SE GRATION VISIT: NCP PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SHOWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000485 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/E NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: SE GRATION VISIT: NCP PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SHOWS SIGNS OF REGIME FLEXIBILITY REF: A. KHARTOUM 470 ¶B. KHARTOUM 469 ¶C. KHARTOUM 468 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The President's Special Envoy to Sudan, General Gration, met with GOS Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail at National Congress Party Headquarters on April 8, 2009. Proclaiming that Sudan is willing to make a deal, Ismail hinted that the NCP would likely offer SE Gration something to address NGO/humanitarian issue, but stated flatly that the 13 expelled NGOs would not be allowed to return as part of the compromise deal. Ismail spent a large portion of the meeting lamenting broken promises made by the United States to Sudan in the past. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) SE Gration, USSES Shortley, CDA Fernandez, and emboffs met with Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail April 8 in Khartoum at NCP headquarters. Ismail began the meeting by listing four points for the Special Envoy to consider: i - the major problem between the U.S. and Sudan is mistrust, ii - any repair of U.S.-Sudanese relations must be comprehensive in its approach, with specific priorities listed, iii - the U.S. and Sudan should not "start from zero" despite the new U.S. administration, and iv - Khartoum is willing to deal. ¶3. (C) On his last point, Ismail handed the Special Envoy a non-paper that listed issues of "particular concern" to the Government of Sudan. He highlighted that all of these topics were old ones, and that they were the same that the GoS discussed with former Special Envoy Williamson. He proclaimed these priorities as CPA implementation, resolution of the Darfur problem, the lifting of economic sanctions ("it's affecting the humanitarian situation, as we are unable to get railway and airplane parts,") and the normalization of relations with the United States ("not because we are afraid of Susan Rice, but because the U.S. is a superpower and can help us have peace.") ¶4. (C) The Special Envoy replied that none of the above could occur unless the GoS delivers on a solution that will provide immediate relief to the pending humanitarian disaster in Darfur. Citing a timetable of only weeks or months before reports of death are blamed on President Bashir's decision to expel NGOs in Darfur, he urged Ismail to consider the return of large organizations like Save The Children (US),CARE, and Mercy Corps. This, he argued, would not only provide the necessary respite for the internally displaced, but would also provide political capital for the GoS that could be used to improve relations with the West. In addition, the Special Envoy stressed that a comprehensive Darfur cease-fire is needed urgently. ¶5. (C) Ismail immediately rejected the idea that the GoS is not "taking concrete steps" to cure Sudan's ills and claimed that unfulfilled commitments from the United States and the United Nations were to blame for the country's state of affairs. Ismail was careful to mention that Sudan has "no need to save face" over President Bashir's decision to expel NGOs, insisting that the action was made based on a pre-ICC-announcement report. Hinting that the NCP is "looking for options on the humanitarian issue so you (the U.S.) will be satisfied," he noted the establishment of a sub-committee that is "studying the issue." ¶6. (C) Despite his hopeful discussion of the possibility of improved relations and a compromise on the humanitarian situation in Darfur, Ismail went on at length about broken past promises from the U.S. following the signing of the CPA agreement. Like Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie, Ismail complained that "John Garang, Salva Kiir, and even Minni Minawi have been received at the White House, but President Bashir and Vice President Taha, who also signed the CPA and the DPA, have never even been invited to Washington." Ismail suggested that talks with "only one side" (i.e. - the SPLM) in Washington are "a waste of time" and that the NCP and SPLM should be present at all high-level USG meetings. ¶7. (C) Ismail also described the lengths the NCP had gone to achieve peace in Sudan since the signing of the CPA, noting KHARTOUM 00000485 002 OF 002 "there are no NCP ministers in the South, even though the SPLM has ministers and assembly members in every state up to the border with Egypt." He cited the lack of Sudanese Armed Forces in southern Sudan as a major concession and pointed out that the NCP "is not behind the trouble with the census" as evidence of his party's willingness to support the CPA. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: The National Congress Party seems to want a solution on the "humanitarian" issue in Darfur resulting from its own expulsion of the NGOs, and desperately wants to improve relations with the U.S. The constant refrain in our meetings with the regime has been that the NCP would like to normalize relations and wants to be received in Washington - the possibility of which should not be underestimated in its ability to encourage better behavior from the regime. Ismail's views hew closely to those of President Bashir - they both see themselves as "moderates" with some hardline views - and it is notable that Ismail is now the fifth senior NCP official to reject the notion of allowing the 13 NGOs back into Sudan, while at the same time offering hope of a compromise. If there is a compromise that effectively addresses the looming humanitarian crisis, it will need to be one that immediately offers clearly defined guarantees to improve the operating environment for humanitarian operations in Darfur that can be measured over time. If an improved operating environment for delivery of humanitarian services in Darfur and the Three Areas can be rapidly achieved, and a compromise can be reached to allow all programs (if not all individual expelled NGOs) to resume, SE Gration will have achieved more than the UN (plus the AU, the Arab League, and assorted visiting envoys and potentates) has achieved during a month of discussions and negotiations with the government. END COMMENT. FERNANDEZ