EMBASSY TRIP TO EL FASHER MARCH 15-17

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000390 DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E, IO, PRM NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: EMBASSY TRIP TO EL FASHER MARCH 15-17 REF: A) KHARTOUM 383 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The expulsion of 13 INGOs has led to a deterioration of services in IDP camps that local NGOs have neither the capacity nor inclination to fill, representatives of Al Salaam, Abu Shouk and Zam Zam (reftel) IDP Camps told CDA Fernandez on a March 15-17 trip to El Fasher. They also noted that any attempt by the government to dismantle the camps is misplaced, because insecurity prevents IDPs from returning home. Meanwhile, representatives of SLM/Minni Minnawi warned CDA about impending famine in far North Darfur, and accused the GOS of politicizing relief efforts to punish pro-rebel Zaghawa civilians. In meetings with UNAMID, the force's senior leadership told CDA they are exploring how they can provide temporary emergency relief in IDP camps to fill the gap left by the INGO expulsions, and also described a preliminary proposal for a 15-20 person Mobile Monitoring Team (MMT) to investigate armed attacks in the event of a negotiated cessation of hostilities. Finally, representatives of remaining INGOs told CDA they felt nervous and vulnerable following several acts of violence and heightened rhetoric, and it was unclear whether they would or could continue to operate in Darfur in this environment. End Summary. LOCAL NGOS ILL-EQUIIPED TO MEET HUMANITARIAN NEEDS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On March 15, CDA Fernandez and an Embassy team made up of POL, RSO, USAID, and JLE departed Khartoum despite feverish MFA efforts to block the trip. Despite written orders to prevent the journey, inobservant airport staff allowed emboffs to depart on commercial air to Darfur. In El Fasher, CDA first met with Abdalla Adam Bashar, former IRC Coordinator of Al Salaam Camp, and Adam Al Nur Abdallah, a Fur Dimlij (tribal leader). Bashar stated that expulsion of the 13 INGOs will have eventual "huge effects" on the ground, and is already being felt in very tangible ways. Patients in clinics operated by Action Contre la Faim (ACF) were sent home following the announcement of the expulsions, he said, but they continued to return to the clinic. Desperate for help, local authorities begged ACF national staff members to return, he said. "Officials in Khartoum thought they could just supply a few doctors �0A;and things would be fine," he observed. "But they are realizing it's not so easy. You need not only doctors but qualified staff for patient care." Bashar also cited water services as an area that would suffer greatly from the INGO expulsion, noting the technical and operational expertise brought by Oxfam in the operation of water systems could not easily be replicated by the government. "The government cannot even provide water or electricity for people who pay in El Fasher town," he said, noting that he himself had not received water shipments in over a month, despite paying local taxes. Bashar also lamented that services provided by some expelled INGOs--such as IRC--in rebel-held areas would not be replaced by the government at all. ¶3. (SBU) Bashar continued to say that local NGOs have neither the capacity nor the neutrality to replace the expelled INGOs, noting that the only genuine local NGO was the Sudanese Red Crescent. "The rest are organs of the security apparatus, used to control and monitor the camps," he asserted, adding that these organizations would fulfill the government's desire to dismantle the camps by cajoling (or threatening) IDPs to return home. "If they refuse, they will force them out," he said. The Fur Dimlij Abdallah noted that IDPs cannot return due to insecurity and the fact that many of their houses have been newcomers. "They'd rather die here than there," he remarked. ¶4. (SBU) CDA also met with Ahmed Abu Al Bashar (no relation) a community leader in Abu Shouk IDP camp, who asserted that there was a big gap in confidence between IDPs and local NGOs backed by the government. For example, he said, the government denies that rapes occur in Darfur, so how will its organs provide healthcare and services for rape victims? He also predicted humanitarian disaster will slowly proliferate under the watch of local NGOs, because "they will never acknowledge a need for help if something is beyond their capacity, for that is tantamount to admitting they failed." Since the expulsions, residents of Abu Shouk are suffering from a lack of medicine, food and water following the exodus of IRC, CHR and ACF, he said, and predicted that their departure would lead to a "slow death" for IDPs. SECURITY