SOUTHERN SUDAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000459 NOFORN FOR DS/TIA/ITA AND DS/IP/AF E.O. 12958: DECL: 25X-1HUMAN TAGS: ASEC PTER AMGT SU SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SUDAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) REF: STATE 13023 02/12/09 Classified By: RSO CHUCK LISENBEE. REASON 1.4 (B),(C),(D). ¶1. (U) Keyed to ref a are the Security Environment Profile Questionnaire (SEPQ) responses below for Southern Sudan. -------------- POLITICAL VIOLENCE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Demonstrations ¶A. Are there ethnic or religious communities in country that are capable of carrying out significant anti-American demonstrations? No. The overwhelming majority of Southern Sudanese are very pro-American. ¶B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations within the last 12 months? No. ¶C. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S. diplomatic facilities? N/A. ¶D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration? N/A. ¶E. As these anti-American demonstrations usually triggered by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by domestic issues? Anti-American demonstrations, if they do occur, would likely be triggered by U.S. foreign policy initiatives. ¶F. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? Peaceful, although some have become violent in the past. ¶G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to USG property or injuries to USG employees? No. ¶H. If violent, have any demonstrators ever penetrated our perimeter security line? No. ¶I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the country within the last 12 months? Yes. ¶J. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S. diplomatic facilities? No. ¶K. What is the average size of an anti-government demonstration? 250 people. ¶L. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? They are generally peaceful due to the large security presence that is deployed when they occur. ¶M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to USG property? No. ¶3. (SBU) Macro Conflict Conditions ¶A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate or intrastate conflict? Yes. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continues to pose a threat against the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) in the border areas of Southern Sudan. Recently, reports are indicating that following a military attack against its leadership in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),the LRA is moving in small numbers in Southern Sudan to evade capture by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA),Ugandan and DRC armed forces. There have been numerous incidents of the LRA raids on villages in Southern Sudan resulting in local people being killed, and their children being kidnapped. Efforts to sign a peace agreement with the LRA have been unsuccessful thus far. ¶B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is limited to a specific region or a countrywide civil war? It is primarily limited to the border areas of Southern Sudan. ¶C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic facilities located in the region? No. ¶D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American orientation? No. ¶4. (S/NF) Host Country Capabilities ¶A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well-trained? No. The police service in Southern Sudan lacks sufficient resources to adequately protect its population. The Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) lacks vehicles, radios, and other equipment necessary to provide law enforcement services. The police are oftentimes only able to respond to crimes as a result of victims dispatching vehicles to pick up and take the police to the scene or as a result of direct support from the United Nations (UN) Civilian Police (CIVPOL) or UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). In contrast, SPLA Military Police has a good track record of response but generally handles the situation and perpetrators with brute force and unfettered use of weaponry. ¶B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies? If so, please elaborate on effectiveness of training. The U.S. Department of State has a fledgling program targeting the criminal justice sector funded via the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement totaling $13.5 million in FY'09. Some of this support is directed towards training, equipping, and capacity building of the Southern Sudan Police Service. U.S. economic sanctions prohibit USG assistance being provided to security organs associated with the Government of National Unity. ¶C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious, widespread corruption inside their agencies? Yes, while the RSO enjoys a good working relationship with senior police officials, the police force as a whole is under equipped, inadequately trained, and subject to corruption. It is not uncommon to find an armed policeman intoxicated while on duty or in uniform. There have been numerous reports of harassment of Westerners by the lower levels of the police force. This generally involves the victim being accused of some "crime," such as a traffic infraction and then they are requested to pay a fine or buy beer and/or cigarettes for the officer. Police officers are severely underpaid, which makes them easily susceptible to bribes. ¶D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable of deterring terrorist actions? Yes, The Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) in Southern Sudan is made up of 90% Southerners and 10% Northerners. It is the only post-CPA institution in the South and coordinates border control efforts with other related security agencies in the South with NISS efforts in the North. Particular effort is exerted on following Somali extremists into Sudan and their activities in the South. ¶E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with U.S. Embassy requests for information and support? Yes, NISS has reached out to the USG for support in its efforts to monitor borders and has offered up information on extremist activities upon request. ¶F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats in recent years, have host country security services been able to score any major anti-terrorism successes? Yes, but this information is sensitive and compartmented. ¶G. Has the host country been responsive (re: timeliness and allocation of resources) to Embassy requests for protective security? Yes. ¶H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at major airports in the country? (Excellent; Very Good; Good/Average; Poor) Poor. The Juba International Airport lacks basic security mechanisms to adequately safeguard passengers and crew members. Access control to the tarmac and other areas of the airport is loose and many times people can just walk around the security mechanisms that are in place. The airport also lacks x-ray machines and walk-thru metal detectors. Passengers are searched using handheld metal detectors, and baggage is manually searched, if searched at all. ¶I. How effective are customs and immigration control agencies? (Effective, Average, Ineffective) Ineffective. Customs and immigration