PARTING THOUGHTS ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN DARFUR FROM THE

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000802

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - EFTO

DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C
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SENSITIVE NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: PARTING THOUGHTS ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN DARFUR FROM THE
OCHA CHIEF

KHARTOUM 00000802 001.4 OF 003


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Summary
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1. (SBU) On his last day on the job after five years with the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Sudan,
two of those years as the OCHA/Sudan Chief, Mike McDonagh (protect)
provided USAID officers with a candid tour d'horizon of the
humanitarian situation in Darfur. Respected throughout his tenure
in Sudan as an experienced and reasonable voice on humanitarian
issues, McDonagh lamented the lack of quality, gap-filling programs
following the expulsion of 13 NGOs in March, and the ongoing
bureaucratic impediments imposed upon the humanitarian community by
the Government of National Unity's Humanitarian Aid Commission
(HAC). McDonagh acknowledged that NGO and UN efforts appear to have
narrowed the gaps and prevented a humanitarian crisis in Darfur,
while recognizing that the greatest impact of the expulsions is some
loss of quality in programming and humanitarian interventions in
contested areas of Darfur. McDonagh acknowledged inconsistent
messages coming from UN leadership on gap-filling, early recovery,
and returns policy, but downplayed these differences in messaging as
irrelevant, noting that at the end of the day, returns do not depend
on UN opinion, but rather security and IDP resolve. Looking
forward, McDonagh predicted that the humanitarian community would
get over the expulsion hump, and the humanitarian situation in
Darfur would remain relatively stable and under control if
new/returning NGOs are permitted to expand programs and the rainy
season is not severe. McDonagh urged continued U.S. pressure on the
Government of Sudan (GOS) - particularly on the "problematic and
intimidating" HAC Commissioner Hassabo Abdel Rahman - to abide by
its humanitarian commitments, particularly those relating to
population movements and returns. End summary.

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Not Content with Checking the Box
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2. (SBU) On June 25, 2009, the outgoing UN OCHA Chief, Mike
McDonagh, provided USAID/OFDA and Food for Peace (FFP) officers with
his views of the evolution and current state of the humanitarian aid
effort in Darfur. According to McDonagh, the March 4 expulsions of
13 international and three national NGOs ushered in a new period in
humanitarian operations here, one that is more vulnerable. While
admitting that the aid program prior to the expulsions verged on
"overkill" in some sectors, McDonagh noted that we are now in the
unfortunate position of "underkill", specifically with regard to
program quality and access.


3. (SBU) Although efforts to measure the humanitarian situation
have been ongoing through the joint UN/GOS joint assessment, McDonagh
cautioned against using the assessments as the end-all-be-all
measure of humanitarian needs in Darfur. He emphasized that that
the assessment teams had only visited 38 locations within Darfur
that were directly impacted by the expulsions, but had not assessed
areas with pre-expulsion needs. McDonagh also added that the
assessment results should be treated with some suspicion given the
HAC's persistent intimidation of technical line ministries. [Note:
Line ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture, not the UN
cluster leads, are charged with producing the reports that are
presented to the HLC each month. End note.] Referring to a recent
incident when HAC Commissioner Hassabo Abdel Rahman threatened to
expel the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) after a report on nutrition
indicators, McDonagh noted: "If the HAC is willing to threaten the
head of a UN agency, I can only imagine what they do to a poor
doctor from the Ministry of Health."


4. (SBU) According to McDonagh, political expediency is creating
a situation in which cosmetic changes are considered adequate
substitutes for the programming expertise lost by the expulsions.
Organizations are so focused on providing coverage to various areas,
that they are not considering the ability of affected populations to
access those areas: "If services can still go on, the box gets
checked." Although humanitarian services have resumed in many
locations, significant questions remain regarding sustainability,
program quality, and impact. McDonagh recognized that the
qualitative effect of humanitarian operations is inherently
difficult to measure, and the ongoing assessments and reports to the
international community tend to focus on outputs rather than impact.

