PARTING THOUGHTS ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN DARFUR FROM THE

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000802 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - EFTO DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C NSC FOR MGAVIN DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN GENEVA FOR NKYLOH UN ROME FOR HSPANOS NEW YORK FOR DMERCADO SENSITIVE NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: PARTING THOUGHTS ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN DARFUR FROM THE OCHA CHIEF KHARTOUM 00000802 001.4 OF 003 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) On his last day on the job after five years with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Sudan, two of those years as the OCHA/Sudan Chief, Mike McDonagh (protect) provided USAID officers with a candid tour d'horizon of the humanitarian situation in Darfur. Respected throughout his tenure in Sudan as an experienced and reasonable voice on humanitarian issues, McDonagh lamented the lack of quality, gap-filling programs following the expulsion of 13 NGOs in March, and the ongoing bureaucratic impediments imposed upon the humanitarian community by the Government of National Unity's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). McDonagh acknowledged that NGO and UN efforts appear to have narrowed the gaps and prevented a humanitarian crisis in Darfur, while recognizing that the greatest impact of the expulsions is some loss of quality in programming and humanitarian interventions in contested areas of Darfur. McDonagh acknowledged inconsistent messages coming from UN leadership on gap-filling, early recovery, and returns policy, but downplayed these differences in messaging as irrelevant, noting that at the end of the day, returns do not depend on UN opinion, but rather security and IDP resolve. Looking forward, McDonagh predicted that the humanitarian community would get over the expulsion hump, and the humanitarian situation in Darfur would remain relatively stable and under control if new/returning NGOs are permitted to expand programs and the rainy season is not severe. McDonagh urged continued U.S. pressure on the Government of Sudan (GOS) - particularly on the "problematic and intimidating" HAC Commissioner Hassabo Abdel Rahman - to abide by its humanitarian commitments, particularly those relating to population movements and returns. End summary. -------------- Not Content with Checking the Box -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On June 25, 2009, the outgoing UN OCHA Chief, Mike McDonagh, provided USAID/OFDA and Food for Peace (FFP) officers with his views of the evolution and current state of the humanitarian aid effort in Darfur. According to McDonagh, the March 4 expulsions of 13 international and three national NGOs ushered in a new period in humanitarian operations here, one that is more vulnerable. While admitting that the aid program prior to the expulsions verged on "overkill" in some sectors, McDonagh noted that we are now in the unfortunate position of "underkill", specifically with regard to program quality and access. ¶3. (SBU) Although efforts to measure the humanitarian situation have been ongoing through the joint UN/GOS joint assessment, McDonagh cautioned against using the assessments as the end-all-be-all measure of humanitarian needs in Darfur. He emphasized that that the assessment teams had only visited 38 locations within Darfur that were directly impacted by the expulsions, but had not assessed areas with pre-expulsion needs. McDonagh also added that the assessment results should be treated with some suspicion given the HAC's persistent intimidation of technical line ministries. [Note: Line ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture, not the UN cluster leads, are charged with producing the reports that are presented to the HLC each month. End note.] Referring to a recent incident when HAC Commissioner Hassabo Abdel Rahman threatened to expel the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) after a report on nutrition indicators, McDonagh noted: "If the HAC is willing to threaten the head of a UN agency, I can only imagine what they do to a poor doctor from the Ministry of Health." ¶4. (SBU) According to McDonagh, political expediency is creating a situation in which cosmetic changes are considered adequate substitutes for the programming expertise lost by the expulsions. Organizations are so focused on providing coverage to various areas, that they are not considering the ability of affected populations to access those areas: "If services can still go on, the box gets checked." Although humanitarian services have resumed in many locations, significant questions remain regarding sustainability, program quality, and impact. McDonagh recognized that the qualitative effect of humanitarian operations is inherently difficult to measure, and the ongoing assessments and reports to the international community tend to focus on outputs rather than impact. KHARTOUM 00000802 002.3 OF 003 ¶5. (SBU) At the same time, McDonagh said the HAC continues to block