ANGRY NCP "MODERATE" SIGNALS AN UNBENDING REGIME:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000427 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A A/S CARTER, SE GRATION,AF/SPG, AF/C NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: ANGRY NCP "MODERATE" SIGNALS AN UNBENDING REGIME: TELLS US WHAT HE REALLY THINKS ABOUT US REF: A. REF: A. KHARTOUM 424 ¶B. B. KHARTOUM 421 ¶C. C. KHARTOUM 365 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a contentious meeting with CDA on March 26, the usually moderate NCP former General Yahia Babiker dismissed US policy in Sudan as "not wise" and accused the U.S. of giving his country nothing substantive in exchange for the NCP's years of bilateral cooperation on the CPA and anti-terrorism issues. Criticizing the last 20 years of US policy in Sudan and trotting out the now-standard NCP canard that the recently expelled INGOs acted as cover for intelligence activities in Darfur and were also less efficient at delivering aid in Darfur than the GOS, Babiker disagreed with CDA's suggestion that the expulsions were a political mistake that will cost the NCP dearly. He insisted that the U.S. fully supports the ICC, alleging that our "inaction" at the UNSC has pushed the NCP and Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir further away. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The meeting with General Yahia Babiker took place in his office at Joint National Transition Team. CDA Fernandez began by updating Babiker on the proposed visit of Presidential Special Envoy Scott Gration. He noted that the visit could set U.S.-Sudan relations back on a "normal path" following the "foolish" decision to expel INGOs. Babiker immediately cut off the CDA, saying sharply, "We beg to differ, this is not stupid. Other things are stupid, like the indictment (of President Bashir),for example, but not this." CDA countered that the U.S. has continued to reach out in good faith to the NCP despite the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant and the provocation of the NGO expulsions. The US was measured in its response to the ICC and this had unfortunately been answered by the NGO expulsions which had further deteriorated an already tense situation. Babiker, however, was incredulous at the suggestion that relations could improve after the ICC, and quickly discredited all previous U.S.-led efforts in Sudan. "Terrorism cooperation, the CPA? All for nothing. We received no recognition from the U.S., and you treat Southern Sudan as a sovereign country. Personally, in the last 15 years, I have learned how to work with the U.S., but by day I am losing confidence in our relationship." ¶3. (C) Not wavering from the official GOS line on the INGO expulsions, Babiker queried CDA, "Why should the U.S. care about the humanitarian NGOs?" Expelling the NGOs, according to Babiker, was an internal decision that should have no bearing on U.S.-Sudan relations, as the decision was not a political one. "No one in Sudan sat in a meeting just to expel the American NGOs," he said. "If they had wanted to retaliate, they should have kicked out Alberto!" referring by first name to the CDA. ¶4. (C) Similar to coverage recent allegations in Sudanese newspapers, Babiker accused the NGOs of having links to "intelligence" organizations, and of seeking to discredit Sudan by passing information to Western opponents of Sudan such as activist Eric Reeves. Accusing the INGOs of diverting U.S. aid money to fund subversive operations in Darfur, he said, "You know better than I do, these organizations are not cost-effective in delivering relief," and cited a random statistic that the World Food Program was so inefficient it wasted USD$300 million in Sudan in 2006. "Give us a chance to feed ourselves. You are stopping us. This is a sovereign decision, and we have the right to make it. You can call it stupid or you can call it wise." CDA countered that nothing had prevented Sudan from responding to the Darfur crisis it itself created in 2003, but the international community had responded where the regime couldn't or wouldn't. ¶5. (C) Babiker told CDA that the situation in Darfur was untenable to the GOS, as the IDP camps threaten to destabilize a region that the NCP regards as secure and suitable for agriculture. "The Darfuris are growing hashish instead of food, like the Taliban are growing opium in Afghanistan. Why don't you let Darfuris grow their own food?" When the CDA countered that IDPs would grow their own food if the government hadn't killed thousands of them in order