SPLM SG AMUM URGES THE USG NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000611 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/E NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS TO USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI KDEM AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: SPLM SG AMUM URGES THE USG NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF SUDAN'S LARGEST ISSUE: CPA IMPLEMENTATION REF: KHARTOUM 592 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4(b) a nd (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Secretary General of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Pagan Amum emphasized the importance of critical items within the CPA being implemented in a credible way, in particular the elections and the referendum, by 2011 in order to keep peace alive in Sudan. He laid out a number of post-2011 scenarios, and did not rule out the all-out collapse of Sudan resulting from the National Congress Party's refusal to allow the 2011 Referendum to take place (mostly through its refusal to agree upon a referendum bill.) He also outlined the NCP's tactics for destabilizing the South through arming militias and Arab tribes, attempting to politically divide the SPLM through nefarious actors, and withholding revenue and resources. Amum assured the CDA that any war that would be fought would be won on the ground, and stated that the SPLA/M would defeat the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) due to the size, strength, and firepower of its infantry. The SPLM SG also urged the USG not to become a victim of the NCP's game of fabricating constant crises in order to distract from Sudan's larger problems of CPA implementation and a political settlement to the Darfur conflict. He warned that the NCP will try to pigeon-hole the USG (and Special Envoy Gration) into solving the minor crises of the day, rather than focusing on the issues that need to be resolved in order to create a lasting peace for all of Sudan. End Summary. SG AMUM RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT NORTHERN CENSUS DATA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) CDA met with Secretary General of the SPLM Pagan Amum at the party's new headquarters building in south Khartoum on May 6. SG Amum told CDA that he discussed the census results with the Chairman of the Southern Sudan Center for the Census and Statistical Evaluation (SSCCSE) Isaiah Chol on May 5. Chol outlined three anomalies in the North's data: a) an absurdly low number of Southerners in northern Sudan (and especially Khartoum); b) an unusually high population in South Darfur; and c) a suspiciously high population of nomads (reftel). The north's data reflect that there are only 240,000 Southerners in northern Sudan, said Amum. According to the SPLM SG, there are at least two million southern Sudanese in the North. Amum said that the population recorded for South Darfur demonstrates an "abnormal growth rate" that is double the region's mean population. Finally, Amum said that the large increase in nomads is "not normal;" does this mean that more settlers are becoming nomads? he asked; "This doesn't make sense," he added. Because the North refused to share its raw census figures with the South, these problems were not resolved at a technical level and are quickly becoming "political," said the SG. Amum noted that the northern census data reflect a troubling pattern: a reduction of Southern Sudanese in all of Sudan and a reduction of African tribes in Darfur (coupled with a rise in Arab tribal populations in Darfur). The North's data largely question whether western Sudan is a Dar-Fur or Dar-Arab region. (Note: "Dar" in Arabic means "land of" End note.) "These things lead me to conclude that the census has been manipulated for political reasons," said Amum (reftel). (Note: The GNU Presidency agreed to endorse the 2008 census results on May 7 in Khartoum. GNU First Vice President and Government of Southern Sudan President Salva Kiir told Special Envoy Gration on May 8 that the parties made a "political decision" to endorse the results so that CPA implementation could continue to move forward. Kiir said that the SPLM noted its concerns about the North's data and the two parties further agreed that the results would not be used for elections, power-sharing or wealth-sharing arrangements. (septel). End Note.) THE FUTURE OF SUDAN POST-2011 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Amum outlined three possible scenarios for Sudan post-2011: a) a united, stable, and peaceful Sudan in which the Sudanese people feel like they have a new sense of belonging; b) two independent, separate Sudans that negotiate agreements on resource-sharing, trade, movement of people across the border, and other items; and c) a Sudan at war that could end in the nation's total collapse. There are 20 months left for "Sudan to come to an end," said Amum. He said that option "a" is the least likely because Sudan has KHARTOUM 00000611 002 OF 004 not used its four years (nor will it use the last two year interim period under the CPA) to "re-create itself" into an attractive, unified state. While scenario "b" is most likely, the SPLM is working from the worst-case scenario (scenario "c"),trying to find a peaceful end to Sudan post-2011. In the worst-case scenario, the NCP will delay the referendum because it wants to put conditions on post-2011; this will lead to war, said Amum. That war might be brief and could lead to the emergence of two separate states, or it could lead to the complete collapse of Sudan, he grimly warned. The question is, how do we assure that a referendum happens on time so that war doesn't break out? asked Amum. How do we break Sudan's pattern of