DARFUR REBEL UPDATE, SPRING 2009

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000597 DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: DARFUR REBEL UPDATE, SPRING 2009 REF: A) KHARTOUM 583 B) LONDON 953 C) 2008 KHARTOUM 1614 D) KHARTOUM 220 E) KHARTOUM 507 F) KHARTOUM 481 G) KHARTOUM 372 H) KHARTOUM 425 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Although holding no territory in Darfur, JEM continues to pick up detritus from other Darfur rebel movements. Its incursion into the SLA/Minnawi stronghold of Dar Zaghawa on May 4-5 in far north Darfur indicates that it will continue to flex its muscles as it seeks to position itself as the dominant military force in Darfur. Meanwhile, SLA/Unity has been crippled by defections, and the "Tripoli Group," cobbled together from other factions, exists largely in name only. SLA/Minnawi holds limited territory south of El Fasher and in its traditional stronghold of Dar Zaghawa but has no significant military capacity. SLA/Abdul Wahid holds defensive positions throughout Jebel Marra and has no interest in striking GOS or rebel positions at lower elevations. Numerous rebel actors exist on the periphery with no effect on the situation on the ground, and Darfur remains a violent and tragic region. End Summary. -------------- JEM: A FISTFUL OF DOLLARS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Previously one of the lesser Darfuri rebel movements, Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has matured significantly in the last several months by integrating key rebel commanders and fighters from rival factions. In addition to the high-profile poaching of Suleiman Jamous from SLA/Unity (reftel A), JEM has also recruited key figures from the fractured URF coalition (Adam Ali Shogar and Mansour Arbab Younis) and SLA/Minni Minnawi (Arko Suleiman Dahiya and Bakhit Karima) and other groups as it seeks to cement its position as Darfur's dominant military power and broaden its ethnic base and popular appeal. JEM continues to reach out to other disillusioned commanders with promises of money and power, according to one defector from SLA/Minnawi to whom Ibrahim offered a high position in the movement in March. Another rebel source told poloff that for the most recent wave of recruitments, a Chadian army general named Omar Baher (phonetic) was responsible for distribution of cash "signing bonuses" for new recruits. Jamous was said to have received 300,000 Sudanese pounds (approximately 130,000 USD) in return for joining JEM, while commanders were being paid the equivalent of between 10,000 and 50,000 USD. The going rate for individual soldiers was the equivalent of 2,000 USD. (Note: While not always reliable, rebel sources have quoted figures similar to these since February 2009. End note.) Despite the success of its recruitment drive, however, sources in the UQd non-governmental organizations in Darfur stressed that, contrary to claims by JEM leadership (reftel B),it is unlikely that JEM has acquired any significant territory in Darfur, and still remains based in Um Jaras, Chad. ¶3. (SBU) On the evening of May 4, UNAMID military officials received information from a Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) commander at the Minnawi stronghold of Umm Baro indicating the presence of JEM combatants in nearby Shegeg Karo. On May 5 at 18:30 the same SAF commander informed UNAMID that JEM had taken Shegeg Karo and Muzbet, two small towns at the far northern edge of inhabitable land in Darfur. A SLA/Minnawi Commander confirmed to UNAMID fighting between SLA/Minnawi and JEM in Furawiya and the presence of JEM in the vicinity of Muzbat. (Note: Minnawi called CDA Fernandez the afternoon of May 5 to report that JEM had attacked Muzbat and Furawiya. These areas constitute the traditional lands of Minnawi's Ila Digen clan of Zaghawa. End Note.) ¶4. (SBU) Since autumn 2008, several conflicts have weakened JEM's ability to operate within Darfur, including clashes against SAF in September 2008; an internal purge directed against JEM-aligned Meidob fighters in December 2008; and JEM's disastrous escapade to Muhajeriya and subsequent retreat to Chad in January/February 2009. Besides racking up an embarrassing list of defeats in Darfur, JEM's capacity to strike Khartoum, as it did a year ago (May 2008),would likely be limited by SAF consolidation of its hold over the desert territory in far north North Darfur (reftel C). One well-connected source in El Fasher told poloff in April that the SAF has initiated plans to construct a military airport in Malha, approximately 200 km northeast of El Fasher. While some marginalized rebel actors do operate in the deserted region positioned along ancient caravan routes, SAF air assets in the area and increased SAF control north of El Fasher would mount a challenge against any JEM convoy en route KHARTOUM 00000597 002 OF 004 to Omdurman. -------------- SLA/UNITY: 3:10 TO UM JARAS -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Once a well-respected fighting force with significant resources and mobility on the ground in North Darfur (but with little political vision or coherence),SLA/Unity has withered to a shadow of its former self. The defection of Suleiman Jamous to JEM and the departure of Ali Karbino has undone the faction's control over key areas in Kafod, North Darfur, and Khor Apache, in East Jebel Marra (Note: SLA/U was rumored to have conducted negotiations with Karbino for his return to the movement as Chief of Staff, but the result is unknown. End Note.) SLA/U's most notable commander, the SAF-trained