KHARTOUM 00000802 002.3 OF 003





5. (SBU) At the same time, McDonagh said the HAC continues to
block assessments that could provide a more objective indication of
program quality and impact, such as nutrition assessments. McDonagh
noted that there will be a lag-time before the humanitarian
community begins to see the limits of this approach, but the cracks
will become more evident the next time that systems are tested by
disease outbreaks or new displacements. Additionally, McDonagh
lamented the loss of technical quality and outreach to rural and
"contested" areas due to the expulsions, referring to Medecins Sans
Frontieres, Action Contra la Faim, and Solidarites in particular.
In his view, these organizations were on the front lines of the aid
effort, ensuring that sectors meet technical standards and pushing
operations into hard-to-reach rural areas. In McDonagh's words, "We
lost our Marines."

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U.S. Pressure Still Needed
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6. (SBU) Despite his less-than-sanguine view of the
post-expulsion operating environment, McDonagh sees hope
with new agencies beginning to "resume" operations in Darfur.
Although the success of the operation will depend on the
severity of the rainy season, McDonagh believes that new or
resuming programs, if targeted to areas of high need such
as Kalma, Kass, and Zalingei, will reintroduce much-needed access
and technical quality that will help stabilize the situation,
assuming the GOS does what is necessary to
facilitate the return of these organizations.



7. (SBU) McDonagh noted the issue of population movements/return
as a key area of needed U.S. engagement with the UN and GOS. He added
that the specific issue of certifying population movements is an
area where U.S. pressure on the GOS is sorely needed. Although not
specifically addressed by the Joint Communique,
population/movements/returns is covered by existing agreements -
including a memorandum of understanding (MOU) directly between the
GOS and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
McDonagh urged the U.S. to continue pushing the government to allow
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and IOM
to implement activities directly related to their mandates. Despite
signing MOUs with IOM in 2004 and 2006, the GOS continues to
restrict IOM work in all three Darfur states, most notably in South
Darfur. IOM is the only international organization with a written
MOU with the GOS with regard to monitoring and verifying the
appropriateness of returns and other population movements and
ensuring that these movements do not violate international
humanitarian principles, as in the case of coerced and/or forced
displacement.


8. (SBU) UNHCR reports continuing challenges in commencing
protection and camp coordination and camp management activities in
North and South Darfur, despite repeated engagement by donors and
high-level UN representatives. The HAC continues to prevent the
organization from full operation in North and South Darfur,
asserting that UNHCR lacks a mandate to work with IDPs, and that
UNHCR is seeking to assume the government's role in managing IDP
camps and protecting its people.


9. (SBU) According to McDonagh, the UN will soon be finalizing
its "framework" on returns for presentation to donors and GOS; however,
much of the foundation of the framework has already been approved by
the GOS. McDonagh urged the U.S. to engage with the HAC,
particularly Commissioner Hassabo, to live up to its existing
humanitarian commitments.


10. (SBU) When pressed by USAID officers, McDonagh acknowledged
that senior UN leadership in Sudan holds varying positions and
opinions on topics such as the level of gap-filling, need for early
recovery programming, and returns policy. McDonagh chalked this up
to differing perspectives on the nature of the conflict and
political pressure from both the GOS and UNAMID. While downplaying
these differences of opinion, McDonagh was quick to note that UN
Under-Secretary General/Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes has
been consistently strong in his messaging to the GOS on these
issues.


KHARTOUM 00000802 003.3 OF 003


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Comment
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11. (SBU) We generally concur with McDonagh's forthright
assessment of the current humanitarian situation in Darfur. Post
is concerned that continued focus on expulsion-related gaps, as
well as ongoing HAC harassment, intimidation, and interference,
could limit the visibility of overall humanitarian needs and dilute
the picture that is presented to the international community.
At this critical juncture prior to the full onset of the
rainy season, the humanitarian community must avoid settling for
cosmetic measures in lieu of quality, targeted humanitarian
interventions. However, like McDonagh, we are optimistic that
humanitarian operations can regain significant lost capacity and
program quality as new/affiliate NGOs re-establish and expand
programs. The devil remains in the details of implementation,
however, and continued high-level engagement will be
necessary to ensure that the GOS lives up to all of its
humanitarian commitments, including ensuring safe and voluntary
returns per international standards.

WHITEHEAD