AGREEMENTS WITH JEM WON'T STABILIZE DARFUR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000639

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
DEPT PLS PASS TO USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: AGREEMENTS WITH JEM WON'T STABILIZE DARFUR,
MINNAWI TELLS SE GRATION

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Any peace process in which JEM is prominently
featured will not serve as a stabilizing force in Darfur,
Assistant to the President and SLM/MM leader Minni Minnawi
told SE Gration in a meeting on May 8. If and when JEM signs
a bilateral ceasefire with the GOS, it will simply direct its
energy toward destroying other movements, he said. Minnawi
also expressed indignation with the Government of Qatar for
their lack of outreach to him in the course of the Doha
talks, asserting that such a process could not succeed in
bringing peace to Darfur without him. He also demanded to
know the new US administration's position on the 2006 Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA),citing lack of support from the
international community as a principal cause of its failure.
SE Gration reassured Minnawi that the USG is not seeking to
empower JEM, but rather reinvigorate a long-stalled peace
process, and urged a strong role for both the DPA and
SLM/Minnawi in Doha. SE Gration told Minnawi that the DPA
should serve as the "foundation" for a comprehensive peace
agreement on Darfur. End Summary.


2. (C) Minnawi and his associates began the meeting with
familiar lamentations on the lack of implementation of the
2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),and the international
community's failure to support it. "Promises were made to us"
of political and financial support that have never
materialized, said Minnawi, adding that the USG "is very far
away from what it committed." He urged SE Gration for
clarification on the new administration's position on the
DPA, as well as its position on elections in Darfur. (Note:
Minnawi maintains that elections should not be held in Darfur
until the DPA is enshrined in the interim national
constitution. End Note.) SE Gration replied that the DPA
remains a very good agreement, and should be the "foundation"
of whatever ultimately comes out of the Doha peace process.
With regard to the election, SE Gration noted that given the
displacement of persons as a result of the conflict in
Darfur, an interim power-sharing arrangement might be better
suited to allow fledgling political parties time to win the
"hearts and minds" of the people in Darfur.


3. (C) Minnawi questioned USG engagement with JEM in the Doha
peace process, and warned SE Gration in ominous tones about
JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim. "Khalil is a muhajedeen
(referring to the JEM Chairman's time as an ARMY doctor who
took up arms in the 'holy war' with the South) and a
fundamentalist," he said. "And Khalil is not alone in Darfur
as he claims." Minnawi then expressed extreme skepticism that
a Doha peace process in which JEM is prominently featured
could serve as a stabilizing force in Darfur. "Once Khalil
signs a ceasefire with the government, he'll return back to
Chad and focus his energy on attacking other movements," said
Minnawi, noting that JEM was at that very moment attacking
his forces near Umm Baro (to be reported septel.) SE Gration
acknowledged the USG has reservations about JEM and its
Islamist roots, emphasizing that the U.S. goal is not to
empower JEM, but rather, to gain traction for the
long-stalled peace process. "I place you higher than JEM
because you signed the DPA," said SE Gration. "But if you
want us to stop engaging with JEM, we need you to step up and
help fill the void," he said. SE Gration then urged Minnawi
to collaborate with other SLA factions to bring new weight
and momentum to the Doha peace process.


4. (C) Minnawi and his associates, however, remained
skeptical of the Doha process, largely due to their negative
view of the state of Qatar. "This Qatari initiative
originated from the Arab League initiative" to avoid ICC
prosecution of President Bashir, said SLA/Minnawi confidante
Mohamed Tijani. He questioned the Qataris' commitment and
motives, noting that "when they came here initially, they
never even approached us to learn about the DPA, though we
are the signatories." Minnawi added that the Qataris remain
ignorant of the situation on the ground in Darfur, in part
because they've failed to consult all parties. "Despite many
promises, they have still not reached out to us," he said.
Minnawi asserted that his movement must be an active party if
the Doha peace process is to succeed, and noted that despite
the lack of outreach, he has sent someone from his movement
(SLM/Minnawi Secretary General Ali Dosa) to Doha as part of
the latest GOS delegation there, though he did not explain in
what capacity. SE Gration lauded this step and encouraged

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Minnawi to travel to Doha himself, asserting his utmost
confidence in the abilities of UN/AU Joint Chief Mediator
Bassole and the intentions of Qatari facilitator FM Ali
Mahmoud.


5. (C) Comment: Minnawi's relevance both politically and
militarily continues to be shaky, but he should never be
discounted as a possible serious spoiler to peace process.
Nonetheless, his presence in Doha would certainly benefit all
parties involved and should continue to be encouraged.
Indeed, it appears that Minnawi is finally beginning to
process the implicit messages of the need to move beyond the
DPA. With regard to JEM, Minnawi is correct in his analysis
that JEM intends to follow the SPLA model of consolidation by
force, money or whatever means necessary to establish itself
as the sole military force in Darfur. This has had (and will
continue to have) destabilizing effects on the ground; JEM's
attack on Muhajeria (and subsequent GOS bombing) ultimately
triggered the displacement of over 40,000 Zaghawa civilians
from South Darfur into Zam Zam camp outside of El Fasher.
JEM's ongoing incursions into Um Barro have caused civilians
to flee to a nearby UNAMID base for safety. A ceasefire with
JEM--and ultimately an end to Chadian (and Libyan) financial
and military support for JEM--remains necessary to achieve a
stable and viable solution to Darfur, but is far from
sufficient. Reconciliation between the Fur and Arab tribes of
Darfur, two elements seemingly forgotten in the Doha process,
remains the ultimate goal.


6. (U) SE Gration cleared this cable prior to transmission.
FERNANDEZ