SEARCHING FOR "TRACK THREE" ON DARFUR HUMANITARIAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000429

DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, SE GRATION, AF/SPG, AF/E, IO, PRM
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN, USAID/W DCHA SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

SENSITIVE
AIDAC
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID ASEC PGOV PREL PREF KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SEARCHING FOR "TRACK THREE" ON DARFUR HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE

REF: A) KHARTOUM 421
B) KHARTOUM 409


1. (SBU) This is an action message, please see para 7.


2. (SBU) Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
(DSRSG) for Humanitarian Affairs Ameerah Haq met with a core group
of major donors on late on March 25 to inaugurate a weekly ad hoc
coordination mechanism in Khartoum between Darfur humanitarian
donors and the UN on what the new humanitarian infrastructure in
Darfur should look like after the Khartoum regime's March 4
expulsion of 13 major Western NGOs and suppression of 3 Sudanese
NGOs. Haq began by apologizing that she didn't want to offend all
the other donors but she wanted a process which could be low-key and
manageable. Present for this initial meeting were COMs from EU, US,
UK, Netherlands, and Norway plus both Sudan and New York-based OCHA
representatives. She noted that this is also a discussion which
needs to occur in New York with major stakeholders.


3. (SBU) Ameerah noted that the UN continues with tracks one and
two of its three track approach: seeking a reversal of the
expulsions and finding some sort of package of interim measures to
prevent a total implosion of the humanitarian effort in Darfur.
Track two is the just completed joint assessment (reftels). Track
three is the discussion that needs to occur first with donors and
then with the GOS on what could eventually replace the NGOs if the
decision is never reversed.


4. (SBU) CDA Fernandez thanked Ameerah and noted that future ad hoc
meetings should include specialized experts such as USAID
colleagues. He noted that one problem with discussing track three so
soon is track one: there was a working process in place that was
mostly demolished by the Sudanese Government with the expulsion so
whatever new dispensation is going to face the lack of trust created
by the NCP's recent actions. He suggested two points that need to
be watched closely. The first is how any process is handled over
time. The regime negotiated and initially paid lip service to a
structure which included the Joint Humanitarian Access Communique of
March 2007 and the Higher Level Committee to monitor the communiqu.
Over time it slowly subverted the process. For example, a suggestion
that NGOS needed to only "notify" the GOS on travel outside of
Darfur's capitals became over time a "requirement for permission" to
travel which eventually almost paralyzed INGO work in large parts of
the region.


5. (SBU) CDA also noted that unfortunately most countries had been
very passive when they were on the HLC and had been deceived by HAC.
NGOs were cowed by fear of HAC retaliation against them. The regime
had sought to create an artificial division between the humanitarian
and the political where NGOs had to suffer in silence and donors
(except the US) could not complain. There needed to be a restoration
of "donor primacy in the process." Donors were both funding the NGOs
and the UN agencies. Both Haq and others present generally agreed
with that analysis. Ameerah noted that regime officials had removed
impediments at the federal level while creating new ones at the
state level.


6. (SBU) The UN's Humanitarian Rep for Darfur, Toby Lanzer, noted
that the humanitarian and peacekeeping operations are so large that
it is easy for the regime to play "divide and conquer," so there is
a need for greater and constant coordination between the UN and
donors to prevent this. He added that we should not forget that
Sudan is a brutal police state and that "it backed down slightly on
the NGO issue with the UN because it needed an agreement." It will
always act badly and that should come as no surprise to anyone. He
suggested that the regime is unlikely to expel any more NGOs in the
near future because of the firestorm of criticism it had ignited.
Haq noted that "all we've done is avert a short term crisis over the
next one to two months" and that there was a real danger that the
current, temporary, ad hoc arrangement would become track three.
OCHA suggested that involving real players, such as national
security (NISS) rather than just the Humanitarian Affairs Ministry
might also make sense since they were the ones calling the shots in
this crisis. UK rep agreed, noting that NISS mostly controls
Humanitarian Affairs anyway and it would remove the pretense that
these are humanitarian rather than political decisions taken by the
regime.


7. (SBU) After the meeting, Ameerah Haq approached CDA Fernandez and
said that she was sending Lanzer to Paris next week to try to get
SLM rebel leader Abdul Wahid Nur to allow his partisans among the
leaders in the teeming Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur to accept
urgently help from the UN and other INGOS (replacing the ones

KHARTOUM 00000429 002 OF 002


expelled) in the form of food and meningitis vaccinations. Haq asked
for American help in encouraging the stubborn Abdul Wahid to be
reasonable. CDA noted that the US does not have any special
influence over Abdul Wahid but he would certainly pass the message
to Washington to coordinate with the French.


8. (SBU) Comment: The meeting was a very humble beginning to the
next great task facing donors and the UN in Sudan: what replaces the
almost dysfunctional and rickety humanitarian structure which was
precipitously demolished by the NCP on March 4? Getting an answer
will indeed require greater coordination by donors in Sudan and in
New York and a consistent message and principled stand by the UN. It
also needs consistent pressure and eventual incentives for the
regime by the international community. Otherwise, a patient and
duplicitous NCP will merely wait until a changing cast of characters
here and elsewhere allows them to subvert whatever structures and
processes are put in place. End comment.
FERNANDEZ