SE GRATION IN EL FASHER: A PESSIMISTIC MINNAWI, A MYOPIC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000507 DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: SE GRATION IN EL FASHER: A PESSIMISTIC MINNAWI, A MYOPIC WALI, A DETERIORATING SITUATION AT ZAM ZAM IDP CAMP ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Presidential Special Envoy Scott Gration and delegation traveled to El Fasher on Saturday, April 4, meeting with the Wali of North Darfur, who strongly denied serious humanitarian gaps but still desires bilateral cooperation, telling the delegation "We put our hand in your hand to solve Darfur." At Zam Zam IDP camp, leaders voiced frustrations with the departure of NGOs which provided vital services to the camp, and a tour of the camp provided a firsthand view of precarious situation faced by the estimated 95,000 IDPs living there (over 40,000 arrived within the last month as a result of fighting instigated by the JEM rebel group in Muhajaria). SLM leader Minni Minnawi remains pessimistic on the prospect of peace talks in Doha, refusing to confirm his participation, and noted that he expects more displacements this year in Darfur. End summary. -------------- NORTH DARFUR WALI: "NO GAPS EXIST" -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Welcoming the SE and delegation to the newly constructed seat of the government in El Fasher, the Wali (governor) of North Darfur Osman Mohammed Kibir said that Sudanese authorities in North Darfur have a genuine interest in moving relations with the U.S. forward in a mutually beneficial direction. He assured the delegation of his "complete faith" in previous agreements, and reminded them that the international community needs to utilize the government of North Darfur in order to completely fulfill any new peace agreement with rebel movements in Darfur. "We announce our readiness to sit with any party, just to listen, and then begin deliberations," he said. "We wish to start a new beginning." ¶3. (SBU) After a short PR presentation celebrating the North Darfur government for "progress" on security and livelihood issues, Wali Kibir immediately turned to a lecture on the humanitarian situation, particularly at Zam Zam IDP camp. "The UN claims that there are 39,000 IDPs in Zam Zam, but we doubt these figures," Kibir said. "We think they are not true. The situation in the camps is good. There is no health epidemic, and there are improvements in terms of mortality rates." (Note: The UN has estimated that approximately 95,000 IDPs are currently living in Zam Zam. Over over 40,000 arrived within the last month as a result of fighting instigated by JEM in Muhajaria in January 2009. The Zaghawa inhabitants of Muhajaria left when the government took over this area that had previously been controlled by SLM/Minnawi (Zaghawa) but was forced out following attacks by JEM (also Zaghawa). End note.) Criticizing the expelled INGOs that worked in North Darfur, Kibir told the crowd the INGOs "humiliate their donors," adding, "All Sudanese NGOs have moved to fill the gap. The situation here is normal and good and no gaps exist." The largely clueless (but mostly benign) regime PR agent Kibir urged that the U.S. lift sanctions on Sudan - "IDPs are being directly affected by the sanctions," he claimed - and closed his presentation with echoes of President Obama's inaugural address by saying, "We put our hand in your hand to solve the problem of Darfur." After the meeting he criticized CDA Fernandez to the local press for directing the Special Envoy to Zam Zam camp rather than other, "better" camps in the area. -------------- ZAM ZAM CAMP: NEW ARRIVALS, CLOSED CLINICS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) A full GOS police escort escorted the SE and delegation through the final checkpoint in El Fasher, past the deep trench dug to protect the town, and down the crumbling Darfur highway to sprawling Zam Zam IDP camp. At the border of the camp, red-capped security officers from SLM/Minnawi shooed away the GOS police and ushered the group through the sandy lanes of the labyrinthine camp. As the delegation approached to meet Minnawi and camp leaders, hundreds of IDPs sent out a cheer and unfurled protest banners. "We welcome the representative of President Barack Obama for the first time in Sudan," Minnawi began. "The Special Envoy is here to listen to our problems. The government said there are no problems, but he is here to see and give an opportunity for camp leaders to speak for themselves." Zam Zam Sheikh Ali Ishaq Hamid, speaking next, smilingly thanked the delegation for their visit, and warmly welcomed officials from the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. ¶5. (SBU) Abakar Idris, leader of the older and more established section of the camp, forthrightly praised the work of the NGOs that once operated there (including CARE, a USAID partner, and SUDO, an independent Sudanese NGO),and called the expulsion of the NGOs "the most serious problem which has added to all our other problems. They came here to put an end to our suffering, to not allow us to KHARTOUM 00000507 002 OF 003 die," he said. Idris criticized the Khartoum regime for not implementing the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, an agreement that he said had led IDPs to believe that the conflict and displacements in Darfur would soon be resolved. "Now we have a situation where women and children are dying, with no way to provide for basic needs. We will not accept the situation, we ask for the international community to put an end to these violations." ¶6. (SBU) Sadig Saleh, leader of the new IDPs who fled fighting in South Darfur in January/February 2009 and had recently arrived in Zam Zam, told the delegation that the humanitarian situation in the new part of the camp has deteriorated rapidly as new arrivals have no access to health facilities. Estimating that 42,000 Zaghawa IDPs have arrived there in the last three months, Saleh bemoaned the lack of security and humanitarian assistance at the site. "We need food. We are facing danger when we collect wood for charcoal. There are land mines, and the police nearby are there only to dismantle the camp," he said, receiving sustained applause in reaction to his last point. In addition to asking the U.S. and the international community to find an immediate solution to return