SE GRATION MEETING WITH UN RC DAVID GRESSLY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000501 DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/E NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MCAPS EFIN EAID ASEC AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: SE GRATION MEETING WITH UN RC DAVID GRESSLY ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The UN Resident Coordinator for Southern Sudan told U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration that with 20 months left until the 2011 Referendum, the international community, and particularly partners to the CPA, must re-focus their energies on achieving implementation of only those elements of the peace accord that will take Sudan through and beyond the remainder of the Interim Period. The CPA's ability to affect Sudan's broad-based democratic transformation was dead by 2006; with the Referendum looming on the horizon, the international community must now focus on extending the peace past 2011. Abyei's resolution, the demarcation of the North/South border, and Referendum laws for both Abyei and the South need to be concluded by the end of 2009. Only by reducing the CPA to its lowest common denominators can the world avoid a resurgence of North/South conflict. This arithmetic does not require elections, he noted, emphasizing that "while not un-useful or un-important, they are not essential to the peace." END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) UN Resident Coordinator for Southern Sudan David Gressly briefed SE Gration on the status of CPA implementation and the viability of North/South peace on April 6 in Juba. While upbeat about the changes the CPA has brought to Southern Sudan since 2005, Gressly maintained that overall, the public nature of the agreement's non-implementation (Abyei, census, JIU formation, wealth-sharing irregularities) of the accord has been so public over the past three years that should 2009 end without agreement on a law governing the 2011 Referendum, it will be clear to Southerners that their "rights will be denied again and change the dynamic of peace in Sudan." The Special Envoy asked if Southern independence was a foregone conclusion, noting concerns that expectations for what independence will hold might outstrip the reality. Gressly hedged and noted that the point of the Referendum is to assess that belief. In his opinion, the expectations gap needs to be managed at two levels: what does unification or separation mean in terms of tangible deliverables to the people, and how can either outcome be made more "comfortable" for the two CPA parties. ¶3. (SBU) Gressly counseled the SE against reading too much into continued SPLM/NCP dialogue. "Yes, they are still talking but there has been no meaningful advancement," he said, "the transformative promise of the CPA is no more." Instead, the international community needs to focus on selective CPA implementation that will carry Sudan through the Referendum in an environment of an enhanced, and extended, peace. The census and DDR, for example, are important but not essential for the Referendum. "Both sides will do the easy parts of DDR, but neither will significantly downsize," Gressly noted. On the other hand, resolving Abyei, demarcating the North/South border, and Referendum Acts for both Abyei and the South need to be concluded by the end of 2009 - or by early 2010 at the latest. ¶4. (SBU) Gration pressed Gressly on his assertion that elections are not an essential element of the CPA. "That's correct, because they are not essential to North/South peace," Gressly continued. "If the parties reject the Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling on Abyei, this will be a serious blow to the CPA; a Referendum without an established border could call into question its legitimacy, but the UN can handle the Referendum without elections, if it is required." The Special Envoy reviewed his belief that elections are an important educational tool in advance of 2011, for both the populace and government. Gressly did not disagree with the point, but noted that he questioned the mechanics of the timeframe just released by the National Election Commission - such as Southern voter registration during the rainy season. "We can still have credible elections, but it requires a good deal of organization by all parties," he said. ¶5. (SBU) SE Gration reviewed current thinking on the possibility of trilateral discussions between SE Gration, Kiir, and Taha. Gressly suggested packaging together CPA-mandated post-referendum arrangements in order to maximize each sides' maneuvering room during talks. Essential elements covered should include border demarcation, a limited-period extraordinary wealth-sharing agreement, and specific provisions for the accommodation of migratory groups (e.g., Misseriya). (NOTE: In the past, NCP has also focused on liabilities sharing, or the South assuming a percentage of Sudan's national debt. END NOTE.) Gressly also counseled that the SPLM views the CPA as a path to the Referendum, and anything that deviates from that path, or a set of benchmarks that deviate from it, will be resisted. SPLM sees its compliance with the CPA as guaranteeing the international community's endorsement of the 2011 Referendum's outcome. "SPLM legitimacy is tied to their very attempt to implement the CPA. Kiir has taken very personalized hits, and even alienated himself from his cabinet on issues such as the census, in order to get the South to that point," he said. KHARTOUM 00000501 002 OF 002 ¶6. (SBU) Gressly departed from the topic of CPA implementation to turn to the evolution of Southern Sudan. While he understood donor concern about the budget crisis, Gressly opined that it held a silver-lining: it provides Juba with a second chance to get its financial systems right. The GOSS's present revenue totals mirror those of 2005/2006, and while not a comfortable period in the fledgling government's history, "it proves they can manage this, and hopefully learn from it," to better utilize their oil revenues in the future. ¶7. (SBU) Gressly then outlined the three main security challenges for the South: 1) professionalization of the SPLA (for which he credited USG assistance efforts) 2) building the capacity and legitimacy of the Southern Sudan Police Service 3) inter-tribal conflict tied to the cultural importance of cattle and scarce natural resources. While none of these alone are enough to derail the prospects of a lasting peace, continued GOSS distraction from reform efforts - as a result of Khartoum-Juba tensions or drag on the economy because of Khartoum's non-payment of arrears, could spark violence that would lead to delays in CPA consolidation - delays within a time-period in which there is virtually no margin for error. ¶8. (SBU) Comment: We agree with Gressly's assessment that the most critical aspects of the CPA - in terms of maintaining peace and stability - are the referendum and items linked to the referendum such as border demarcation and wealth-sharing post 2011. Elections are important in order to keep the CPA on track and attempt to deliver something to greater Sudan on the "democratic transformation" promise of the CPA, but not as important as the referendum in terms of maintaining peace. Many observers have made the argument that elections have the potential to create more instability if not handled carefully. ¶9. (U) SE Gration reviewed this message before transmission. FERNANDEZ