AGREEMENTS WITH JEM WON'T STABILIZE DARFUR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000639 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS TO USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2019 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: AGREEMENTS WITH JEM WON'T STABILIZE DARFUR, MINNAWI TELLS SE GRATION Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Any peace process in which JEM is prominently featured will not serve as a stabilizing force in Darfur, Assistant to the President and SLM/MM leader Minni Minnawi told SE Gration in a meeting on May 8. If and when JEM signs a bilateral ceasefire with the GOS, it will simply direct its energy toward destroying other movements, he said. Minnawi also expressed indignation with the Government of Qatar for their lack of outreach to him in the course of the Doha talks, asserting that such a process could not succeed in bringing peace to Darfur without him. He also demanded to know the new US administration's position on the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),citing lack of support from the international community as a principal cause of its failure. SE Gration reassured Minnawi that the USG is not seeking to empower JEM, but rather reinvigorate a long-stalled peace process, and urged a strong role for both the DPA and SLM/Minnawi in Doha. SE Gration told Minnawi that the DPA should serve as the "foundation" for a comprehensive peace agreement on Darfur. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Minnawi and his associates began the meeting with familiar lamentations on the lack of implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),and the international community's failure to support it. "Promises were made to us" of political and financial support that have never materialized, said Minnawi, adding that the USG "is very far away from what it committed." He urged SE Gration for clarification on the new administration's position on the DPA, as well as its position on elections in Darfur. (Note: Minnawi maintains that elections should not be held in Darfur until the DPA is enshrined in the interim national constitution. End Note.) SE Gration replied that the DPA remains a very good agreement, and should be the "foundation" of whatever ultimately comes out of the Doha peace process. With regard to the election, SE Gration noted that given the displacement of persons as a result of the conflict in Darfur, an interim power-sharing arrangement might be better suited to allow fledgling political parties time to win the "hearts and minds" of the people in Darfur. ¶3. (C) Minnawi questioned USG engagement with JEM in the Doha peace process, and warned SE Gration in ominous tones about JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim. "Khalil is a muhajedeen (referring to the JEM Chairman's time as an army doctor who took up arms in the 'holy war' with the South) and a fundamentalist," he said. "And Khalil is not alone in Darfur as he claims." Minnawi then expressed extreme skepticism that a Doha peace process in which JEM is prominently featured could serve as a stabilizing force in Darfur. "Once Khalil signs a ceasefire with the government, he'll return back to Chad and focus his energy on attacking other movements," said Minnawi, noting that JEM was at that very moment attacking his forces near Umm Baro (to be reported septel.) SE Gration acknowledged the USG has reservations about JEM and its Islamist roots, emphasizing that the U.S. goal is not to empower JEM, but rather, to gain traction for the long-stalled peace process. "I place you higher than JEM because you signed the DPA," said SE Gration. "But if you want us to stop engaging with JEM, we need you to step up and help fill the void," he said. SE Gration then urged Minnawi to collaborate with other SLA factions to bring new weight and momentum to the Doha peace process. ¶4. (C) Minnawi and his associates, however, remained skeptical of the Doha process, largely due to their negative view of the state of Qatar. "This Qatari initiative originated from the Arab League initiative" to avoid ICC prosecution of President Bashir, said SLA/Minnawi confidante Mohamed Tijani. He questioned the Qataris' commitment and motives, noting that "when they came here initially, they never even approached us to learn about the DPA, though we are the signatories." Minnawi added that the Qataris remain ignorant of the situation on the ground in Darfur, in part because they've failed to consult all parties. "Despite many promises, they have still not reached out to us," he said. Minnawi asserted that his movement must be an active party if the Doha peace process is to succeed, and noted that despite the lack of outreach, he has sent someone from his movement (SLM/Minnawi Secretary General Ali Dosa) to Doha as part of the latest GOS delegation there, though he did not explain in what capacity. SE Gration lauded this step and encouraged KHARTOUM 00000639 002 OF 002 Minnawi to travel to Doha himself, asserting his utmost confidence in the abilities of UN/AU Joint Chief Mediator Bassole and the intentions of Qatari facilitator FM Ali Mahmoud. ¶5. (C) Comment: Minnawi's relevance both politically and militarily continues to be shaky, but he should never be discounted as a possible serious spoiler to peace process. Nonetheless, his presence in Doha would certainly benefit all parties involved and should continue to be encouraged. Indeed, it appears that Minnawi is finally beginning to process the implicit messages of the need to move beyond the DPA. With regard to JEM, Minnawi is correct in his analysis that JEM intends to follow the SPLA model of consolidation by force, money or whatever means necessary to establish itself as the sole military force in Darfur. This has had (and will continue to have) destabilizing effects on the ground; JEM's attack on Muhajeria (and subsequent GOS bombing) ultimately triggered the displacement of over 40,000 Zaghawa civilians from South Darfur into Zam Zam camp outside of El Fasher. JEM's ongoing incursions into Um Barro have caused civilians to flee to a nearby UNAMID base for safety. A ceasefire with JEM--and ultimately an end to Chadian (and Libyan) financial and military support for JEM--remains necessary to achieve a stable and viable solution to Darfur, but is far from sufficient. Reconciliation between the Fur and Arab tribes of Darfur, two elements seemingly forgotten in the Doha process, remains the ultimate goal. ¶6. (U) SE Gration cleared this cable prior to transmission. FERNANDEZ