the expelled NGOs, Saleh said all IDPs support international justice, and he thanked the U.S. for what he called a "strong and daring" stance on Darfur. ¶7. (SBU) At the next stop of the tour of Zam Zam, surprised IDPs greeted the delegation when it paused to observe a large working water bladder, recently installed in the camp with assistance from UNICEF and the Sudanese NGO, WES. The delegation paused at the locked gates of an empty clinic formerly run by SUDO, and a vocational education facility run by CHF, both operations shuttered following the GOS decision to expel 13 international NGOs and dissolve 3 Sudanese NGOs. Ishaq, the sheikh of Zam Zam, told the delegation that since the beginning of March, two other sites (including a veterinary center) and 20 kindergartens are no longer operating for a total of 25 NGO-supported activities closed down and hundreds of camp dwellers unemployed as a result. -------------- MINNI MINNAWI: DOHA, MAYBE -------------- ¶8. (SBU) In a meeting on the evening of April 4 in an Embassy-operated house in El Fasher, Minnawi was pessimistic as he discussed with the SE the prospects for the future in Darfur. In response to SE's observation that "No one will think of peace if Darfur enters the disaster phase," Minnawi criticized the National Congress Party's (NCP) policy in Darfur, saying it engenders support for the rebel movements and Arab militias, which in turn leads to the deterioration of the security situation. "The NGOs must come back to resume work," Minnawi said, insisting that he personally has been pressuring the ruling regime to bring back the NGOs, as he believes the move to "Sudanize" humanitarian relief in Darfur will lead to disaster. Minnawi said he had attempted to organize a commission with the three Walis of the three Darfur states to push NCP authorities for a return of the NGOs, but Minnawi said the Walis crumbled at the last minute and did not press their counterparts in Khartoum to address the yawning gap. ¶9. (SBU) Minnawi was cautiously optimistic on the subject of the Doha negotiations, calling it a "good and wide process." He remarked that the AU/UN Joint Chief Mediator Gibril Bassole should support total inclusion of all movements in the process, but that Libya, Chad and JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim are not interested in peace the way that Minnawi and his movement have proven to be. Referencing his group's conduct in South Darfur in January, he said, "We know when to fight, and we know when to leave." But given that he expects increased displacements and increased fighting in the short term, Minnawi was skeptical that negotiations would bear fruit within the coming months, and he said that his experience with the DPA still weighs heavily on his decision to engage in further peace talks. "Maybe I will meet you in Doha, but can I go? Maybe they won't invite me." Minnawi said that JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim is using recent Chadian financial largesse to "buy" as many rebel groups as possible and incorporate them into JEM but "their loyalty is not strong, they are only doing it for money." -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Comment: Although not as tense as Nyala (the capital of South Darfur) the North Darfur capital El Fasher still remains a divided city through which the stinking aroma of acrimony pervades. The Wali of North Darfur's observation that the situation in the camps is "good" is correct only in that the situation in the camps KHARTOUM 00000507 003 OF 003 is not catastrophic. . Given the slowly deteriorating situation in Zam Zam, the Wali's comments show how out of touch he is with reality. As the delegation observed on April 4, the situation in Zam Zam was deteriorating daily with increased population pressures on the camp. . Now numbering more than 95,000, Zam Zam is Darfur's third largest IDP camp, and its highly politicized IDPs there are well organized, articulate in their criticism of Sudanese authorities, and desperately ready for increased humanitarian assistance. One fear of the NCP and North Darfur Wali Kibir is that Zam Zam will become another rebel stronghold and no-go area for government forces, much like Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur. That process seems well underway. ¶11. (SBU) Comment, continued: The fighting in Muhajeriya in January that swelled Zam Zam also displaced significant numbers of Minnawi's supporters, and his presence in Darfur in now limited exclusively to North Darfur, in areas directly south of El Fasher, and then far to the northwest in arid North Darfur. As his territory has shrunk but the concentration of his constituency has increased, politics in North Darfur may distract Minnawi's attention from the vital role he has reluctantly played on the national stage since signing the DPA. His "maybe" in response to whether he will go to Doha shows in stark relief the problem facing Bassole and the current international effort to bring peace to Darfur: while all parties support the concept of peace talks in Doha, they overburden their positions with preconditions and in the end often refuse to travel. The SE's initiative to hold security discussions may break this log-jam and if progress can be made in Addis on security arrangements (for example formalizing some aspects of the de-facto ceasefire between SLA/AW commanders in Jebel Marra and the government) then UNAMID will finally have something to monitor. Getting JEM to agree to any security arrangements will be much more difficult, as JEM does not actually hold any territory - the only leverage it has to extract political concessions from the government is its ability to make long-range attacks into Sudan with support from Chad. Seen in this light, if Abdel Wahid's commanders are willing to negotiate there may be more hope for progress on security arrangements with SLA/AW than with any of the Zaghawa movements. This won't reduce the level of conflict in Darfur, however. As Chief Mediator Bassole pointed out to SE Gration in their second meeting April 10, the key to reducing conflict over the long term is to engage with the two most violent and aggressive groups in Darfur - the Zaghawa (JEM, SLA/U, and SLA/MM) and the janjaweed (Arab) militias. End comment. ¶7. (U) SE Gration reviewed this message before transmission. FERNANDEZ