abyei area at over

500.


3. (C) Qazi said that in conjunction with the JIUs and Joint
Integrated Police Unit (JIPU),UNMIS is well-positioned to
quell any individual or localized outbreaks of violence, such
as demonstrations or looting. But if combatants begin to
show up in significant numbers, UNMIS could be forced to take
up a defensive posture. Ultimately, the UN force is an
enabler, he said, and the primary responsibility falls on the
NCP and the SPLM and their respective militaries to prevent
large-scale armed conflict. Should the SAF and the SPLA fail
to control proxy militias, or even worse, become involved in
combat themselves, UNMIS would be hard-pressed to respond. To
that end, Qazi urged that the USG persuade both parties to
take a defensive posture to keep troublemakers out of the
Abyei area. "The SAF should be facing North, while the SPLA
should be facing South," he said.


4. (C) Qazi also discussed the possibility that the PCA
decision might be postponed, an option the NCP has raised
with several parties in Khartoum, and to which the SPLM
reportedly objects. The argument for postponement is that the
two parties need to assert more control over their proxies,
especially the Missariya Arabs, he said. On the other hand,
UNMIS is "as prepared as it's going to be," and more time
risks increasing tension and leading to more volatility down
the road. The day of the announcement would likely be
characterized by relative calm, Qazi said, given the presence
of of international VIPs and the fact that neither side would
want the stigma of having its confederates cast the first
stone. The real worry is what will happen a week or two after
the announcement when the PCA's decision moves into
implementation, he said.


5. (C) Qazi also noted that while both the NCP and the SPLM
had publicly committed to easing the situation on the ground
in advance of the PCA decision, "neither party has done much
of anything." Public outreach in particular has been
limited, and as a result, critical messages to Abyei's
population about the sanctity of their rights regardless of
the ruling are not being delivered. Given the lack of print
media or television, UNMIS had proposed establishing radio
broadcasts using Miraya FM (UN Radio),but this proposal was
rejected by senior NCP officials in the MFA, he said. The
parties have also done little to rein in their firebrands, an
unsettling prospect, especially in the case of the SPLA,
whose chain of command he described as "tenuous."


6. (C) Comment: With the PCA decision just two weeks away,
both the NCP and the SPLM need to step-up their high-level
presence and outreach in the Abyei area and take the
necessary steps to ensure that their respective militaries
secure the area from unwanted intruders. Qazi's assessment
that UNMIS would not be able to quell a major outbreak of
violence, similar to the heavy fighting between the SAF and

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SPLM in May 2008, assumes that this might occur in the period
after the PCA ruling is announced, and not in its immediate
aftermath, a judgment shared in Juba by UNMIS head David
Gressley Postponement looks to be a two-edged sword that
might allow more time to prepare the people of Abyei, if both
the NCP and SPLM take action to do so, but might also
increase internal tensions by putting off a decision that the
population expects in two weeks' time .

WHITEHEAD