DARFUR HUMANITARIAN UPDATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KHARTOUM 000811

DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C, PRM
NSC FOR MGAVIN
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
UN ROME FOR HSPANOS
NEW YORK FOR DMERCADO

SENSITIVE NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PREL ASEC KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR HUMANITARIAN UPDATE

REFS: A) KHARTOUM 746
B) KHARTOUM 802

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) The number of security incidents involving the UN and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Darfur has remained stable,
with no increases reported in recent weeks. Nevertheless, the
situation on the ground is unpredictable, with security remaining a
primary concern for agencies. (Note: Security incidents typically
decrease during the rainy season. End note.) As of mid-May, the UN
reported that conflict among armed opposition factions, the Sudanese
Armed Forces (SAF),and ethnic groups had displaced more than
137,000 people in Darfur since January 2009 alone, bringing the
total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to more than 2.7
million.


2. (SBU) The loss of key partners in all critical sectors has
reduced the quality of humanitarian operations in some areas. While
programs have been able to continue utilizing local staff and
augmented-assistance from government line ministries, USAID notes
that program management, monitoring, and quality have decreased.
Given reduced access to rural populations due to lack of agencies in
these areas, as well as ongoing Government of Sudan (GOS)
restrictions, combined with the current quality of humanitarian
programming, relief agencies note that the humanitarian situation in
Darfur could potentially deteriorate during the coming months of the
hunger season. End summary.

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Key Humanitarian Vulnerabilities in Darfur
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3. (U) Ongoing conflict, displacement, and insecurity continue to
affect populations in Darfur. As of mid-May, the UN reported that
conflict among armed opposition factions, the Sudanese Armed Forces
(SAF),and ethnic groups had displaced more than 137,000 people in
Darfur since January 2009, bringing the total number of IDPs to more
than 2.7 million. Attacks on humanitarian workers and assets, while
showing a decrease during the ongoing rainy season, continue to
impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in
need. On July 3, the third incident of international NGO staff
abduction in Darfur since the expulsions occurred in Kutum, North
Darfur. On July 3 at 2035 hours, six unknown armed assailants
attacked the GOAL international compound in Kutum and kidnapped two
GOAL international staff and one local guard. According to initial
reports, the assailants forced the staff into a land cruiser and
drove west toward Amou, North Darfur. Local security officials
pursued the vehicle but were unable to overtake the assailants.
Shortly thereafter, GOAL staff learned that the local guard had been
released in Amou. As of July 6, the whereabouts of the abducted
international staff remain unknown. To date, no contact has been
made with the abductors and no ransom has been demanded.
Intermittent SAF aerial bombing campaigns persist in rural areas.


4. (U) The early March expulsion of 13 large international agencies
and dissolution of three national NGOs revealed and/or resulted in
several key humanitarian vulnerabilities in the aid operation. In
response, the humanitarian community has focused extensively on
filling the gaps left by these organizations in the life-saving
sectors of food, health and nutrition, and water, sanitation, and
hygiene. UN agencies and the remaining 65 to 70 smaller NGOs, in
coordination with the Government of National Unity (GNU),have
initiated numerous short-term measures and expanded existing
programs and areas of operation to prevent a rapid deterioration of
humanitarian conditions in northern Sudan. Although current
short-term measures have temporarily and quantitatively filled the
majority of the gaps left by the expulsions, the initiatives are not
intended to replace sustainable, longer-term programs to meet
humanitarian needs. In addition, relief agencies have begun to
emphasize that gap-filling is only one piece of a much larger
humanitarian picture, noting ongoing needs and existing
vulnerabilities that were exacerbated by the expulsions.

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Reduced Humanitarian Access
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4. (U) The staff reduction caused by the expulsions has
particularly affected humanitarian access to remote areas and
contested locations, severely limiting early warning reporting.
Without relief agencies present in these locations, information
regarding current concerns is unavailable for areas that have
typically presented some of the most significant humanitarian needs.



5. (SBU) In addition, many organizations continue to face procedural
delays when attempting to expand programs to fill identified
humanitarian gaps in particular locations. Delays include refusing
to approve technical agreements (TAs) and Sudanese government
non-compliance with agreed travel notification procedures,
particularly to locations in South Darfur. NGO staff report that,
despite the Ministerial Decree and recent statements by Presidential
Advisor Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin regarding the sufficiency of travel
notification for NGO travel rather than travel permits, security
checkpoints throughout South Darfur continue to frequently, although
inconsistently, demand travel permits for staff travel outside of
Nyala. One USAID partner notes that the frequent demands by
checkpoint officials for travel permits have led the organization to
opt for requesting travel permits rather than submitting a travel
notification to ensure that staff may travel unimpeded to project
sites. In the USAID partner's view, harassment at checkpoints in
South Darfur has increased since the announcement of the Ministerial
Decree and Dr. Ghazi's visit. Security officials in North Darfur
have also inconsistently applied the requirement for travel permits
despite the Ministerial Decree, most recently demanding seven-day
advance notice and requests for approval for travel to Kutum town,
North Darfur.


