JEM AND SLA/U ALLEGEDLY SKIRMISH AS JEM OVERHAULS ITS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000583 DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: JEM AND SLA/U ALLEGEDLY SKIRMISH AS JEM OVERHAULS ITS POLITICAL ARM ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Amid several high-profile defections from SLA/U to JEM, a minor skirmish in North Darfur earlier this week between rival SLA/Unity commanders has not yet spread to direct conflict between JEM and SLA/U, contrary to some early reports. JEM's political wing evolved further this week as it announced the creation of a new executive secretariat that incorporates former movement dissidents, SLA rebel commanders and senior JEM leadership into a consolidated leadership structure. Meanwhile, Sudanese authorities sentenced 11 more detainees to death for participation in the May 10 JEM assault on Khartoum, and JEM's spokesman vowed that their fighters currently in GOS custody will remain a vital issue in negotiations expected to occur in Doha, Qatar next week. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Fighting between remnants of the now-depleted Sudanese Liberation Army/Unity (SLA/U) faction was reported on April 27 near Birmaza in North Darfur, but UNAMID sources described it to poloff as a "minor skirmish." In an event somewhat reminiscent of the incident that sparked the January 2009 fighting in Muhajeriya, former SLA/U commanders Suleiman Jamous and Salih Jarbo traveled to Um Rai (close to Bir Maza) to collect several of their commanders who had refused to switch allegiances to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Fasil Hassaballah and Yousif Nureen refused to join Khalil Ibrahim's ascending movement, and when the newly JEM-allied commanders insisted they disarm, a minor skirmish erupted. A senior UNAMID official reported on April 28 that concerns about the incident appear to be overblown and noted that there has been no fighting in Darfur among any parties to the conflict since the ICC. ¶3. (SBU) Speaking to poloff on April 29 by telephone from Doha, JEM Spokesman Ahmed Hussein Adam played down the incident, saying JEM commanders had not notified JEM senior leadership of the skirmish, leading him to conclude it was Government of Sudan (GOS) propaganda. He was doubtful that different Darfuri rebels would fight each other at this time, and alluding to the Khartoum regime, he added, "We need to focus on the real enemy." Speaking with CDA Fernandez on April 28 by phone, Minni Minnawi claimed that a 40-car JEM column yesterday attacked Abdallah Yahya at a place called Amarye (which we assume is the same place as "Um Rai") near Bir Maza. After taking some vehicles, they broke off and returned to the JEM main force at the border in Wadi Hawar in a place called Budieye. Minni remarked that JEM continues to avoid GOS forces while it tries to destroy/absorb the other rebel movements. ¶4. (SBU) As part of a major movement overhaul to coordinate its political message, JEM announced a rebel "shadow cabinet" on April 27 through its website, naming JEM dignitaries, former SLA rebel commanders and former movement dissidents to posts of executive secretaries, regional secretaries, and state secretaries. Notably, Suleiman Jamous, formerly of SLA/U, was named JEM Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, and Adam Ali Shogar, also formerly of SLA/U, was named Secretary for Political Affairs. Senior commanders within JEM retained positions similar to the ones they held before, as illustrated by the appointment of JEM senior commander Suleiman Sandal to the post of Secretary for Security and Intelligence. Osman Wash, a former Ibrahim family confidant who fled to Asmara, Eritrea in 2008 following conflict within the movement, has since returned to the movement as Secretary for Legal Affairs. (Note: An English translation of the full Arabic list is available by unclass email. End note.) ¶5. (SBU) Spokesman Ahmed Adam, now also JEM's Secretary for Media, told poloff that the new structure represents the reconciliation of different factions within the movement. Proud that the new positions include tribes and ethnicities outside the Kobe Zaghawa sub-clan which has formed the core of JEM since its inception, Adam insisted that JEM leadership had "made some concessions" to former rivals, including Osman Wash and Suleiman Jamous, for the sake of movement cohesiveness and internal unity. Although Adam was not able to explain how the new leadership structure would affect the movement's political objectives, he said that JEM intends to use this structure in future negotiations at Doha. ¶6. (SBU) According to the UN and press reports, on April 26 Sudanese authorities sentenced an additional 11 JEM combatants to death for participating in the May 10, 2008 JEM assault on Omdurman. While none of the 81 JEM prisoners have yet been executed, Adam said that their release will continue to be of vital importance to the movement as it moves forward in negotiations with the GOS, especially given that Osher Ibrahim, half brother to Khalil Ibrahim, remains in detention. "They are trying to blackmail us," Adam said. "Bashir thinks this will bring him safety, preventing us from launching another attack." Adam said that JEM views Sudanese Presidential Advisor and Darfur negotiator Nafie Ali Nafie is KHARTOUM 00000583 002 OF 002 amenable to a GOS-JEM prisoner exchange, but believes that Nafie's efforts are stymied by a cautious and anxious President Bashir. "They don't care about their soldiers and offiers," he said, referring to the unknown number of GOS troops currently detained by JEM in their territory in Eastern Chad. "But we care about our people - it's important to our struggle." ¶7. (SBU) Comment: While SLA/AW is largely isolated in Jebel Marra holding defensive positions, and SLA/MM shows little real capacity for organization or strategy, JEM's senior leadership is light-years ahead in terms of sophistication. This week's announcement of a "shadow cabinet" and delineated positions for its newest acquisitions mark another step in the empowerment of the movement on a political level, one which has taken place over the larger backdrop of a leadership vacuum among the Darfuri movements. Although JEM holds little to no territory within Sudan, is still an overwhelmingly Zaghawa movement, and JEM essentially was beaten back from Muhajaria and chased out of Darfur by Minnawi, the Ibrahim family and associates cast a long shadow as they travel to talks in Doha. Sudanese authorities recently hanged a number of (non-Zaghawa) Darfuris on trumped-up murder charges unrelated to the conflict in Darfur. Should the GOS go ahead with the executions of the JEM combatants at a time when the movement is regaining momentum in the field, the regime would certainly set back the prospects for a limited ceasefire with JEM. While we have no sympathy for JEM armed combatants who are in custody given their reckless behavior, and we have little information regarding the status of the Sudanese prisoners held by JEM, senior Sudanese officials will not relinquish this valuable bargaining chip in a fit of spite but will seek to exact maximum political benefit from them. End comment. FERNANDEZ