COMBATTING THE MENINGITIS OUTBREAK IN DARFUR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000405 SENSITIVE AIDAC SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN, USAID/W DCHA SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: COMBATTING THE MENINGITIS OUTBREAK IN DARFUR REF: A) KHARTOUM 318 B) KHARTOUM 313 C) KHARTOUM 311 D) KHARTOUM 306 E) KHARTOUM 299 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) SUMMARY. As international donors and humanitarian agencies continue to seek ways to address the humanitarian gaps created by the Sudanese government's March 4 and 5 expulsions of 13 international organizations and dissolution of three Sudanese organizations, cases of meningitis are increasing throughout Darfur, particularly in South Darfur and West Darfur. On March 18 and 19, USAID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) staff met with members of the UN World Health Organization (WHO) to discuss the current situation, the impact of gaps due to the expelled health partners, and alternative measures that the international community and Government of National Unity (GNU) can implement to prevent the spread of the deadly disease and treat the cases already diagnosed. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- THE LAST SIX WEEKS IN DARFUR'S DEADLY MENINGITIS SEASON -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) The meningitis season in Sudan typically occurs between January and April, and health officials generally observe an increase in the number of reported isolated meningitis cases rather than a widespread outbreak of disease. Meningitis is highly contagious, particularly for populations living in overcrowded IDP camps during the January to April dry season. In addition, according to Mdecins Sans Frontihres (MSF),a meningitis patient receiving rapid and appropriate treatment has a mortality rate of 5 to 10 percent, whereas an untreated meningitis patient has a 50 percent mortality rate. According to WHO, this year's first cases of meningitis appeared in South Darfur during the week of February ¶7. During the week of February 15, the South Darfur State Ministry of Health (MOH) requested that rural hospitals form committees to combat a potential meningitis outbreak through conducting active case finding, case management, and immediate reporting to the MOH. In addition, WHO made efforts to increase disease surveillance, pre-position supplies, and train national staff, and the Federal MOH prepared to conduct a vaccination campaign. ¶3. (U) On March 1, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported suspected meningitis cases in West Darfur and South Darfur, including 14 suspected cases and one confirmed case in Thur and Kutrum towns in Jebel Marra, West Darfur, and 14 suspected cases in the teeming Kalma IDP camp, near Nyala, South Darfur. ¶4. (U) On March 2, the South Darfur MOH declared a meningitis outbreak in Kalma camp. According to federal health guidelines, the threshold for a meningitis outbreak in a population living in a camp is two confirmed meningitis cases, or more than 10 cases in a population of 100,000 individuals, or a doubling of cases over a period of three continuous weeks. (NOTE: Kalma met all three criteria at the end of February. END NOTE). ¶5. (U) During the planning phase for the substantial preemptive measures against the meningitis spread, health partners did not anticipate the GNU's immediate expulsion and dissolution of key implementing health partners in Darfur. In the last 20 days, without the necessary humanitarian staff, many of the pre-planned activities, campaigns, and surveillance exercises have gone unimplemented and the residents of Darfur have suffered. According to WHO, the expulsion denied health care to 1.5 million people in Darfur, including individuals in the IDP camps most dramatically impacted by the current meningitis season, Kalma camp and Bielel camp in South Darfur, and Thur camp in West Darfur. Kalma, a stronghold of Paris-based rebel leader Abdul Wahid Nur, has long been a target of particular ire by the Sudanese authorities, which culminated in a massacre there in August 2008. ¶6. (SBU) On March 10, OCHA reported two incidents of internally displaced persons (IDPs) rejecting government officials entry into Kalma camp, including IDPs declining to allow Sudanese government medical staff and Sudanese non-governmental organization (NGO) staff entry to commence the planned meningitis vaccination campaign. IDPs did however permit staff from the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) to enter the camp. According to local reports, the IDPs do not trust KHARTOUM 00000405 002 OF 003 government authorities and fear that the Sudanese staff will inject IDPs with 'bad things'. ¶7. (SBU) As of March 13, WHO reported 47 cases of meningitis in South Darfur, including four fatalities. Due to the lack of health partners conducting disease surveillance in Kalma IDP camp, any South Darfur case counts after March 3 exclude data from Kalma camp. This, due to the camp's significant size and caseload potential, is not a small omission and as a result, the number of meningitis cases in South Darfur could be significantly higher than current reports. Prior to their expulsion on March 4, health partners in Kalma camp had reported 32 cases of meningitis and two deaths. Following laboratory tests on two cases from Kalma camp, health officials confirmed cases of neisseria meningitides serotype A, the strain that the routine vaccination prevents. Although no data is available from Kalma camp after March 3, WHO and the South Darfur MOH have been monitoring the arrival of meningitis cases to Nyala's teaching hospital and note that no cases from Kalma have been admitted and/or treated since March 3. WHO and the MOH have also been monitoring the health clinics in Bileil locality, near Kalma camp, and report no admitted cases from Bileil either. (NOTE: Although this is indirect evidence, it suggests that people are not traveling from Kalma camp to seek outside medical care, and perhaps the situation within the camp is not as severe as believed. END NOTE). As of March 20, the number of meningitis cases in Kalma camp remained unknown because health partners were not seeing or treating patients in the camp and the IDP leaders had no idea which camp residents had undiagnosed or untreated meningitis. ¶8. (SBU) As of March 18, IDPs in Kalma camp forbade Sudanese health staff from