6. (SBU) In addition, partners report that some of the delays in
completing TAs result from the fact that state-level Humanitarian
Aid Commission (HAC) officials, particularly in West Darfur, are
demanding that NGOs include what the latter deem to be an
unsuitable national NGO partner in the TA. NGOs note inconsistent
application of this requirement, with some NGOs obtaining TAs
without a national NGO partner, but other NGOs experiencing pressure
from the HAC to accept national partners unilaterally chosen by the
HAC. On June 25, one of the pending TAs was signed by the West
Darfur HAC, with the international NGO agreeing to find a national
NGO partner, while two other pending TAs remained unsigned.


7. (SBU) In Kalma camp, South Darfur, which remains one of the
largest camps with continued humanitarian gaps following the March
expulsions (ref. A),bureaucratic impediments employed by state
authorities have prevented USAID partners Merlin and International
Medical Corps (IMC) from fully commencing activities to fill the
gaps left by expelled NGOs, nearly three months after the
organizations submitted requests for approval to work in the camp.
On June 22, USAID partner American Refugee Committee (ARC) began
implementing water, sanitation, and hygiene activities in the camp
after state and federal-level authorities finally approved ARC's TA
on June 18. However, while IMC has a signed TA for health
activities throughout South Darfur, which in theory includes Kalma,
the South Darfur Deputy Wali, or deputy governor, has refused to
permit the organization to initiate health activities in one of the
former clinics in the camp. On June 29, Merlin received approval
from the HAC to conduct health activities in the camp. However,
local officials have insisted that Merlin assume responsibility for
both health clinics rather than only one. The officials have also
denied permission for Merlin to initiate nutrition activities,
asserting that the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) may continue the
Kalma nutrition program. [Note: Since the expulsions, UNICEF has
been providing salary support to former nutrition workers as a
stop-gap measure to maintain services in the camp. End note.]
However, UNICEF emphasized that it is not an implementing agency
and, thus, is unable to continue supporting the nutrition program in
Kalma. On July 2, UNICEF submitted a letter to the State Ministry
of Health and the South Darfur HAC Commissioner requesting that
authorities grant Merlin permission to implement nutrition programs
in Kalma, as UNICEF support for the activities would soon cease. On
July 2, the South Darfur HAC requested that Merlin begin working on
a technical agreement with the SMOH, including the health and
nutrition project details needed to implement work in Kalma. In
addition, the HAC committed to discuss these issues at the next
South Darfur High-Level Committee meeting scheduled for the evening
of July 2.

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Delayed Assessments and Reduced Reporting
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8. (SBU) Independent assessments are critical to shaping and
targeting humanitarian operations. However, NGOs and UN agencies
are often denied access to populations to undertake assessments,
particularly in outlying locations and politically sensitive areas.
When assessments are undertaken, the GNU HAC often does not permit
public release of the assessment results. (Note: Humanitarian
agencies faced challenges in conducting assessments and sharing the
results long before the NGO expulsions. For example, the HAC has
obstructed the release of the Darfur Nutrition Assessment since
October 2008. End note.) With fewer relief agencies present
throughout Darfur, accurate and timely assessment information needed
to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches those most vulnerable is
lacking.

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Diminished Quality of Humanitarian Programs
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9. (U) The loss of key partners in critical sectors has reduced the
overall quality of humanitarian operations. While programs have
been able to continue utilizing local staff and augmented assistance
from government line ministries, USAID notes that program
management, monitoring, and overall quality have decreased. Failure
to replace short-term, stop-gap measures with the technically-sound
programs that existed prior to the March 4 expulsions has reduced
humanitarian effectiveness. This, in turn, increases the chances of
a humanitarian deterioration by the end of 2009-particularly during
the rainy season and concomitant hunger gap.


10. (SBU) Reductions in program quality include intermittent
staffing of health and nutrition facilities, lack of oversight and
monitoring for technical quality, decreased capacity for
verification activities, and limited coverage of remote and
contested areas. In addition, without NGOs present that possess the
capacity to monitor distributions of food and relief commodities,
humanitarian agencies note that the most vulnerable populations may
be marginalized, and the potential exists for misdirected
assistance.


11. (SBU) In the health and nutrition sector, relief agencies
indicate that the mere presence of a clinic does not necessarily
fill the gap left by expelled organizations. The clinics, which are
now primarily run by the Ministry of Health (MoH),typically lack
adequate drugs and adequately-trained and motivated staff. In
addition, relief agencies note that beneficiaries sometimes avoid
accessing health services, even if in a nearby clinic, due to
concerns that the health workers will not provide impartial,
appropriate care. Many conflict-affected populations remain
suspicious of government-sponsored assistance; thus, over-reliance
on MoH-run facilities only appears to fill gaps, but does not
address the underlying concerns and needs of beneficiaries.