non-Darfuri Abu Bakar Kado, told Embassy Political Assistant in April that he has switched allegiances and joined Fur rebels in Jebel Marra, aligning with SLA/AW commander Mustafa Ruko. Although JEM continues to claim that Abdulla Yahia, chairman of SLA/U, will defect to JEM, Yahia has denied any connection to JEM. And while it remains to be seen whether international representatives of SLA/Unity, including Mahgoub Hussein (London), Osman Bushra (Tripoli) and Sharif Harir (N'Djamena),will continue to act in concert with the isolated members of the faction, without key commanders SLA/U's influence on the ground in Darfur will likely be minimal. ¶6. (SBU) Despite the gradual dissolution of the movement since the start of the year, former SLA/U elements still remain a destabilizing force in North Darfur, continuing their cooperation with armed bandits to attack SAF military convoys en route from El Fasher to West Darfur or Feina, on the Chad-Sudan border in North Darfur. In March near Korma, North Darfur, SLA/U (or bandits claiming alliance with SLA/U) attacked a SAF convoy and successfully raided its shipment of weapons, vehicles and fuel. According to the UN in April, the GOS still has not solidified control over the road connecting El Fasher to West Darfur, as SAF soldiers guarding the convoy during the March attack fled at its start, abandoning the SAF military booty into the hands of the attackers. -------------- SLA/MINNAWI: UNFORGIVEN -------------- ¶7. (SBU) UN observers, rebel sources and Darfuri experts continue to doubt whether Minni Minnawi and his movement have any significant strength left in the field. Currently, Minnawi and his associates claim undisputed territory in two scattered locations in North Darfur: Umm Barro and Karnoi, near the Chadian border; and a triangle of territory south of El Fasher, from Zam Zam IDP camp at its apex, south to the towns of Dar Es Salaam and Shangil Tobay. SLA/MM lost significant territory in South Darfur in January and February 2009 following clashes with JEM and SAF, and the movement's presence in the restive province remains only a titular office in Nyala. In a further humiliation for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signatory faction, an attempt to take back territory in the North Darfur market town of Wadaa backfired in February 2009, as Mima tribesmen unhappy with SLA/MM administration of the area executed their brethren who had cooperated with the Zaghawa movement, and relied on GOS protection in a two-day battle that drove SLA/MM forces back towards Dar Es Salaam (reftel D). ¶8. (SBU) During an April visit by Special Envoy Scott Gration to Zam Zam IDP camp (reftel E),a facility swollen with tens of thousands of new arrivals displaced by the fighting in Muhajeriya, SLA/MM managed to muster up less than a dozen armed movement security officers, uniformed in desert camouflage and new red berets. Although several technicals packed with armed gunmen supported the visit and provided protection for Minnawi, their ranks were dwarfed by the numbers of GOS police and security officers who had recently established a GOS "forward operating base" of sorts next to Zam Zam. Speaking with poloff in April, a former SLA/MM commander who had recently defected from the movement said that Minnawi's commanders in the field are not united, and while they have yet to come into conflict with one another, he believed that Minnawi's command over them was functionally ineffective. One senior SLM/MM official admitted as much in April in a conversation with poloff on the status of the DPA. "Now we must stay in Khartoum," he said. "We are too weak in the field." -------------- SLA/ABDUL WAHID: HIGH PLAINS DRIFTERS -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Geographically the most advantageous territory in Darfur, KHARTOUM 00000597 003 OF 004 Jebel Marra remains safely in the hands of the Fur rebels of SLA/Abdul Wahid who base their operations in the mountainous towns of Feina, Deribat and Rokoro. Currently not threatened by any ongoing SAF military operations, SLA/AW enjoys a relatively centralized and compact command structure, and their territory stretches west near Zalingei and north to Tawila without controlling either of those cities. Suleiman Marjan is the one SLA/AW commander who controls land outside of the Jebel Marra region, basing a miniscule contingent of the faction near Jebel Eisa, approximately 250 km north of El Fasher. ¶10. (SBU) During a visit of SE Gration and delegation to Deribat on April 5 (reftel F),SLA/AW commander Terrada estimated that his movement possesses about 100 technicals throughout Jebel Marra, though sources at UNAMID estimate that the number might be as low as 10-15. A senior UN military official who joined the delegation noted that the rebels who accompanied Commanders Terrada and Gaddura were well-armed, drove vehicles pilfered from GOS sources, and consisted of seasoned soldiers, a picture in stark contrast to other rebel movements that rely on younger fighters and Land Cruisers pilfered from international organizations. ¶11. (SBU) Unlike the rest of Darfur's rebel movements, it is worth noting that SLA/Abdul Wahid continues to enjoy substantial political support among the Fur and IDPs. As a political entity, however, the group remains subject to the whims of its mercurial leader with no apparent organizational structure. To rectify this, the Swiss Government has initiated a series of capacity building workshops for SLA/AW in Switzerland attended by Abdul Wahid, his commanders and political representatives of