entering the camp to commence the vaccination campaign. However, in Bielel camp Sudanese MOH staff initiated the meningitis vaccination campaign with technical support and supplies from WHO. As of March 18, more than 6,000 of the 25,000 camp residents had received the vaccine. (NOTE: Typically those under 2 or over forty-five do not get immunized. END NOTE). Because sector 1 of Kalma camp is contiguous with Bileil camp, humanitarian staff hope that some Kalma camp residents may seek vaccinations at Bileil camp. MSF/Netherlands (MSF/H) had planned to conduct a vaccination campaign targeting 130,000 individuals in Kalma and Bileil camps in early March, the expulsion of MSF/H staff left the IDP population of these camps vulnerable to meningitis and without health care. Following the NGO expulsion and IDP prohibition of Sudanese organizations to enter the camp to provide services, WHO, UNICEF, and OCHA have attempted daily negotiations with highly politicized IDP leaders in hopes of reaching an agreement. Although the negotiations remain unresolved, according to OCHA, IDP leaders reported plans to provide their decision on the alternate health partners who would be permitted to conduct a vaccination soon. On March 18, IDP leaders summoned health partner Merlin to a meeting in the camp; however, when Merlin staff arrived, the youth group members prohibited the health staff from meeting with the IDP leaders, so the issue remains unresolved. As of March 22, Merlin had still not been allowed into Kalma to conduct an immunization campaign. CDA Fernandez is seeking to contact Kalma IDP Camp elders to urge them to allow the vaccinations to proceed. ¶9. (SBU) West Darfur's Nertiti area is also experiencing increased caseloads of meningitis. Prior to their expulsion, MSF/France (MSF/F) had planned a vaccination campaign for 40,000 individuals in Jebel Marra, West Darfur, particularly near Nertiti town and Thur camp, where MSF/F staff registered 17 cases of meningitis since early February. In addition, USAID staff noted unconfirmed reports of cases of meningitis in the rural area approximately 1km outside Nertiti town, Thur town, and Golo IDP camp during the first week in March. On March 12, community members in Thur town and Kutrum town reported four cases of meningitis each. As of March 18, WHO reported 18 cases of meningitis in Nertiti and Thur, including two deaths and one confirmed specimen of neisseria meningitides serotype ¶A. On March 18, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported 13 cases of meningitis in the Golo area of Jebel Marra, West Darfur. WHO plans to conduct an assessment to the affected areas on March 21 to verify the information. ¶10. (U) On March 18, WHO staff in North Darfur reported 13 suspected cases of meningitis. Although laboratory confirmation is pending, health staff note that the cases have appeared during the last five weeks without any particular geographic cluster or origin. Although the cases remain limited, WHO staff encourage further surveillance and preparedness for all area health partners. -------------- NEXT STEPS, SUGGESTIONS, AND ACTIONS -------------- KHARTOUM 00000405 003 OF 003 ¶11. (U) During the March 18 meeting with USAID/OFDA staff, WHO officials outlined continuing measures to address the unfolding situation. In addition to advocating for continuous monitoring of the situation on the ground, WHO plans to pay salaries of Sudanese health clinic staff of expelled partners in gap areas through the end of March in order to facilitate the continued collection of surveillance data. As health sector lead, WHO is organizing meetings twice a week to coordinate with the MOH and remaining NGO partners on the best ways to fill the existing health care gaps and maintaining the health care gap map. ¶12. (SBU) By all accounts, the water situation in the most affected areas appears to be sufficient, as IDPs are permitting the entry of some supplies (i.e. fuel) and local staff of expelled NGOs are still working. GNU authorities have requested that World Vision International (WVI) assist in Kalma camp with water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) issues, and WVI reported that local authorities have pressured WVI field staff to assume some WASH services in some of the camps surrounding Nyala as well as in Kass IDP camp. Currently, WVI staff remain in "a wait and see mode". (NOTE: This report of the GNU targeting specific agencies to work in designated areas despite lack of technical agreements, or results of the UN assessment, or specific mandates is consistent with what USAID is hearing from many of its partners remaining in Darfur. END NOTE) -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (SBU) If negotiations between the sheiks in Kalma and OCHA do not result in greater access by NGOs to the IDPs to conduct an immunization campaign, we risk having the potential for widespread disease and possible increased mortality which in the case of Kalma could be prevented. NGOs and donors are concerned that the government may use the stalemate in negotiations as an excuse to force their way into the camp, or cut Kalma off completely. For now the government is content with standing by and watching the negotiations between the sheikhs and the international community because a dragging out of the situation only undermines the sheikhs' authority and creates internal chaos in the camp. Recognizing what a tinderbox Kalma is, government engagement at this time will only result in further bloodshed in Kalma the likes of what we saw in August of last year. Additionally, with significant humanitarian gaps existing, Post is concerned that the international community will see further manipulation of humanitarian assistance and NGOs by the GNU in the coming weeks and months. GNU pressure on NGOs to work in specific areas and address certain sectoral needs leaves the humanitarian response vulnerable to significant government manipulation of services. The current operating environment, for both humanitarian staff and the millions of beneficiaries they serve, can only be characterized as one of tension, fear, and looming uncertainty whereby all parties involved are subject to the whims and wishes of an erratic and hostile Sudanese government. Post will continue to closely monitor the meningitis situation in country and encourage all stakeholders, especially the government, to take an active role in combating a meningitis outbreak. FERNANDEZ