VP TAHA WANTS POSITIVE RELATIONS WITH USG, UNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000699

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S, AF/C, AF/E
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: VP TAHA WANTS POSITIVE RELATIONS WITH USG, UNITY
FOR SUDAN, AND IDPS TO GO HOME

Classified By: CDA Mark Asquino a.i. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a May 25 meeting, an unusually loquacious
GNU Second Vice-President Ali Osman Taha told Codel Isakson
(Senator Johnny Isakson R-Georgia, Senator Bob
Corker,R-Tennesee) CDA a.i. Asquino, and emboffs that the GoS
wants "direct engagement and direct contact" with the USG,
citing a "mountain of respect and admiration of the American
people." He said that US sanctions against Sudan impaired his
country's ability to find solutions to its conflicts, and
called on the USG to assist Sudan to renew ties with
international financial institutions. On CPA implementation,
he insisted that a majority of Southern Sudanese prefer unity
with the North to an independent state, and said that the
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) has failed Southerners.
He defended Sudan's humanitarian policy and argued that most
residents of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps could
return home "at any time," but remain in camps out of
dependency syndrome or coercion. He said that "all options
are on the table" for a prospective Darfur peace deal, and
called on the US to play an active role in its achievement.
END SUMMARY

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CONFRONTATION WITH US HAS LED TO BAD OUTCOME FOR BOTH PARTIES
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2. (C) Sudan VP Taha welcomed Senators Isakson, Corker and
CDA Asquino, telling them that "the people and GoS are
interested in having positive and normalized relations with
the US." He told the Senators that he welcomed their visit to
Khartoum and Darfur as "we have an open door policy for
visitors to see for themselves." He recalled past positive
Sudan-US relations, when "Sudanese students studied in the
US, and our universities had good relations with many
American counterparts.," But he then noted that "Starting
with the 1980's, this has changed. The result of this
(US-Sudan) confrontation has not led to good outcomes for
either party." He expressed interest in improving relations
and encouraged additional visits by American delegations to
Sudan.


3. (C) Taha stressed that "Sudan is paying the price for
(USG) sanctions" and said that sanctions have inhibited the
government's ability to resolve its internal problems, as USG
sanctions have blocked Sudan's access to international
lending institutions such as IMF and the World Bank. "Its
like the chicken and the egg. We are supposed to solve
conflicts and finance post-conflict needs while being subject
to sanctions. To solve conflicts, rebuild our society, and
find better livelihoods for people, please let us have
normalized relations with your country and other
international institutions. Otherwise you will have
frustration in the South because they will get nothing out of
peace."

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BRING PEOPLE OF SUDAN TOGETHER FOR UNITY
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4. (C) On revenue-sharing within the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA),Taha claimed that the GNU is already
providing half of its oil revenues to the GOSS, and spending
its half of the revenues on the entirety of the North,
including Darfur. "At the end of the day, Sudan has very
little resources." He said that while many have asked that
the North do more to support the South financially, the North
is not in a position to contribute any more oil funds "to
help our brother Southern Sudanese" beyond its 50%. He
underscored the difficulty in developing a country as vast as
Sudan after the end of a twenty-one year civil war. "Due to
war, all of the infrastructure is down, no roads or
communication. The challenge is the size of the country. We
have vast resources, but we don't have the key, which is
funding and training."


5. (C) Taha claimed that if the 2011 Referendum, which gives
South Sudan the right to vote for independence or unity
through the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
"were held today," a majority of southern Sudanese would vote
for unity with the North. He argued that this was true
because southerners had not seen significant, positive
post-CPA changes under the leadership of the GOSS. "Now they

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are left to themselves and have autonomy, but are not able to
deliver, and so the people see that the North is not that
bad. People will come to realize that the solution is not to
separate." (NOTE: Post believes that the overwhelming
sentiments among southern Sudanese is for secession. END
NOTE.) He insisted that "even after twenty-one years of civil
war, we never broke the human element that connects us. Even
during the war, more southern Sudanese came to the North (as
refugees) than to our neighbors." He said that difficulties
in border demarcation have arisen "because the line has never
been in existence in actual terms", but said that the GoS is
committed to completing the task of demarcation. To complete
implementation of the CPA, he called on the "support of the
international community to help the Sudanese people either in
the South or the North to find a better life," and complained
that "the International Community has let us down by not
honoring Oslo I or II." If the Referendum results in unity,
Taha said that the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) made up of
Sudanese Armed Forces from the north and Sudanese People's
Army forces from the south would be "seeds for a new national
army." Like National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)
Chief Salah Ghosh, Taha insisted that the end goal of the CPA
should be a unified Sudan. "We believe unity will be far
superior to separation for the region. You can be of great
help to bring people of Sudan together for unity."

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IDP CAMPS: NOT THAT INNOCENT
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6. (C) Taha reserved his sharpest criticism for advocacy
groups, such as Save Darfur, and said the regime has been a
"victim of a very negative media campaign to tarnish Sudan's
image to serve certain groups." Senator Corker advised VP
Taha that Sudan has "done things that hurt itself," and its
image, such as the March 4/5 expulsions of the 13 NGOs. Taha
responded that "no government would do something against its
own interests or like to see its image tarnished." He charged
that the issues of humanitarian affairs and IDP camps in
Darfur have been politicized. However, he promised that the
regime is prepared to accept "new NGOs from any country and
facilitate their activity, if we can agree on how to best
take care of their (Internally Displaced Persons --IDPs)
humanitarian needs in a responsible manner."