to steal their land and drive them into camps, Babiker disparaged the IDPs by saying: "They are just sitting in the middle of the towns. If they are so afraid of the government, why don't they return to the villages?" Babiker KHARTOUM 00000427 002 OF 002 was equally unbending on the issue of UNAMID deployment, disagreeing when the CDA noted that NCP foot-dragging for a year (2007-2008) had further tarnished Sudan's standing abroad and undermined the credit it should have received for accepting the peacekeeping force in the first place. "We agreed to the airlift in September 2008, and it took 4 months to take place because of the UN, so it's the UN's fault, not ours." ¶6. (C) The CDA noted that with the Obama administration now preparing its new strategy for Sudan and its naming of a new Special Envoy and an Assistant Secretary for Africa, the NCP should not miss this opportunity for a fresh start in its relations with the U.S.. Babiker, however, changed the subject to a long litany of perceived slights by the U.S. against Sudan in the last 20 years going back over the past 4 US Presidents. "If you make promises, then keep them; but you haven't kept any promises for so many years," he criticized unhesitatingly, adding, "I don't think you are helpful in Sudan. You should advise your government that its policies are not wise." The CDA said that constructive dialogue now would preserve both the NCP's and the U.S.'s ability for flexibility in the future, but expelling the INGOs was a political mistake that would cost the NCP dearly. "Political mistake with who?" Babiker asked rhetorically. "The West is not our political constituency." ¶7. (C) As the CDA attempted to keep the meeting focused on the pending SE visit and the INGO expulsions, Babiker insisted that the ICC arrest warrant was a tool of US foreign policy against Sudan and the NCP. "Omar Al-Bashir is more sympathetic than others in the government, but you pushed him," Babiker said, and dismissed the INGOs as unimportant in the greater picture of U.S.-Sudan relations. "You assume you have been hurt, but it is not true. You always look at the negative side. If we do 99.5 percent, you look at the 0.5 percent we did not do." When CDA warned him that the U.S. response to irresponsible NCP actions in the past could have been much stronger and more harmful to the regime, Babiker brushed it off by motioning with his fist in the air, "You give me a punch in the face and say it could have been worse? What is worse, two punches? A bullet?" CDA noted that he had also wanted to talk about funding for the disputed region of Abyei (Babiker heads the Unity Fund between North and South Sudan) but there had not been time to do so. It would be good if the disputed region's administrator did not go away from Khartoum empty handed and actually had a budget so many months after the June 8, 2008 Abyei road map was agreed to. A now normal Babiker readily agreed that a budget for Abyei is long overdue. ¶8. (C) Comment: The usually mild Gen. Babiker obviously wanted to use this meeting to bluntly express his strong negative feelings on the current state of U.S.-Sudanese relations. This is also a frequent NCP tactic to respond to a "mistake" like the NGO expulsion by calculatedly escalating rhetoric to seize the advantage in any current or future discussion. This was very much in evidence during this meeting which had a strong element of political theater. However, the assumptions underlying Babiker's statements were striking in their inflexibility and irrationality. Such views are all the more surprising coming from one of the NCP's leading moderates (another "moderate," Dr. Ghazi Salahudin recently expressed himself in similar terms). By repeating NCP propaganda on the "treachery" of the INGOs and the alleged U.S. role in the ICC, Babiker revealed himself as a moderate who is, at least for the present, mouthing the rhetoric of an NCP hard-liner, whether because of self-interest or self-preservation. With the GOS now on the hook for humanitarian delivery in Darfur, Babiker's belief that Darfuris can miraculously grow crops in parched, salt-laden earth (when they are not high on hashish) with imaginary funding from an overstretched government raises questions about the GOS's intentions to feed Darfur's IDPs. This studied rage is something we can expect to see more of as the regime prepares the political field for any substantive discussions with any visiting official Americans and needs to be seen as nothing more than an opening gambit in the regime's calculations. FERNANDEZ