various overseas satellite offices. Speaking to poloff from the most recent workshop in Bern on May 3, SLA/AW Commander Ibrahim Al Helou asserted that SLA/AW has no plans to attend peace talks (in any location) unless its demand for security is met, but noted that the movement has agreed to broaden its external relations and reach out to other rebel factions and constituents, including the SPLM. -------------- OTHER DARFURI FACTIONS: BLAZING SADDLES -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Numerous marginal factions and disconnected leaders compete for attention on the sidelines of the conflict in various African capitals. The signing of the March 15 Tripoli Agreement (reftel G) has had no measurable impact on the ground in Darfur. Besides the remnants of SLA/Unity, the so-called "Tripoli Group" is composed of factions that remain inert parties to the conflict. SLA/Khamis Abdallah retains popular support among the Masalit but has little to no presence on the ground; Khamis himself is said to remain in Nairobi. The SLA/Juba faction headed by Mohamed Saleh Haraba is said to have no military presence on the ground, nor does the Maidob-based JEM/Idris Azrag faction. Very little is known about the Tripoli Group's other component, the Arab-led URFF, outside of its Asmara-based spokesman Al Hadi Agabeldour. ¶13. (SBU) JEM/Collective Leadership, the driving force behind the fractured URF coalition, maintains a marginal presence in Darfur. (Note: JEM/CL leaders travelled to Tripoli in March but are not formally part of the March 15 Tripoli Agreement. End Note.) Its chairman, Bahar Abu Gharda, is perhaps best known for his alleged role in the September 2007 attack on an AMIS Camp at Haskanita, and has at various times been claimed as an ally by both SLA/MM and SLA/U. The faction's loquacious spokesman, Tadjadine Bechir Niam, shuttles between N'Djamena, Tripoli and London. UNAMID sources estimate that JEM/CL does maintain some presence on the ground, with between one and two dozen vehicles roaming the lawless corridor along the border between North and South Darfur up to East Jebel Marra, but it is not considered a significant military force. ¶14. (SBU) Other factions include SLA/Ahmed Abdelshafie, whose leader lives a nomadic existence between Juba and Kampala. He has reportedly been provided 15 vehicles by the SPLM but his force remains very weak militarily. According to one of Shafi's close associates in Khartoum, Shafi has no plans to return to the field. The defiant, young Darfuri Arab leader Anwar Khater, who claims to have his own faction and was jailed numerous times by GOS authorities at the height of the conflict, moved to Cairo at the beginning of this year and has similarly indicated no interest in returning to Darfur. The Revolutionary Democratic Forces Front (RDFF) of Salah Abu Surra in West Darfur is static and rumored to be suffering from financial difficulties. Little is known about additional non-aligned Darfuri Arab factions, mostly due to their irrelevance. The Sudanese Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) of Ahmed Ibrahim Diriege is no longer an active movement, though as a respected former Governor of Darfur, the London-based Diraige was KHARTOUM 00000597 004 OF 004 once seen as a potential unifier of the divergent rebel groups. His interests appear to lie elsewhere, apparently, as he spent most of April 2009 far afield in Botswana. ¶15. (SBU) Comment: The reach and capacity of Darfur's rebel movements have descended to a nadir not seen since the start of the conflict. Although well-armed and organized, SLA/AW suffers from poor executive leadership and if not challenged, surely plans to wait out the conflict in the remote reaches of Jebel Marra. Holding less territory than at the start of the year, SLA/MM poses no military threat, and has few choices but to continue calling for DPA implementation. The disintegration of SLA/U was long in coming, and JEM's ability to profit greatly from the "disunity" of the movement is a sign that the Ibrahim brothers are a cut above their Darfuri brethren. But we hesitate to conclude that Darfuri IDPs and civil society will automatically benefit from the current situation, as despite the weakening of the rebel factions, Darfur remains a violent and tragic region. Since none of the rebel movements except SLA/AW has any popular legitimacy, it will be important to include civil society, tribal, and political representatives in later rounds of peace talks, so that the people of Darfur are part of the peace process and support the political agreements that are reached on resolving the conflict. ¶16. (SBU) Comment, cont'd: Ongoing instability, particularly Arab tribal clashes in South Darfur (reftel H),reveal that the GOS similarly has little ability to capitalize on the rebels' weaknesses. Unsecured roads, ungovernable tribal areas and an overall leadership vacuum in Darfur indicate that conditions are ripe for another JEM incursion into Sudanese territory. A repeat of JEM's assault on Muhajeriya, and the subsequent displacement of tens of thousands of Darfuris, could spell disaster with fewer humanitarian agencies on the ground to respond to any mass movement of civilians. Hope for providing UNAMID peacekeepers with a "peace to keep" rests with the GOS and the extended leadership of JEM, and their willingness to engage in constructive talks at Doha on the future of Darfur. A unilateral announcement by the GOS to formalize its de facto ceasefire with SLA/AW would also be a welcome next step in the peace process. End comment. FERNANDEZ