SHURA COUNCIL REITERATES PLEDGE TO UNITE THE FUR, BUT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000478 DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: SHURA COUNCIL REITERATES PLEDGE TO UNITE THE FUR, BUT LAMENTS GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE REF: A) KHARTOUM 153 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In an April 3 meeting with SE Gration, Shura ('Consultative') Council representatives from the Fur, Tunjur and Birgid tribes expressed frustration with the refusal of leader-in-exile Abdul Wahid to participate in peace talks. They posited that the Fur could instead be represented in Doha by a composite of civilian leadership and SLA military commanders. But they cautioned that due to the divisive tactics of the NCP regime, the Fur people are far from unified. It will be difficult to ensure that any such group is truly representative and has the popular backing of the Fur people, they said, because the government is constantly seeking to co-opt genuine civil society with pro-government actors. However, the Shura Council promised to continue working towards uniting through a shared vision for the Fur, and said they will travel to Doha themselves if necessary. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU)On April 3, SE Gration, USSES Shortley and CDA Fernandez met with Shura Council members from several of Darfur's indigenous African tribes, including El Amin Mahmoud Mohamed Osman (Fur), Ibrahim Ahmed Adam (Tunjur),Tag Eldeen Siddig Ahmed (Birgit). (Note: Tribal 'Shura Councils' are consultative councils comprised of respected intellectuals that constitute an important part of Darfuri civil society. Unlike most all of Darfur's rebel factions, these civil society figures possess a degree of political sophistication and capacity, as well as substantive ideas for resolving the conflict. Unfortunately, like Darfur's rebel factions, they are also often characterized by disunity, overlapping efforts, political ambition and personal rivalries. End Note.) ¶3. (SBU) The Shura Council told SE Gration that following their last meeting with USSES Shortley (reftel),they have been working hard to initiate consultations with Fur civil society leaders, IDPs and military commanders to achieve consensus on the destiny of the Fur people and explore alternatives to Abdul Wahid's leadership. But they lamented that they were short on resources, and that an open exchange of ideas was obstructed by the repressive regime, which works diligently to keep the Fur divided. "If you want to engage with Darfurian civil society, you have to make sure you are working with the right people," explained Mahmoud, who continued, "because there are many people who are in the hands of the government." From the GOS-sponsored Sudan People's Initiative in Kenana all the way back to the Abuja talks, he said, the government has always succeeded at co-opting civil society representation by ensuring participation of its own agents and stooges, whom it empowers with money and resources. "Doha is an even more favorable venue than Abuja" for the government to do this, said Mahmoud, citing close ties between Sudan and the Arab League. ¶4. (SBU) Noting that there was a window of opportunity for progression of the peace talks in the coming weeks, USSES Shortley asked what it would take to get a group of representative Fur leaders to Doha for peace talks. Mahmoud stated that should Abdul Wahid continue to refuse any attempts at dialogue, it was conceivable that a group comprised of Fur civilian leadership (native administration and civil society) and SLA/Abdul Wahid-aligned field commanders could attempt to represent the Fur at talks. But he noted that such an undertaking was fraught with challenges, because the government could prevent anyone it distrusted from leaving the country, or otherwise co-opt such a delegation by filling it with pro-government actors. Such is the dilemma, he said, because most of the Fur are located inside Sudan and thus subjected to the controls of an autocratic regime. On the other hand, Fur diaspora leaders such as Ahmed Diraije and Tijane Sese are largely out of touch with the realities on the ground and carry little weight among IDPs, he said. (Note: Tag Eldeen Siddig Ahmed also suggested that rebel leaders prominent in the early years of the conflict, such as Ahmed Abdulshafie and Khamis Abdalla, could also assume the mantle of leadership, although such leaders have significantly diminished instrength and relevance over the years. End note.) ¶5. (SBU) SE Gration expressed an appreciation for the difficult task of bringing people together in such an environment, but asserted that if the Shura Council wanted USG support and assistance, it had to take the lead in uniting the Fur people. "We want to help you, but you have to create an environment that allows us to do so," he said. "If you come with a unified voice, we'll make sure you have a seat at the table." The Shura Council members promised to continue their work to unite the Fur people, and accepted "the historic challenge" of going to Doha themselves if necessary. ¶6. (SBU) Comment: Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the KHARTOUM 00000478 002 OF 002 intransigence of Abdul Wahid among Fur elite, it is a testament to the effectiveness of GOS machinations (and, perhaps, the consultative nature of the Fur psyche) that they have been able to do absolutely nothing about it. By many accounts, Abdul Wahid maintains the fervent allegiance of most IDPs. Given this reality, no Fur leaders have shown a willingness to try to supplant him. Though the USG can and should encourage alternatives, any attempt to anoint someone in Abdul Wahid's place would be both ill-advised and likely met with extreme skepticism. However, developing a network of credible Fur leaders that could contribute to peace efforts and provide an alternative to Abdul Wahid's intransigence remains a valid objective. End comment. ¶7. (U) SE Gration and USSES Shortley cleared on this cable prior to transmission. FERNANDEZ