7. (C) The Vice-President had broader criticism for the
presence of camps for IDPs, which are largely supported by
NGOs. Taha made the far-fetched claim that many residents
stay in the IDP camps by choice and are, in fact, able to
return to their homes at any time. He added that most IDP
camp residents come to the camps for rations and become
dependent on the services of the foreign NGOs. According to
Taha, leaders of rebel factions tell their supporters
residing in IDPs camps to remain there and not to return to
their original homes, promising that "we will get you a
better deal at the end of the day." Taha told the Senators
that "Your delegation may be number six-hundred-something",
stating that many IDPs flock to the camps to see the wave of
visitors. "It has become like a theater!" In a comment that
made eyes roll, Taha maintained with a straight-face that
some in the IDP camps actually possess a home in town and
return to it in the evenings, or in some cases, rent it out
to foreigners, while they themselves stay in the IDP camp for
free. He said that the IDPs often engage in illegal trade of
weapons or drugs. "It is not that innocent, that people are
in need and the bad Sudanese government is trying to get
them. These camps are in the areas of control of the
government, and still many call us these bad names." Taha
said the regime has continued to allow the camps to exist out
of humanitarian concern, but due to the fact many of the
camps have continued to exist for 4-5 years, the Government
has considered initiating town planning in the camps to make
them permanent settlements.


8. (C) To Senator Corker's question on whether the IDPs could
leave the camps and not be victimized by janjaweed militia,
Taha responded that in Western and Southern Darfur, many IDPs
are already moving back. Taha said that he is leading a
government initiative to provide returning IDPs with homes
and help them "to restart their normal life." He argued that
the IDPs will find it increasingly difficult to return to
their native villages, the longer they stay in the camps, as
rival groups settle in the IDP's vacated homelands. "The Fur

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have suffered the most by the fighting in Darfur, but the
longer they stay in the camps, the more they have to lose.
The sooner we have reconciliation, the sooner people can
return to their homelands, even if they have to build camps
there." Taha defended GoS efforts to resettle IDPs, and
complained that "When the Government asks people to go back,
the NGOs complain by saying 'why is the government forcing
people back when they will be killed and the janjaweed will
rape the women.' The people are captive to this humanitarian
business," he concluded.


9. (C) Senator Isakson raised Foreign Minister Deng Alor's
comment to him earlier in the day that the Darfur conflict
could be resolved if the GoS made Darfur one region with a
Vice-Presidential position designated in the national
government and if it provided compensation to Darfur's
people. Taha responded by citing the existence of the Darfur
Peace Agreement's (DPA) moribund Transitional Darfur Regional
Authority (TDRA),headed by Sudanese Liberation Army revel
leader and DPA signatory Minni Minnawi. Taha said that for a
future Darfur peace deal, "All issues are open for discussion
at the table." He downplayed the utility of a unified Darfuri
state, noting that as opposed to South Sudan, there had not
been overwhelming support by Dafuris for a unified region.
"The government stance is for the people to decide (on a
unified Darfuri state within the central government) by
referendum one year after national elections. The GoS has no
red line on this. We have agreed to the concept of
decentralization and are open for suggestions for
Abuja-positive."


10. (C) COMMENT: VP Taha's skeptical (and callous) view of
IDP camps echoes a common frustration in the regime that
humanitarian assistance in Darfur in some ways perpetuates
the dependency of many Darfuris on foreign aid. While the
regime has already eased restrictions on foreign NGOs and
allowed some expelled aid groups to return under new
auspices, the GoS is likely to continue to call for a return
of IDPs from camps to their local homelands. Until there is a
stable, sustained peace deal involving the major Darfuri
rebel groups, this will likely be a hard sell for the
majority of IDPs. Taha is correct, however, to note that the
longer IDPs remain in camps in Darfur, the more difficult it
will be for them to return to their homes and support
themselves independent of foreign aid. On North/South
relations, Taha's assessment of the North's role in the Sudan
civil war, as a refuge for Southerners fleeing the violence,
is paternalistic, and reflects the view of many in the regime
that the Southern Sudanese are incapable of governing
themselves and need the North's protection. Calling for the
US to declare support for a united Sudan (also raised by NISS
Chief Salah Ghosh),Taha signaled an increasing realization
by the regime that within two years the South will likely
secede. His prediction that Southerners would vote for union
is either a show of optimism or a self-delusion. What is
clear is that the regime is likely to continue to portray the
GOSS as incompetent, and an independent South as not viable.
The USG should continue to urge both the North and the South
to adhere to the CPA, including the holding of a 2011
referendum on southern self termination, while tying positive
incentives to CPA implementation. Perhaps most critically,
discussion and negotiation between the parties for the
"agreement after the agreement" (what will happen after 2011)
must begin as soon as possible in order to reduce the chances
of renewed conflict and ensure a peaceful separation, if and
when it comes to that. END COMMENT
ASQUINO