SEARCHING FOR "TRACK THREE" ON DARFUR HUMANITARIAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000429 DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, SE GRATION, AF/SPG, AF/E, IO, PRM NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN, USAID/W DCHA SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU SENSITIVE AIDAC SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID ASEC PGOV PREL PREF KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: SEARCHING FOR "TRACK THREE" ON DARFUR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE REF: A) KHARTOUM 421 B) KHARTOUM 409 ¶1. (SBU) This is an action message, please see para 7. ¶2. (SBU) Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) for Humanitarian Affairs Ameerah Haq met with a core group of major donors on late on March 25 to inaugurate a weekly ad hoc coordination mechanism in Khartoum between Darfur humanitarian donors and the UN on what the new humanitarian infrastructure in Darfur should look like after the Khartoum regime's March 4 expulsion of 13 major Western NGOs and suppression of 3 Sudanese NGOs. Haq began by apologizing that she didn't want to offend all the other donors but she wanted a process which could be low-key and manageable. Present for this initial meeting were COMs from EU, US, UK, Netherlands, and Norway plus both Sudan and New York-based OCHA representatives. She noted that this is also a discussion which needs to occur in New York with major stakeholders. ¶3. (SBU) Ameerah noted that the UN continues with tracks one and two of its three track approach: seeking a reversal of the expulsions and finding some sort of package of interim measures to prevent a total implosion of the humanitarian effort in Darfur. Track two is the just completed joint assessment (reftels). Track three is the discussion that needs to occur first with donors and then with the GOS on what could eventually replace the NGOs if the decision is never reversed. ¶4. (SBU) CDA Fernandez thanked Ameerah and noted that future ad hoc meetings should include specialized experts such as USAID colleagues. He noted that one problem with discussing track three so soon is track one: there was a working process in place that was mostly demolished by the Sudanese Government with the expulsion so whatever new dispensation is going to face the lack of trust created by the NCP's recent actions. He suggested two points that need to be watched closely. The first is how any process is handled over time. The regime negotiated and initially paid lip service to a structure which included the Joint Humanitarian Access Communique of March 2007 and the Higher Level Committee to monitor the communiqu. Over time it slowly subverted the process. For example, a suggestion that NGOS needed to only "notify" the GOS on travel outside of Darfur's capitals became over time a "requirement for permission" to travel which eventually almost paralyzed INGO work in large parts of the region. ¶5. (SBU) CDA also noted that unfortunately most countries had been very passive when they were on the HLC and had been deceived by HAC. NGOs were cowed by fear of HAC retaliation against them. The regime had sought to create an artificial division between the humanitarian and the political where NGOs had to suffer in silence and donors (except the US) could not complain. There needed to be a restoration of "donor primacy in the process." Donors were both funding the NGOs and the UN agencies. Both Haq and others present generally agreed with that analysis. Ameerah noted that regime officials had removed impediments at the federal level while creating new ones at the state level. ¶6. (SBU) The UN's Humanitarian Rep for Darfur, Toby Lanzer, noted that the humanitarian and peacekeeping operations are so large that it is easy for the regime to play "divide and conquer," so there is a need for greater and constant coordination between the UN and donors to prevent this. He added that we should not forget that Sudan is a brutal police state and that "it backed down slightly on the NGO issue with the UN because it needed an agreement." It will always act badly and that should come as no surprise to anyone. He suggested that the regime is unlikely to expel any more NGOs in the near future because of the firestorm of criticism it had ignited. Haq noted that "all we've done is avert a short term crisis over the next one to two months" and that there was a real danger that the current, temporary, ad hoc arrangement would become track three. OCHA suggested that involving real players, such as national security (NISS) rather than just the Humanitarian Affairs Ministry might also make sense since they were the ones calling the shots in this crisis. UK rep agreed, noting that NISS mostly controls Humanitarian Affairs anyway and it would remove the pretense that these are humanitarian rather than political decisions taken by the regime. ¶7. (SBU) After the meeting, Ameerah Haq approached CDA Fernandez and said that she was sending Lanzer to Paris next week to try to get SLM rebel leader Abdul Wahid Nur to allow his partisans among the leaders in the teeming Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur to accept urgently help from the UN and other INGOS (replacing the ones KHARTOUM 00000429 002 OF 002 expelled) in the form of food and meningitis vaccinations. Haq asked for American help in encouraging the stubborn Abdul Wahid to be reasonable. CDA noted that the US does not have any special influence over Abdul Wahid but he would certainly pass the message to Washington to coordinate with the French. ¶8. (SBU) Comment: The meeting was a very humble beginning to the next great task facing donors and the UN in Sudan: what replaces the almost dysfunctional and rickety humanitarian structure which was precipitously demolished by the NCP on March 4? Getting an answer will indeed require greater coordination by donors in Sudan and in New York and a consistent message and principled stand by the UN. It also needs consistent pressure and eventual incentives for the regime by the international community. Otherwise, a patient and duplicitous NCP will merely wait until a changing cast of characters here and elsewhere allows them to subvert whatever structures and processes are put in place. End comment. FERNANDEZ