war-peace through a peace agreement that is ultimately dishonored-war? he questioned. This pattern is what we need to prevent this time, said Amum. In order to break this pattern, the NCP needs to allow the referendum law to pass and the referendum to be held on time, he continued. "What they are doing now is the surest way to go back to war," said the SG. (Note: Currently the NCP is refusing to debate the southern Sudan Referendum Bill until the SPLM agrees on post-2011 arrangements on wealth-sharing and other items. End Note.) "It is as if they are putting a gun to our head and telling us to sign here now (on post-2011 arrangements); we won't accept that," stated Amum. The best thing for the NCP to do is to put down their guns, allow the Referendum Bill to pass, and then move to engage the SPLM in an "if" analysis on the separation or unity discussion - something that is also necessary, continued the SG. ¶4. (C) CDA raised a variation on scenario "c" that entails the NCP seeking to destroy the South and the SPLM from within through nefarious actors such as warlords Gordon Kong and Gabriel Tang, SPLM turncoats Bona Malwal and Lam Akol, and others. "This (tactic) seems to be gaining momentum in an effort to weaken the SPLM; am I right?" the CDA asked Amum. Amum agreed that this was also his sense; "this is exactly their plan," he said. The NCP is stepping up their campaign to destabilize the South, particularly by arming militia groups and Arab tribes, seeking to divide the SPLM politically, and withholding or delaying revenue and resources to the South (similar to what is happening with the Abyei Interim Administration). "The South will not collapse on its own, but (the NCP) want to seek to destabilize it so that they can "walk through" it and then seek to restore it, proving to Southerners on the ground that a unified Sudan is one that can keep peace on the ground," speculated Amum. "They will not be able to accomplish this completely," he said. Amum acknowledged that the destabilizing nature of tribal warfare in Jonglei, Warrab, and Lakes States is a problem. He said that the NCP is trying to destabilize Upper Nile State by arming militias; the violence "will not go further than that, though. Amum pointed out a salient fact - that if the NCP seeks to delay the referendum, then it will undermine itself. The very actors the NCP uses to foment instability in the South are the ones who desperately want the referendum to go forward. The South will unite itself around the referendum and even the NCP's Southern agents will flip sides and join the SPLM in the fight for the referendum to take place. The NCP is "digging its own grave," said Amum. ¶5. (C) The SPLM SG proudly noted that the SPLA/M is stronger now than any other time in its history. "We have 160,000 men in garrison." Their mobility and firepower are much higher than they ever have been and most of these men are "experienced infantry." The NCP underestimates this, said Amum. If the referendum is delayed and fighting ensues, these men will become a "volunteer force;" they won't care about salaries, stated Amum. On the other hand, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) used to command a strong infantry constituted of fighters from Darfur and the South. They have lost this and substituted it with a "strong mechanical infantry with high firepower and air capability." Holding a biscuit and drinking tea, Amum said, "(their infantry) will be like biscuits for the SPLM." If there is a war, it will be a "border war," and it will end in the North, the SG said assuredly. The NCP has one thing that the SPLM doesn't and that is a strong airforce that can deliver powerful strikes against some SPLA targets and the civilian population, in order to "terrorize the South into submission," Amum explained. However the Southerners won't flee; they are resilient people; they have lost five million lives in fighting before, he continued. CDA added that the SAF also KHARTOUM 00000611 003 OF 004 possesses SU-25 ground attack aircraft that can destroy tanks. Amum acknowledged that and stated that the SAF uses air power to "compensate for a weak infantry." "Wars are settled on the ground," he said. ¶6. (C) Amum noted that a return to war in Southern Sudan only takes a "few (junior) officers on the ground" to take up arms (such as started the second civil war in 1983). If that happens, SPLM leaders will have to make a decision: a) consider the act a mutiny, move to stop it, and continue engaging in dialogue with the North; b) agree with the military decision and call for a war; or c) the leaders depart the country and allow the next generation to take on the newest struggle - a struggle for the "young boys" now. Amum said that even his daughter (who is currently a medical student in Australia who will soon join the Australian Armed Forces) would return to fight in such a struggle if it occurred. My job, however, is to "cajole or kick the NCP to peace" in the next 20 months before that can happen, said Amum. The North and the South need one another post-separation, so we need to create the conditions for an "amicable divorce" between the two nations, he said. MASTERS OF DISTRACTION - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) As someone who has lived through war for 23 years, said Amum, the question is how do we avoid war. CDA suggested that the stronger the SPLM is politically and militarily, the less attractive it would be for the NCP to instigate war against the South. Amum agreed that the SPLM must not make itself an "attractive target." CDA asked the SG for his opinion regarding the NCP's strategy with regard to the US. "They define the US as the enemy; one which they must avoid conflict with," explained Amum. They see the SPLM