GOS INTENDS TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY IN ENGAGEMENT WITH THE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000644

DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON
NSC FOR MGAVIN
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOS INTENDS TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY IN ENGAGEMENT WITH THE
UNITED STATES


1. (SBU) The Government of Sudan intends to move cautiously in its
engagement with the U.S. and the international community,
Presidential Advisor Dr. Ghazi Salahudin told CDA Fernandez during
their final meeting May 14. While the ruling National Congress
Party is eager to move forward with the Darfur peace process and CPA
implementation, it does not think it wise to jump at the latest
initiative or proposal until having planned ahead carefully and
considered the lessons of the past, according to Dr. Ghazi.
Responding to U.S. and UN requests that the NCP submit a timeline
for prisoner exchanges with the JEM rebel group (per the February
Doha Goodwill Agreement),and consider the U.S. proposal for a
"witnesses conference" on CPA implementation, Ghazi urged that the
U.S. and the NCP should discuss more deeply a longer-term strategy
for Darfur that will address the root causes of the conflict,
including the cross border conflict with Chad. With regard to the
CPA, Ghazi said that the government does not like the idea of a "CPA
in crisis" conference, "because that is not the reality."


2. (SBU) "Khalil Ibrahim is nothing in Darfur," pointed out Dr.
Ghazi, noting that the Zaghawa ethnic group that he purports to
represent is a tiny minority and that Ibrahim is very unpopular,
even less popular than fellow Zaghawa Minni Minawi. "The Fur and
the Arabs in Darfur will never accept an agreement signed with
Khalil," stated Ghazi, pointing out that the Darfur peace process
must be broader than just talks with JEM. Ghazi did not discount
the value of a ceasefire with JEM, but asked rhetorically what would
be gained by releasing JEM prisoners - in the absence of a ceasefire
- other than providing Khalil with additional foot soldiers and
perhaps some limited short-term PR gain for the government. JEM
must be viewed in the context of the regime in Chad, noted Ghazi,
alluding to the close family ties that Chadian President Deby has
with Khalil Ibrahim, and which compelled Deby to begin supporting
Ibrahim due to tribal pressures from within his own Zaghawa clan.
With regard to the broader issues of peace and security and a
political settlement in Darfur, Ghazi suggested instead that the GOS
would like to present some of its own proposals on Darfur to the
Special Envoy during his next visit, without the pressure of an
urgent timeline on prisoner releases. "Please don't allow the
Special Envoy to become imprisoned by this prisoner release issue,"
pleaded Ghazi.


3. (SBU) With regard to CPA implementation, Ghazi suggested that the
GOS and the U.S. should discuss "common interests" in advance of the
Envoy's next visit to lay the groundwork. "Much of the agreement
has been implemented, and we also want to get to the elections and
the referendum, as well as reconstruct the relationship with the
SPLM," stated Ghazi. Pressed on the proposal for an international
conference on the CPA, Ghazi agreed that there is "nothing wrong"
with attempts to marshal international support for the CPA, "but we
must be cautious and move forward carefully, planning ahead
appropriately." Ghazi explained that this is not only because of
the importance of these decisions for the future of Sudan, but also
because of Sudan's relationship with the U.S. and the international
community. "We are interested in a normal relationship with the
U.S., but it should be based on principles. We feel that we have
not been treated fairly for a long time," said Ghazi, referencing
U.S. promises in the past to remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List. "Politics in the U.S. may be fleeting, and we won't
immediately leave the trenches to deal with someone who is
unpredictable." However, Ghazi noted that the GOS appreciates the
positive approach taken by Special Envoy Gration and promised that
the government intends to be constructive in its engagement with
him. Ghazi urged that the Special Envoy meet President Bashir
during the Envoy's next visit, as he is the "key decision-maker on
all of these issues" and can help "unblock many things if he sees
that it is in Sudan's interest to do so." Ghazi also urged that the
U.S. and Sudan begin preparing now for the Envoy's next visit,
preparing in advance the discussion points and agenda to make such a
meeting possible. Ghazi concluded saying that he believes SE
Gration will be successful in achieving a breakthrough with Sudan.



4. (SBU) Comment: Ghazi had clearly prepared carefully for this
meeting, passing a carefully-crafted message that the government is
willing to be constructive on Darfur and the CPA, but wants to
discuss these issues with the U.S. in advance and share ideas on
what will be successful before it agrees to initiatives such as the
CPA witnesses conference. The government is also clearly tying
these issues to the U.S.-Sudan bilateral relationship, and wants
assurances on what steps the U.S. is willing to take to improve
relations before it is willing to show its hand. Laying down clear
markers on what we need to see in order to be able to take action on
items of interest to the Sudanese will be essential to see progress

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on the items of greatest interest to us, namely peace in Darfur and
continued peaceful implementation of the CPA. Other seasoned NCP
interlocutors such as Yehia Babiker Hussein have pointed out that
the U.S. should not assume that the NCP won't do these things anyway
("we should not have to point out that it's in our interests as well
to have peace in Darfur"),but the NCP clearly realizes that
assistance from and involvement by the U.S. will be critical to
getting buy-in from Darfurians, the SPLM, and key international
players. The NCP knows exactly what it is and is not willing to
give up in order to stay in power, has decades of experience in
these types of negotiations, and must be approached carefully and
methodically. However, carefully-planned engagement clearly seems
the best approach to achieve our objectives, if we are able to
define what we can offer and when. Absent that, the NCP will likely
turn its attention elsewhere.

ASQUINO