"DON'T HOLD BILATERAL RELATIONS HOSTAGE TO THE NGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000636 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SE GRATION, USSES, AF A/S CARSON NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ASEC KPKO UNSC AU SU SUBJECT: "DON'T HOLD BILATERAL RELATIONS HOSTAGE TO THE NGO ISSUE," NAFIE TELLS SE GRATION Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The lifting of sanctions on Sudan and removal of Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism list remain the highest priorities for the Government of Sudan, Assistant to the President Nafie Ali Nafie told SE Gration on May 7, accusing the U.S. of holding these more essential issues hostage to progress on the return of the 13 expelled international NGOs. Counseled by SE Gration that the regime must take concrete steps to improve its perception in the U.S., Nafie asked that SE Gration move beyond former US policies designed specifically against the NCP. On the Doha talks, Nafie conceded that the U.S. plays a significant role, and cooperation on this issue could potentially improve U.S.-Sudanese relations. The GOS fully supports a cessation of hostilities in Darfur, and provided that negotiations in Doha lead to a peace deal in Darfur to prevent armed conflict by JEM, then the GOS will move forward on a timeline and a staggered process on the release of JEM prisoners in GOS custody. End summary. ¶2. (C) Welcoming Presidential Special Envoy to Sudan General Scott Gration in his Khartoum office on May 7, Assistant to the President of Sudan Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie thanked SE Gration for the USG's "serious moves" made in Doha on Darfur and Chad-Sudan bilateral relations. Recalling how he enjoyed the April 15-17 visit of Senator John Kerry, Nafie similarly remarked that he was glad that the USG is coordinating its policy on Sudan through the office of the Special Envoy. SE Gration responded by pointing out that for real change in U.S.-Sudan bilateral relations, the Government of Sudan (GOS) needs to make its progress on vital issues more pronounced. In the short term, SE Gration reminded Nafie that the issue of the 13 expelled NGOs remains central; only when they return and reach full capacity will Darfuris feel the impact of SE Gration's effort, a move which will then permit the USG to move forward on issues of importance to the GOS, including the lifting of sanctions and the removal of Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism list. Progress in Doha is equally critical, as talks there must conclude in a cease-fire in Darfur and a timeline of steps to a peace deal, including phased releases of prisoners of war. ¶3. (C) On the issue of bilateral relations, Nafie told SE Gration that talks must encompass "real issues" of direct importance to the National Congress Party (NCP) and the people of Sudan. "If bilateral relations are kept hostage to the advocacy NGOs in the West, then nothing will be done," he said. Adding that Sudan's myriad of internal problems should have no bearing on U.S.-Sudanese relations, Nafie pointed out that the NCP deems issues such as the removal of Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism list, and the lifting of sanctions, to be of higher priority. "We must discuss the reasons for the sanctions," Nafie said, and accused the U.S. of obfuscating official policy by searching for any justifications to slight the NCP. "We can explain ourselves and Qce those who believe we are devils, so we can find some common ground. But if we continue to discuss the NGOs, we will not progress." ¶4. (C) SE Gration reminded Nafie that a main issue that underlies progress on bilateral relations is the perception of the Sudanese regime in the U.S. As the expulsion of the NGOs remains a high-priority issue in Washington, a key way to change our perception of Sudan, and the NCP, is to hasten their return. "The faster we can change perceptions in the U.S., the faster we can progress," he counseled Nafie. "We feel you are serious," Nafie responded supportively, but challenged that the primary issue ahead of both parties is more than one of perceptions. Referring his notes, Nafie read the delegation a translation of alleged testimony reputedly by U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner before Congress on April 28, 2009. "'We will continue to allow sanctions on Sudan as long as Sudan is a source of instability in the region and a cause of humanitarian problems,'" Nafie reported Secretary Geithner as saying. Disappointed that Geithner's alleged remarks underlie U.S. policy on Sudan, Nafie pointed out that U.S. sanctions only adversely affect areas controlled by the NCP, as the USG has issued exemptions from the sanctions for Southern Sudan and Darfur. According to Nafie, the U.S. must give the NCP more in return for its efforts to improve bilateral relations. "You must address this policy. When we do something good, you only give us bits and pieces." KHARTOUM 00000636 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) The NCP views the U.S. as playing a "significant" role in the Doha negotiations, and Nafie said that with Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salaheddin acting as the NCP focal point in Doha, any progress made in the course of negotiations there between GOS and Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) will further U.S.-Sudanese bilateral relations. Asked about a potential ceasefire in Darfur and a peace agreement, Nafie prefaced the discussion by warning that any deal on the release of JEM fighters currently detained by the GOS is entirely dependent on the signing of a cessation of hostilities leading to a peace agreement in Darfur. "If Khalil Ibrahim is planning an assault right now, it is not logical to talk about releasing his commanders," Nafie said. "If we have a ceasefire, some will be released. Then if we have a peace deal, then we will release the rest." Reiterating that the GOS will sign a peace deal and agree to a timeline, Nafie said, "If the final peace is decided the day after tomorrow, we will do it." Closing the meeting, Nafie repeated, "We have a very well-established policy. We agree to the release of the prisoners if there is a cessation of hostilities and peace." ¶6. (C) Comment: Nafie's stated eagerness to sign a ceasefire for Darfur reflects two facets of the reality in Darfur: first, that the GOS has not conducted offensive military maneuvers over the last two months, signaling a mix of victory and fatigue; and second, that the events of May 10, 2008 loom large as progress is made in Doha. Nafie's comments on the cease-fire and peace deal will hopefully set the stage for an eventual good-faith NCP executive decision to stagger a release of captured JEM fighters, including the release of Osher Ibrahim, half brother of JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. Whether this will engender the same in the always volatile, always unpredictable JEM leadership remains a heavy task before Chief Negotiator Bassole. The senior leadership of the NCP continues to believe that JEM, which also has roots in the NCP itself, is not serious about a peace deal and still seeks a military victory on the ground in Darfur. ¶7. (C) Comment, continued: By suggesting that Sudan's problems should be detached from punitive measures taken by the U.S. to change NCP regime behavior, Nafie revealed that hard-liners' in the regime will continue to view the U.S. push on humanitarian issues as inappropriate and not germane to the conversation at hand. Although the comments Nafie credited to the Treasury Secretary may be a mistranslation or mis-attribution the fact that they were brought up in the meeting signals that Nafie still recognizes the good-faith moves of the Special Envoy. Until assured otherwise, the veteran hard-liner may have no choice but continue to view our efforts with skepticism, and refuse to take the steps that we would like to see on Darfur and CPA. End comment. ¶8. (U) SE Gration cleared this cable prior to transmission. FERNANDEZ