REQUEST FOR TERMINATION OF AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE STATUS

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000473 DEPT FOR UNDERSECRETARY OF MANAGEMENT FROM CHARGE INFO SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/EX TOY SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AMGT AEMR CASC KFLO ASEC SU SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TERMINATION OF AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE STATUS REF: A) STATE 22076 B) KHARTOUM 343 C) KHARTOUM 305 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Per reftel A (Para 1 B,) I have re-evaluated the conditions at Embassy Khartoum that led on March 9 to your approval of Authorized Departure (AD) status. Based on this re-evaluation, I ask that Khartoum now be taken off of AD on April 9, at the end of the 30 day AD period. I believe that conditions here have changed in a manner sufficiently significant to permit the return to Khartoum of all EFMs and non-emergency staff who voluntarily departed post under AD provisions. A detailed justification follows. END SUMMARY. -------------- SECURITY SITUATION REMAINS STABLE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Preceding the March 4, 2009 International Criminal Court's (ICC) issuance of an arrest warrant for President Omar al Bashir, the Government of Sudan (GOS) assured me that it would enhance security at all U.S. Embassy facilities and residences, and would also be responsive to all requests for increased security from the Mission. The GOS has fully complied with these commitments. They provided riot police and additional protection for the Chancery, other Embassy facilities and designated residences in the days following the ICC announcement. The GOS also has been responsive to RSO requests for security assistance and cooperation since then. There have been no violent demonstrations at or near our facilities connected with the March 4 ICC announcement or March 5 expulsion by the GOS of 13 Western NGOs (in retaliation for the ICC action) doing humanitarian work in Darfur. ¶3. (SBU) Similarly, there were no demonstrations or any other threats against Embassy staff or facilities following the March 26 announcement by U.S. and international media that there had been January and February attacks by foreign aircraft in Eastern Sudan. These reports indicated that 39 people were killed when jet fighters attacked alleged weapons convoys bound for Gaza via Egypt. When the GOS Minister of Transportation, himself from Eastern Sudan, initially charged that these attacks had been carried out by the U.S., the GOS immediately tamped-down his allegations. Government-controlled media prominently featured USG denials of any U.S. involvement in the attacks. The GOS also made statements in the media that it was investigating who had staged the January and February attacks. The GOS emphasized that it had no evidence of any U.S. involvement. Regarding Darfur, we recognize that the security situation there remains dangerous and volatile. For this reason, we will continue to limit the duration of TDY visits to this region. In addition, we will move forward with plans to build a secure office/housing platform in El Fasher to permit eventual, longer-term TDYs to Darfur. -------------- POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IMPROVES -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In response to the ICC indictment and subsequent NGO expulsions, President Bashir, other senior GOS officials and government-controlled media used strong rhetoric to blast both the U.S. and West as having "colluded" with the ICC in a "conspiracy" against Sudan. However, as reported (reftel B,) such rhetoric has decreased markedly in recent weeks, with the result that the atmosphere here is less politically-charged. Similarly, the GOS has now returned the passports initially seized from U.S. citizens and other nationals who directed the expelled NGOs. Other harassment of the NGOs and their staffs has also declined somewhat in recent weeks, although GOS demands that the NGOs provide exorbitant severance pay for their local staffs remain a source of tension. ¶5. (SBU) Having initially somewhat restricted U.S. Embassy access to senior National Congress Party (NCP) officials in the Government of National Unity (GNU) following the March 4 announcement (restricted in relative terms, as we routinely meet with numerous high-level officials despite our rocky relationship with Sudan,) the regime in recent weeks has done an abrupt about-face. It has not only facilitated high-level NCP meetings for the April 2-11 visit of new U.S. Special Presidential Envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, but also has agreed to unprecedented meetings for him with senior Sudan Armed Forces officers and the NCP Shura Council. In addition, the regime is allowing him access to previously-off-limits rebel commanders in Darfur. The GOS has also agreed to a CODEL coming here later this month. This will be the first such CODEL visit to Khartoum in the past two years. It too marks a change in the GOS's reticence to engage politically at senior levels with the USG following the ICC indictment and NGO expulsions. -------------- GOS OPERATIONAL "SLOW DOWN" SPEEDS UP -------------- ¶6. (SBU) In early March, the Post reported (reftel C) that the GOS had become increasingly less-cooperative on a range of normally-resolvable, operational issues in the lead up to the March 4 announcement of the ICC arrest warrant. These included GOS insistence on screening all outbound U.S. Embassy diplomatic pouches, a "slow down" in issuance of non-diplomatic license plates for official vehicles, the confiscation at Khartoum International Airport of a shipment of unclassified E+E radios and equipment intended for Consulate General Juba, and the refusal of visas for U.S. military officers assigned to UNAMID. During the past month, the Mission has been able to resolve all of these operational issues with the exception of the final one. Mission engagement with the MFA on the pouch issue, supported by discussions between S/USSES staff and the Embassy of Sudan in Washington, resulted in GOS agreement on April 2 to exempt all U.S. diplomatic pouches from scanning. This agreement was based on assurances of "reciprocity" for Sudanese diplomatic shipments from the U.S. In mid-March, following my direct intervention with the MFA Director of Protocol, the GOS agreed to provide non-diplomatic plates for 40 motor pool vehicles. We had made this urgent request in January 2008 following the terrorist assassinations of two of our staff members while they were traveling in an official vehicle. This re-plating will decrease the identification with the U.S. Embassy of U.S. staff traveling in such vehicles. Finally, following prolonged discussion with various GOS agencies, the shipment of official radios for Juba was released on March 31. ¶7. (SBU) Comment: None of these changes in and of itself indicates a dramatic shift for the better in U.S. bilateral relations with Sudan. Serious problems and differences with the regime remain. Clearly, though, there has been significant improvement on a large number of security, political and operational issues that caused concern in early March and led to our going on AD on March 9. In addition, it is worth nothing that despite initial concerns following March 4 that the GOS could halt incoming containers urgently needed for the completion of the New Embassy Complex (NEC) as happened last year, this did not occur. We need only 50 more containers to have all the needed materials to complete the NEC on schedule in late 2009. In the meantime, we will continue carefully to monitor all developments that affect the safety and security of our staff. We will also work to reduce the number of American staff at Embassy Khartoum by severely limiting those coming here on TDY and exploring other ways to reduce our in-country footprint. At this time, however, there is no longer a need for Embassy Khartoum to remain on AD. ¶8. (SBU) Comment Cont'd: Remaining in AD status for another 30 days will negatively affect both the Mission's operational capabilities as well as morale here at a crucial time. Staffing levels need to return to normal to allow this Mission the ability to take advantage of what may be limited opportunities for the new administration to engage the GOS on issues of vital importance to U.S. national security. These include addressing Darfur's looming humanitarian crisis, establishing a new road map for peace in Darfur, and ensuring full implementation of the U.S.-brokered, 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended Africa's longest civil war. For all of these reasons, I request that AD be terminated in Khartoum on April 9. FERNANDEZ