Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KHARTOUM592
2009-05-05 14:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDS CENSUS ROLL-OUT, FRUSTRATION

Tags:  PGOV ASEC PREL KPKO SOCI KDEM AU UNSC SU 
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VZCZCXRO6530
PP RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0592/01 1251409
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051409Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3695
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000592 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/E
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV ASEC PREL KPKO SOCI KDEM AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDS CENSUS ROLL-OUT, FRUSTRATION
LOOMS OVER ELECTORAL DELAYS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 578

B. KHARTOUM 400

C. KHARTOUM 382

D. 08 KHARTOUM 1522

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000592 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/E NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV ASEC PREL KPKO SOCI KDEM AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDS CENSUS ROLL-OUT, FRUSTRATION LOOMS OVER ELECTORAL DELAYS REF: A. KHARTOUM 578 ¶B. KHARTOUM 400 ¶C. KHARTOUM 382 ¶D. 08 KHARTOUM 1522 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4(b) a nd (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Finance Minister Kuol Mawien, a member of the Population Census Council (PCC) and a key GoSS advisor on the census, counseled GoSS President and Government of National Unity (GNU) First Vice President Salva Kiir to completely reject the 2008 census results during GNU Presidency deliberations scheduled for May 6 in Khartoum. Mawien urged Kiir to advocate a compromise position that would supplant the 2008 results with an extrapolation from 1956 census data. Other senior SPLM officials are counseling a similar hard line. GNU Minister of Cabinet Affairs Kosti Manibe (SPLM) said that he wasn't "entirely clear" what Kiir would do regarding the census in his meeting with GNU President Bashir and Vice President Taha. Manibe hoped that "statistical adjustments" to the data could be made or "political agreements" on how to use the data could be reached so as to avoid the GoSS' all-out rejection of the 2008 census outcome. Manibe made it clear on May 4 that an SPLM-NCP deal had not yet been made on the census outcome. Furthermore, the fate of Sudan's elections and the results of its first-ever nationwide census became intertwined on April 29 when National Elections Commission (NEC) Chairman Abel Alier passed word to Kiir of his intention to resign should elections commission funding, the demarcation of the 1956 border, and continued controversy over census results not be resolved swiftly. End Summary. UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDS ROLL-OUT OF CENSUS RESULTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Minister of Finance Kuol Athian Mawien, who is a member of the national Population Census Council (PCC),told Acting Consul General (A/CG) on April 27 in Juba that he briefed Kiir on the national census following Mawien's return from a PCC meeting in Khartoum on April 26. Mawien told A/CG that he advised President Kiir to reject the census outright as a "failed initiative,"
noting that recorded results for the Bahr al Ghazal region alone, the South,s most populous state and the largest recipient of facilitated IDP and refugee returns, were lower than those recorded during the 1956 census. That fact and other glaring anomalies found in the North's data, plus continued disputes at the technical level between the Southern Sudan Census Bureau (SSCCSE) and the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) over Khartoum's failed commitment to raw-data exchange makes it, in Mawien's opinion, impossible for the SPLM or GOSS to accept the census results. Mawien provided A/CG with the following statistics, which he maintains Kiir will dispute on May 6: Sudan (nationwide) 39.6 million South (as a region) 8.26 million Darfur 8.7 million Southerners in Khartoum 500,000 ¶3. (C) Mawien continued to note that the immediate question for the GOSS was not how the census would impact the composition of the National Assembly, but rather how census results in 2009 would impact the South,s share of oil-revenue proceeds should Southerners opt for unification in 2011. "If we accept this fabrication that we are far less than 25% of the population, these results stand for five years. We cannot adequately support our operating costs with the current revenue shares how should we be expected to cope with less?" Mawien proposed that Kiir table before the GNU Presidency on May 6 a compromise census solution that uses the 1956 census figures as a baseline, with an agreed-upon formula to extrapolate growth for all of Sudan (included the partially boycotted states of Darfur and Southern Kordofan) and use that information to supplant the 2009 findings in their entirety. Asked if he believed Khartoum would accept such a position, Mawien responded "they must, because the technical irregularities we feel the CBS has committed are far too great; there must be a political compromise. And at this point, the census and elections are far too inter-connected for Bashir; he needs one in order to get to the other." (Note: The CPA nor the Interim National Constitution link census results to wealth-sharing. Furthermore, post-2011 wealth-sharing arrangements in the KHARTOUM 00000592 002 OF 004 event of separation or unity have not yet been negotiated by the parties. Mawien's statement that census results, if rolled out in their current form, will negatively impact the South's receipt of oil wealth seems to reflect his misunderstanding that the two items are linked. End note.) GOSS Minister of Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng, GNU Foreign Minister Deng Alor and SPLM Deputy SG Yassir Arman