12. (SBU) In addition, dependence upon UN agencies and government
line ministries, particularly in the health, nutrition, food, and
water, sanitation, and hygiene sectors, to conduct direct
implementation of programs is unsustainable. Such dependence risks
creating gaps in assistance or deterioration of program quality due
to the limited duration of stop-gap funding and unavailability of
staff for adequate monitoring. USAID believes that donors will be
reluctant to fund programs in which quality and capacity for
targeting are questionable.

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Lack of Verification for Population Movements
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13. (SBU) Although limited displacement continues in Darfur, the
Sudanese government is strongly encouraging IDP returns. However,
the GOS continues to restrict the work of the International
Organization for Migration (IOM),the primary organization with the
mandate to verify the appropriateness and voluntary nature of
returns (ref B). In 2004 and 2006, the GOS and IOM signed memoranda
of understanding outlining the principles, roles, and
responsibilities for voluntary IDP returns and affirming IOM as the

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lead agency in verifying population movements and assessing related
needs. However, GOS bureaucratic impediments, particularly in South
Darfur, are preventing IOM from fully performing this critical role.
Security officials have denied IOM access to areas of reported
population movements, prevented IOM from participating in
interagency assessments, and impeded staff travel both to state
capitals and rural areas. Without a capable and trusted agency
present to conduct verification activities, humanitarian
organizations are often called upon by the GOS to provide immediate
assistance to "returnees" without confirmation that the population
movements were voluntary and appropriate.

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Obstruction of Protection Activities
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14. (SBU) Of all sectors affected by the March NGO expulsions, the
protection sector lost the most NGO capacity, with six out of the
thirteen expelled international organizations directly involved in
protection-related activities and two of the three dissolved
national NGOs previously implementing protection programs. Relief
agencies have raised significant concerns that the decreased
presence of NGO international and local staff has left many parts of
Darfur vulnerable to under- or non-reporting on human rights issues
and other abuses. Humanitarian partners note that the mere presence
of NGO staff in an area should be considered a critical form of
protection for IDPs and other conflict-affected populations.


15. (SBU) In addition, the Sudanese government continues to obstruct
the work of the UN global cluster lead for protection, the Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In 2007, UNHCR
planned to expand its operation to include protection and camp
coordination and camp management (CCCM) activities in North and
South Darfur from its primarily refugee-based focus in West Darfur.
Despite signing a letter of understanding with UNHCR acknowledging
UNHCR's role in protection throughout Darfur, the GOS continues to
delay full approval for UNHCR activities, and, until recently,
prevented UNHCR staff from traveling to South Darfur. [Note:
Although UNHCR states that it theoretically does not need permission
to commence protection and CCCM activities, in practice, GOS
agreement is essential to facilitating all of the necessary
bureaucratic procedures for full operation, including permission to
travel. End note.]

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Comment
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16. (SBU) While the UN and the Sudanese government's quantitative
assessments of gap-filling may appear impressive on paper, with
nearly 100 percent coverage of all of the major life-saving sectors,
NGOs and UN staff on the ground paint a less rosy picture of the
quality and sustainability of these interventions, as well as the
percentage of the overall humanitarian needs being fully addressed.
The stop-gap measures have prevented a sharp deterioration in
humanitarian indicators in Darfur. However, a clear picture of the
humanitarian conditions in Darfur is unavailable due to reduced
access and coverage following the NGO expulsions, as well as
diminished humanitarian capacity for reporting and assessments.
USAID notes that the humanitarian situation in Darfur remains
tenuous, with signs of potential improvement with the small-scale
returns occurring, but significant ongoing vulnerabilities.
Additionally, it is essential that the international community not
lose sight of the pre-expulsion needs in Darfur by focusing only on
the quantitative filling of gaps left by the expulsions.


17. (SBU) The Special Envoy's initiatives to reinvigorate the peace
process in Darfur and improve security conditions, if successful,
would shift, but not obviate the need for humanitarian interventions
there. Displaced- population returns due to improved security
conditions would require needs-verification in areas of return as
well as provision of assistance in locations where NGOs currently
lack a presence. IOM is willing to work with the GOS to facilitate
the government's goal of reducing camp populations and returning
IDPs to villages of origin. However, this process must be undertaken
in cooperation with the organization so that it can verify returns
are voluntary and orderly, as well as assess returning populations'
needs for assistance. Providing appropriate interventions in areas
of return and ensuring that returnees do not go back to camps due to

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lack of services is in the Sudanese government's interest. In
addition, timely commencement of UNHCR activities in North and South
Darfur is critical to providing populations, whether returning or
remaining in camps, with adequate protection in the not-yet-stable
environment that characterizes Darfur.

WHITEHEAD