as a "tool in the hands of the Americans;" a group that has "sold out" to external actors. Of course, said Amum, the NCP's view of itself is very inflated and proud. The NCP's plan, explained the SG, is to "neutralize the US by cooperating with it as much as it can without giving in or disarming." It will always continue to make control and power its goal, he added. In appearing to cooperate with the US, the NCP will create "as many problems as possible" so as to take the US away from solving the real problems of Sudan that could eventually lead this country back to war. They will make deals with the US on those problems that are not real problems, he warned, "taking the US for a ride." The latest problem they have created and deal they have made with the USG on bringing back four INGOs to northern Sudan is an example; this is a "game" for them - a game intended to neutralize you, said Amum. And they will turn it into a real public relations exercise, he continued. The NCP can be nice; they are "smooth liars," he warned. At the same time they are distracting the U.S. and other nations from the real problems of Sudan. They will move to dishonor the CPA and show a strong force on the ground. They will then use the Americans as a tool and have the Americans tell the South that it should make a deal with the North. ¶8. (C) Amum told the CDA that the timing of Special Envoy Gration's work is "very critical" because he is in Sudan "at the last moment." His goal should be to move Sudan to a stable, peaceful, democratic end-state Sudan that has good relations with the US and the world, opined Amum. To achieve this, SE Gration needs to be focused on very specific objectives. Amun prioritized these objectives as implementation of the CPA (with a particular emphasis on elections and the referendum) and secondly, finding a security and political settlement to the problem in Darfur. His ultimate goal should be to seek a peaceful Sudan through the conduct of a peaceful referendum for which the results are credible and accepted by the people, said Amum. The conduct of credible elections for which the results are accepted by the Sudanese people, is also very important, he added. If elections are not credible, it could lead to the collapse of Sudan through a return to civil war, he warned. Additionally, credible elections will require that critical national laws such as the press/media act and the national security act are reformed, and that there is a new environment that respects freedom of speech and respect for human rights, said the SG. ¶9. (C) Amum proposed that the SE follow the SPLM's "short-cut" approach to solving the problem of Darfur. The KHARTOUM 00000611 004 OF 004 approach has several components, explained Amum: a) the US, UK, France and other nations must take the initiative to call for an immediate cease-fire in Darfur, monitored by UNAMID; b) if found to be necessary, the US should re-inforce the cease-fire with the declaration of a no-fly zone to ensure the protection of civilians; c) the cease-fire would permit and persuade all of the rebel movements to come to the negotiating table and work out a political settlement. Amum said that because there is no military victory or end-game for either the NCP or the rebel movements in Darfur, both would welcome a cease-fire as a "way out." China and Russia, in his opinion, would jump onboard the cease-fire idea because they are "having trouble helping an un-helpable regime." The NCP will see the declaration of a no-fly zone as a big threat, but within the context of establishing a peace, and they will accept it, claimed Amum. Finally, Amum said it was necessary for any negotiations to include the participation of the US, UK, France, Norway and other peace partners. "The way Doha is structured will not work; AU/UN Chief Mediator Bassole and the Qataris are not enough" to bring the movements to the table to reach a political settlement, opined Amum. If this can be achieved, the SPLM can "step up" its process to unify the movements and push the NCP to arrive at a common GNU position, and encourage all parties to sign an agreement. Granted, he said, if the NCP doesn't allow the referendum to go forward (or even the law allowing it),then why should we (the SPLM) try and persuade other marginalized groups to sign an agreement with the NCP that it ultimately will not honor, he said. COMMENT - - - - - ¶10. (C) While Amum is known for laying out doomsday scenarios, his dire analysis of the current political environment and insight on what is likely to happen in Sudan has depth and deserves attention. Amum is correct that if the SPLM is not able to persuade the NCP to implement critical elements of the CPA, including the elections and the referendum, by 2011, then the future of Sudan is a bleak one. He is also correct in observing that the GoS regime is a master of distraction and deception, always throwing its partners, as well as the international community, off-track from solving Sudan's largest problems and instead launching them into painstakingly long debates and negotiations over the minutia of smaller problems, which the NCP intentionally fabricates. This group of "smooth liars'" only interests are the real-politique end game of wanting to be in control and wield power over all of Sudan, and improving bilateral relations with the US in pursuit of this goal while offering as little as possible in return. Amum raises a very important point - that the USG, and especially SE Gration, must not allow themselves to become mired in the crises of the day; instead they should keep focused on the larger problem of Sudan, which is the non-implementation of the CPA and Sudan's (potential) disintegration as it moves towards ¶2011. End Comment. FERNANDEZ