agencies lack the necessary equipment and tools to sufficiently enforce customs and immigration law. ¶J. How effective are border patrol forces? (Effective; Average; Ineffective) Ineffective. The borders of Southern Sudan are porous due to the lack of adequate border patrol forces. These forces are underpaid and inadequately trained and equipped to secure the large border areas. Their low pay makes them subject to bribes and kickbacks. -------------- INDIGENOUS TERRORISM -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Anti-American Groups ¶A. Are there indigenous anti-American terrorist groups in country? Yes. ¶B. If yes, how many? Please name groups. To say there is an organized group or unified organization of Somali extremists may be to overstate the issue. However, Juba is a portal through which Somalis of all types come and go. Some are economic refugees seeking a better life in Sudan, Libya, or Europe. Others may well have a political purpose, one that is anti-Western. The Somalis in Juba control a large number of Hawallas (money exchange),as well as two-thirds of the gas stations in Juba. It is through these businesses that logistical support can be provided to Somalis, including those with extremist views. To date, however, there is no evidence that Somali extremists are trying to exert their political views on Juba and South Sudan itself. In addition, the following groups with a known presence in Khartoum have considerable freedom of movement within Sudan. If seen as a soft target with relatively minimal defense, US and Western diplomatic facilities and personnel would make an attractive target for these groups: -- The self-proclaimed Al Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Niles (AQTN),an indigenous AQ-inspired terrorist group, which was disrupted in August 2007, but many of whose members were subsequently released from custody. The organizational status is unclear, although it is known that the original AQTN is now defunct. -- Abu Hazem Group, though this group is largely defunct. -- Takfir Wa Al-Hijra was once part of the Ansar Al-Sunna, but split away because the originating group was deemed as not sufficiently pure. The group is the greatest concern for the GoS due to its extreme view of Islam and intolerance for others, including fellow Muslims. The group has not attacked Khartoum since 1994. However, their 1994 attack on fellow Muslims left 16 people dead. -- There are preliminary indications of a group called Muslim Forces Union aka Itahaad Qiwaa Muslimeem. -- There are numerous informal cells and networks espousing extremist ideology and jihad against U.S. and Western interests. ¶C. Have these groups carried out an anti-American attack within the last 12 months? Yes, the January 1, 2008 assassinations of USAID officer John Granville and LES driver Abdelrahman Abbas were carried out by a small cell that included former AQTN and Abu Hazem Group members. ¶D. Were any of these lethal attacks? Yes. ¶E. Have these groups attacked U.S. diplomatic targets? Yes, Please see 5c. Takfir Wa Al-Hijra has not attacked U.S. diplomatic targets. ¶F. Have these groups attacked U.S. businesses, U.S. military, or U.S. related targets? No. ¶G. Have these groups limited their attacks to specific regions or do they operate country-wide? All of the groups have freedom of movement throughout Sudan. ¶H. If their attacks are limited to regions, are there any U.S. diplomatic facilities located in these regions? The US Mission has diplomatic facilities in Khartoum and Juba. There are TDY offices and housing in El Fasher and Nyala that are used by diplomatic personnel. ¶6. (S/NF) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups ¶A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not anti-American) in-country? If yes, how many? Please name groups. The Government of Sudan refers to rebel groups as terrorists, but in most cases they are not terrorists per se. ¶B. Have groups carried out attacks in the capital or in areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located? If so, how close? No. ¶C. Were attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate? Please elaborate. No. ¶D. Have any Americans been killed or injured in these attacks? No. -------------- TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Transnational Terrorist Indicators ¶A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a presence in country? Provide names. Yes. Groups include, but are not limited to, Al Qa'ida, Hamas, Hizbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Lord's Resistance Army. ¶B. How does Post assess this presence? Is it an operational cell? Financial cell? Support cell? Propaganda cell? Al Qa'ida: There are AQ-connected individuals and terrorist cells in Sudan without clear links to AQ leadership. Hamas: The HAMAS presence in Sudan is more focused on political and financial matters and is non-operational. Hizbollah: There may be Hizbollah fundraising and support activities in Sudan, but we have no knowledge of operational activities. Palestinian Islamic Jihad: PIJ has a very diminished capacity in Sudan, focused mainly on fundraising, and is non-operational. Lord's Resistance Army: There is a full spectrum of LRA activities in Sudan, concentrated mainly in the South. ¶C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups? Al Qa'ida: There are likely elements in the government who are sympathetic to AQ, though there is no evidence of state sponsorship. Hamas: The Sudanese government is generally supportive of Hamas, but there is evidence of growing support for Fatah. Hizbollah: There is likely limited, if any, government support of Hizbollah given its Shi'a orientation. Palestinian Islamic Jihad: While there is likely some sympathy for PIJ in government circles, its presence in Sudan has decreased significantly in recent years. Lords Resistance Army: The government uses the LRA as a proxy force to destabilize Southern Sudan. ¶D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the country that have a relationship with any of these groups? Yes. NGOs with possible links to terrorist groups include the Islamic African Relief Agency, Benevolence International Foundation, Al-Haramayn, Islamic Dawa Organization, Third World Relief Agency, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Al-Mutanda Al-Islami, and the African Muslim Agency. ¶E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country that are sympathetic to these groups? Yes. ¶F. How does Post assess the level, intent, and scope of hostile intelligence services (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sudan, etc) in country relative to potential anti-American terrorist acts? Third country security services are well represented in Sudan. They include Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Oman, China, Malaysia, Uganda, Jordan, Kenya, Germany, France, Italy, South Africa, and Ethiopia. We do not assess they would engage in anti-American terrorist attacks. ¶G. How does Post assess the availability of weapons and explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile terrorist elements? Arms and munitions are widely available throughout Sudan which serves both as a market and also a transiting point. FERNANDEZ