HOSTAGES RELEASED, MANY FRENCH NGO WORKERS LEAVE DARFUR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000604 DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C, CA/OCS/ACS/AF NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU CAIRO FOR CHRIS ROWAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL CASC KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: HOSTAGES RELEASED, MANY FRENCH NGO WORKERS LEAVE DARFUR REF: A) KHARTOUM 476 B) Khartoum 371 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: After being held for 26 days in western Darfur, two Aide Medicale Internationale (AMI) aid workers (one Canadian, one French) were released by their abductors on April 29. As the French Embassy believes that its nationals and NGOs may be targeted for kidnapping, they have asked all French NGO workers to temporarily leave Darfur and remain in Khartoum for present. The Government of Sudan has shown few signs that it will pursue the abductors responsible for either this or a previous kidnapping of international aid workers. While the French NGO, French/Canadian Embassies, and Government of Sudan (GoS) all deny that any ransom was paid, rumors to the contrary are circulating in Darfur and could embolden kidnappers to continue to pursue western hostages. END SUMMARY ¶2. (SBU) The motives and identities of the abductors of the now-released AMI employees (French nurse, Canadian Administrator) remain murky. The group variously identified itself as "Liberation of Sudan from Foreigners" and "Falcons for the Liberation of Africa" (an earlier group of kidnappers initially used a similar name "Falcons of Bashir"). Their public statements to the media conveyed that they oppose France's policies in the region, but their communication to their AMI, GoS, and French/Canadian Embassy interlocutors signaled that their primary if not exclusive motive was a cash ransom. One week after the abduction, the Canadian conoff informed the abductors that Canada, the US, Australia, and the UK have a common policy not to pay cash ransom to kidnappers. The abductors ceased contacting the Canadians after this call. The French, likewise, informed the abductors that their policy is not to pay ransom, and the abductors ceased contacting the French Embassy. ¶3. (SBU) After the abductors felt that they had reached a dead-end with the Canadian and French Embassies vis-`-vis ransom payment, they contacted media outlets with a threat to kill the hostages unless the French aid workers involved in the 2007 Zoe's Arc "child abduction" case in Chad were re-tried in France. They also attempted to pursue negotiation with the Chadian government, but the latter refused to respond. The Canadian Consul believes that the abductors were likely casting out lines to whomever they believed would pay the highest ransom. ¶4. (SBU) The Canadian and French governments both flew in negotiators, who were issued Sudanese visas within 24-hours, to advise and liaise with AMI and the GoS as they conducted negations with the abductors. AMI was reticent to cooperate with the Canadian Embassy and ceased participating in the Embassy's daily conference calls after four days. The abductors appear to have been relative amateurs as they interchangeably demanded dollars and Euros in different sums with nearly every phone call. The cash ransoms demanded by the abductors ranged from four million to half a million dollars. ¶5. (SBU) The abductors told the two AMI employees, both women, that they had been conducting surveillance on their NGO for some time, including photographing the compound. The aid workers developed a good rapport with the abductors, who provided them with three meals per day and cigarettes. They report that they were not physically abused and, contrary to media reports, did not experience any health issues during the ordeal. ¶6. (SBU) Approximately one week before the hostages were released, a GOS National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) team arrived in Nyala and took over direct communication with the abductors from AMI. NISS negotiated the hostage release in Nyala on April 29. All parties involved deny that a ransom was involved, but rumors are circulating in Darfur that a ransom was indeed paid. The aid workers report that during the handoff when they were released by the abductors to NISS, the hostage-takers and GoS security personnel greeted each other warmly and embraced. (Note: Warm greetings with an embrace are customary in Sudanese society, and the fact that the abductors embraced the GOS officials does not necessarily mean they knew them. End note.) ¶7. (SBU) In order to stage-manage the presentation of the hostages to the media, GoS officials gave the Canadians and French false information regarding the details of the release. The French and Canadians were informed by several officials that the freed aid workers would stay the night of the 29th in El Fasher. The Canadian Consul, however, received word from a source that the aid workers were being flown that evening to Khartoum. The Consul finally received confirmation from MFA Protocol Chief Ali Youssif that this was the case. Nevertheless, the MFA denied the French and Canadians KHARTOUM 00000604 002 OF 002 access to the aid workers when they arrived in Khartoum. ¶8. (SBU) On April 30, the French and Canadians were summoned to NISS Director Salah Ghosh's office to discuss the case. Ghosh told them that the GoS would only allow the aid workers to depart after the arrival of "the French and Canadian delegations." Later that day, French Presidential Adviser for African affairs Bruno Jouber arrived and the GoS held a press conference, which included the freed aid workers, French/Canadian diplomats, and GoS officials, to trumpet the GoS efforts in securing the release. Only after the press conference the aid workers were told they were free to depart. ¶9. (SBU) Pro-government media outlets reporting on the press conference touted the GoS role in the release, as in excerpts from this typical article in Sudan Vision: "The French envoy delivered the appreciation of the French President Nicolas Sarkozi, to President Al-Bashir and his government for the role and concerted efforts they made to release and ensure the safety of the hostages. He expressed hope that the relations between the two countries will develop in various fields. Sudan's State Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Karti, affirmed the responsible role that the government authorities have been playing which demonstrates the conventions, values and the manners of the Sudanese nations, pointing out that the release process was conducted in wisdom necessitated by ensuring safety and health of the hostages." ¶10. (SBU) The French DCM believes it is not coincidental that French nationals were held in both of the recent kidnapping incidents (the first involving Medicens sans Frontiers (MSF) Belgium in March). In his view, French nationals are in danger of future kidnapping due to France's statements in support of the International Criminal Court's March 4 indictment of President Bashir. In a possibly related incident in April, the AMI Nyala compound was robbed and two of their vehicles were stolen. The French Embassy has asked that all French assistance workers temporarily leave Darfur and come to Khartoum. Some 10-12 have done so. However, French nationals of three NGOs that primarily provide medical care to children have said they do not feel they can leave Darfur. The Canadian Embassy has not issued similar guidance to its nationals. ¶11. (SBU) COMMENT: The Government of Sudan has given no indication that it will pursue the kidnappers in either the AMI or MSF abductions. Indeed, MSF local staff has reportedly seen several individuals who are suspected of involvement in the MSF kidnapping walking openly in public. Also troubling is the GoS's refusal to allow Consuls to access the released aid workers or allow the aid workers to depart Sudan before they were displayed at a press conference. The GOS also appears to have used the release of the aid workers as a way to demand a high- level delegation from France - an obvious ploy to coerce official engagement from the French government. While the perpetrators of the kidnapping may have been local opportunists rather than GoS agents, the GoS at the very least may have encouraged the most recent kidnapping by its continuing rhetoric against foreign NGOs and its refusal to apprehend the MSF Belgium kidnappers. For NGOs to continue to operate in Darfur with any degree of security, the GoS must make it clear that those who target NGOS will be pursued and punished. Unfortunately, it has done just the opposite, so it is quite possible there will be additional hostage takings in Darfur. We continue to believe that an informal government connection to the kidnapping is likely, with the possibility that the perpetrators were current or former armed Arab militia (janjaweed) loosely tied to the regime who saw the open season on NGOs declared by the regime on March 4 as an opportunity to make some money. For now, none of the NGO workers has been harmed and NISS and local officials been able to control the situation, but there is no guarantee that this will always be the case. END COMMENT FERNANDEZ