all advocated a similar hardline in discussions with CDA Fernandez on May 4 and 5. ¶4. (C) Government of National Unity (GNU) Minister of Cabinet Affairs Kosti Manibe (SPLM),also a member of the PCC, told poloffs in Khartoum on May 3 that he was "not extremely clear" what would happen during the May 6 meeting of the GNU Presidency. He said that a political deal between the two parties on the results and how they will be used (i.e. - factored into power-sharing in the National Assembly) does not yet exist. Manibe maintained that had PCC Chairman and GNU Presidential Advisor General Bakri Saleh not publicly released census results after the PCC Meeting on April 26, then the Presidency could have to make "statistical adjustments" to the data or "political agreements" on the use of the data in order to calmly agree to its roll-out. Manibe coyly stated that a source told him that Kiir had already agreed to reject the final census results in the May 6 meeting. "I hope this source is not correct" and that the Presidency finds a way to agree on the census outcome, he said. Manibe stated that the GoSS is wary of the North's data, particularly with the unusually high numbers recorded for nomads, high population count in Darfur (when many in Darfur did not participate in census enumeration),and shockingly low count of Southerners in the North. He said that the North's unwillingness to exchange unedited data with the South adds to the suspicion that the North may have manipulated its data. (Note: Local Arabic media reported on April 27 that PCC Chairman Bakri Saleh publicly released census figures found in the census technical report. He stated that the full reports would be released following the Presidency's acceptance of the results. End Note.) UNFPA'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE CENSUS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) UN Population Fund (UNFPA) Chief Technical Advisor on the Census Bob Kandeh told poloff on May 4 that both parties are to blame for the sticky situation they find themselves in regarding the outcome of the census. There were a number of things the parties could have agreed to prior to census enumeration that would have allowed for a more transparent process, said Kandeh. For example, the parties could have stipulated pre-enumeration that raw data was to be exchanged following enumeration. The South's call for an exchange of unedited data only came after enumeration was conducted, said Kandeh. The parties also could have agreed to the release of preliminary results for the census, which would have allowed the two sides to make adjustments to the data. According to Kandeh, neither side preferred this; rather they opted for the release of one set of results only: the final results. He shunned Manibe's idea that "statistical adjustments" to the data could be made at this point in time. ¶6. (C) Kandeh also partially rebuffed the South's complaints regarding northern data. "The Darfur numbers, particularly for South Darfur, are high because of the number of nomads," said Kandeh. According to Kandeh, removing the nomadic population from the Darfur data results in a 22 percent drop in Darfur's overall population. Kandeh said that the UN's mapping exercise indicated high nomadic population numbers (resulting in 5,000 enumeration areas alone for this group), thus their high numbers during enumeration should not come as a surprise. The UN's mapping exercise also revealed resistance among Southerners living in the North to participate in the census at all, for fear of intimidation and/or data manipulation, said Kandeh. Many of the Southern IDPs living in Khartoum did not participate in the census because they were afraid of a "potential backlash" by the North, he continued. Kandeh said that the UN flagged this problem for the parties ahead of time and suggested that joint North/South enumeration teams enumerate in southern IDP camps in the North to avoid Southerners' non-participation. The parties both said this was a good idea, but never did anything about it, said Kandeh. (Note: Joint North/South teams enumerated in Abyei with success. End Note.) This might explain why the number of Southerners recorded in the North was so low, he said. According to Kandeh, the census results largely mirror the data collected during the UN's KHARTOUM 00000592 003 OF 004 pre-enumeration mapping exercise. ¶7. (C) "Those who would sup with the devil need a long spoon," said Kandeh, suggesting that the SPLM should have called for a census process with more checks and balances beforehand in order to assuage its fears about the NCP's manipulation of census data. He urged that the two parties learn from the census exercise and apply those lessons to elections. For example, said Kandeh, the parties should agree to compare voter registration data sets ahead of voter registration, in order to create a more transparent electoral process. "There has been a lot of misunderstanding and mistrust" between the parties regarding the census, said Kandeh. It has become a political game, he added. The UN census technical expert, who has been blamed at times by both parties for leaning impartially towards one party or the other, speculated that when census results are finally released, people will be "relieved." Not only is the deferment impeding electoral preparation, but tensions are running high over how the parties will react publicly upon the release of the results, he said. When poloff asked Kandeh what he thought the GoSS' reaction to the results might be, he said, "it depends on who Kiir talks to last; if he talks to GoSS Minister for Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng, he will accept the results; if he talks to Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly Speaker James Wanni Igga, he will reject the results." NEC CHAIRMAN PROPOSES RESIGNATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) GoSS Minister