assessments that could provide a more objective indication of program quality and impact, such as nutrition assessments. McDonagh noted that there will be a lag-time before the humanitarian community begins to see the limits of this approach, but the cracks will become more evident the next time that systems are tested by disease outbreaks or new displacements. Additionally, McDonagh lamented the loss of technical quality and outreach to rural and "contested" areas due to the expulsions, referring to Medecins Sans Frontieres, Action Contra la Faim, and Solidarites in particular. In his view, these organizations were on the front lines of the aid effort, ensuring that sectors meet technical standards and pushing operations into hard-to-reach rural areas. In McDonagh's words, "We lost our Marines." -------------- U.S. Pressure Still Needed -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Despite his less-than-sanguine view of the post-expulsion operating environment, McDonagh sees hope with new agencies beginning to "resume" operations in Darfur. Although the success of the operation will depend on the severity of the rainy season, McDonagh believes that new or resuming programs, if targeted to areas of high need such as Kalma, Kass, and Zalingei, will reintroduce much-needed access and technical quality that will help stabilize the situation, assuming the GOS does what is necessary to facilitate the return of these organizations. ¶7. (SBU) McDonagh noted the issue of population movements/return as a key area of needed U.S. engagement with the UN and GOS. He added that the specific issue of certifying population movements is an area where U.S. pressure on the GOS is sorely needed. Although not specifically addressed by the Joint Communique, population/movements/returns is covered by existing agreements - including a memorandum of understanding (MOU) directly between the GOS and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). McDonagh urged the U.S. to continue pushing the government to allow the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and IOM to implement activities directly related to their mandates. Despite signing MOUs with IOM in 2004 and 2006, the GOS continues to restrict IOM work in all three Darfur states, most notably in South Darfur. IOM is the only international organization with a written MOU with the GOS with regard to monitoring and verifying the appropriateness of returns and other population movements and ensuring that these movements do not violate international humanitarian principles, as in the case of coerced and/or forced displacement. ¶8. (SBU) UNHCR reports continuing challenges in commencing protection and camp coordination and camp management activities in North and South Darfur, despite repeated engagement by donors and high-level UN representatives. The HAC continues to prevent the organization from full operation in North and South Darfur, asserting that UNHCR lacks a mandate to work with IDPs, and that UNHCR is seeking to assume the government's role in managing IDP camps and protecting its people. ¶9. (SBU) According to McDonagh, the UN will soon be finalizing its "framework" on returns for presentation to donors and GOS; however, much of the foundation of the framework has already been approved by the GOS. McDonagh urged the U.S. to engage with the HAC, particularly Commissioner Hassabo, to live up to its existing humanitarian commitments. ¶10. (SBU) When pressed by USAID officers, McDonagh acknowledged that senior UN leadership in Sudan holds varying positions and opinions on topics such as the level of gap-filling, need for early recovery programming, and returns policy. McDonagh chalked this up to differing perspectives on the nature of the conflict and political pressure from both the GOS and UNAMID. While downplaying these differences of opinion, McDonagh was quick to note that UN Under-Secretary General/Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes has been consistently strong in his messaging to the GOS on these issues. KHARTOUM 00000802 003.3 OF 003 -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) We generally concur with McDonagh's forthright assessment of the current humanitarian situation in Darfur. Post is concerned that continued focus on expulsion-related gaps, as well as ongoing HAC harassment, intimidation, and interference, could limit the visibility of overall humanitarian needs and dilute the picture that is presented to the international community. At this critical juncture prior to the full onset of the rainy season, the humanitarian community must avoid settling for cosmetic measures in lieu of quality, targeted humanitarian interventions. However, like McDonagh, we are optimistic that humanitarian operations can regain significant lost capacity and program quality as new/affiliate NGOs re-establish and expand programs. The devil remains in the details of implementation, however, and continued high-level engagement will be necessary to ensure that the GOS lives up to all of its humanitarian commitments, including ensuring safe and voluntary returns per international standards. WHITEHEAD