Mawien claimed that National Elections Commission Chairman (NEC) Abel Alier was contemplating resignation in the face of Khartoum's continued refusal to transfer funds to the Commission for electoral preparation. According to Mawien, Alier was "despondent" about the fate of Sudanese elections, and increasingly convinced that President Bashir intended to use the "promise of elections," and their ultimate delay, as a means of indefinitely postponing the 2011 Referendum. Alier shared with Mawien on April 27 his previous week's discussion with President Bashir on the need for expedited funds, transfer to the NEC (ref A). According to Mawien Alier told Bashir that if an agreement on the census, border demarcation, and financial transfers to the NEC did not occur by the end of May that elections would have to be postponed. Alier claimed that Bashir was non-committal on the question of preparedness or willingness to postpone elections, and offered no reassurances with respect to NEC funding. (NOTE: Because the parties have not yet agreed to release census results, the NEC missed its first elections preparation deadline - the demarcation of geographical constituencies; constituency delimitation was supposed to take place from April 15-May 15. UNMIS Elections Chief Ray Kennedy has noted that given NEC's limited capacity and lack of funds, there is no way the Commission will meet its early June deadline for launching voter registration, either (ref A). End Note.) ¶9. (C) Mawien claimed Alier was open about his continued dissatisfaction with the SPLM and the fact that the party had "saddled him with the responsibility of chairing a hollow process," and he demanded that Mawien press First Vice President and President of the Government of Southern Sudan Salva Kiir to re-engage Bashir on credible elections timelines (ref D). If the parties could not reach an agreement on the census and the border, there was no reason for him to remain as NEC Chairman. Alier claimed that if President Bashir did not move quickly to allow the NEC to establish elections commission offices across Sudan, then Alier would have no choice but to resign. (COMMENT: Alier has expressed deep frustration to A/CG and AIDOffs in the past about how the SPLM railroaded him into accepting the NEC Chairmanship, with a heavily guilt-laden "if not you, who?" approach. Alier has consistently maintained that he does not want to be part of an illegitimate process that would taint his legacy as one of Sudan's, arguably few, neutral elder statesmen. END COMMENT). THE SPLM AND ELECTIONS - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) GNU Minister Manibe told poloffs in Khartoum that NEC Chairman Alier is "trying to do his best," despite the political and financial challenges the NEC faces in preparing for elections. Manibe assured poloffs that Alier is "above intimidation" and will not bend to political pressure. Manibe said that the NCP's idea of holding an early GNU KHARTOUM 00000592 004 OF 004 Presidential election (separate from the other national and state-level elections) in order to restore legitimacy to an ICC-indicted President Bashir was defeated; mainly by the NEC's roll-out of an elections calendar which calls for all elections to take place simultaneously in February 2010. Manibe said the NCP tried to orchestrate an early GNU Presidential election by having 26 of its small, affiliate parties send a petition to the NEC calling for an early presidential election before the NEC rolled-out its elections calendar (reftels C and D). "The NCP never approached us (the SPLM)" on the idea, said Manibe. The GNU Minister said that having all elections take place at one time, per the NEC's electoral calendar, is the only acceptable way for elections to be conducted. Manibe noted that per the NEC's calendar, voter registration falls during the rainy season (June-August 2009). He suggested that the registration continue through November in order to prevent disenfranchising voters in the South, which is heavily affected by rainfall during the summer months. ¶11. (C) Manibe said that the SPLM's election team has only met once and is still "in the early stages" of preparing the party's strategy. Manibe, who is a member of the nine-person campaign strategy sub-group, suggested that the SPLM should have some sort of an electoral strategy (including potential coalitions and candidates) in place by mid-May. The coy Manibe did not provide any information on potential SPLM coalitions or national-level candidates. COMMENT - - - - ¶12. (C) While at one point it seemed as though the SPLM and the NCP were brokering a political agreement regarding the census outcome and the use of census results with regards to power-sharing in the National Assembly, it is clear now that anything can happen on May 6 in the absence of an agreement. The most practical solution from a political perspective would be for the parties to agree (and announce) that there were some obstacles to achieving an accurate and complete census, and therefore agree to keep the status quo for power sharing following elections (if and when they occur). However, it is evident that there is a lack of understanding regarding the census and how it does or does not affect the political environment, particularly in the South. The noxious air of mistrust between the North and the South only adds to inability of the two sides to reach a practical compromise on the data. For now, the USG should continue to counsel both parties to reach an agreement on how best to use the data, release the results with the caveats on the various obstacles to a complete census, and immediately move forward to preparing for elections. If a hold-out of the results lasts much longer, or even worse creates a crisis between the parties in the event of a GoSS rejection, elections preparation will be further delayed. End Comment. FERNANDEZ

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