TRUMPS POLITICAL DEMANDS FOR IDPS -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The government's hope that it can dismantle IDP camps by removing services is misplaced, according to Dr. Abduljabbar Abdalla Fadul, a prominent Darfuri academic. He noted that "no single IDP is KHARTOUM 00000390 002 OF 004 interested in staying in the camps, but they are prevented from returning home due to insecurity," recalling the attempted return of a number of IDPs to their village of Hassan Jadia in East Jebel Marra. "They returned and started to harvest their crops, but soon after their harvest, most of their belongings were looted by GOS soldiers," he said. Consequently, they returned to the IDP camp, he said. Contributing to the insecurity are GOS forces, Janjaweed militia, and bandits, many of whom are former Zaghawa rebels, he said. "Minnawi's fighters have deserted him in droves because they have not been paid," he said, adding that most of the carjackings in Darfur are the work of SLM/Minnawi. PESSIMISM ON FUTURE DOHA TALKS -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Professor Abduljabbar told CDA he was skeptical about the prospects for peace in Darfur given the current direction of the peace process. "The weakness of Doha is the same weakness of Abuja," he said, noting that Darfur's problems cannot be solved without the Fur. He characterized Paris-based SLM leader Abdul Wahid as "a hopeless guy" whose youth, immaturity and inexperience resulted in him having zero support from Fur elites or intellectuals. While he retains wide name recognition in IDP camps and support among camp sheiks because of his wild promises and intransigence, Abduljabbar asserted that IDPs' desire to return home is stronger than any political allegiance to Abdul Wahid or his political demands. "They are much less concerned with justice or compensation than they are with security for their return home," he said. ¶7. (SBU) Ahmed Adam Yousif, founder of the respected local NGO focusing on peace and reconciliation, was also pessimistic about the prospects for Doha. He noted that with the exception of JEM, all the rebel movements were weak militarily, and "weak movements do not meet our demands as Darfurians." A strong movement was needed to be a counterpart to the GOS, he said, because hardliners like Nafie Ali Nafie have no inclination to negotiate. He predicted that without Abdul Wahid, the Doha talks would fail, and lamented that Abdul Wahid was not replaceable because of entrenched support among IDPs. Fur elders in exile like Ahmed Diraije and Tijane Sese "have no standing among IDPs. They have no connection with them," he said. UNAMID PLANS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE -------------- -- ¶8. (SBU) On March 16, CDA met with an oblivious JSR Rodolphe Adada at UNAMID HQ in El Fasher. The flippant Adada, who seemed only vaguely aware of the situation around him, stated that UNAMID remained concerned about the humanitarian situation, and was examining how it could assist with the water crisis in Zam Zam and other camps on an emergency basis by delivering water bladders and interfacing with technical groups before humanitarians take over. Adada emphasized that UNAMID's role was one of temporary relief, and it did not plan to replace the expelled NGOs as a provider of humanitarian service. "We are like a neighbor who sees that the house next door is burning, so we bring over a bucket of water until the fire brigade arrives," he said. (Note: CDA cautioned Adada that if UNAMID is not careful, it might end up being stuck with this provision of services and risk the ire of IDPs, who n Lasge`part o|Q>G??Q__:Q;_?'~u/awQm/x o resume in earnest by April, and that he hoped for a 70% deployment rate by mid-summer. He monotonously affirmed that the GOS had been fully cooperative with UNAMID's demands and that the force had "nothing to complain about with the government right now." He stated that the next tripartite meeting was scheduled for March 31 in El Fasher, and although "there is nothing really important to discuss," it is important to continue these meetings. UNAMID'S PROPOSAL FOR A MOBILE MONITORING TEAM (MMT) -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Following his meeting with JSR Adada, CDA met with UNAMID force Commander Martin Luther Agwai. Agwai stated that he remained hopeful for an eventual negotiation of a cessation of hostilities between two or more parties in future rounds of peace talks, and to that end UNAMID has created a proposal for a Mobile Monitoring Team, inspired by some State Department suggestions in late 2008, to investigate and report on armed attacks or acts of aggression to monitor a reduction in violence. Such a team would be small (15-20 persons) and embedded into a Ceasefire Commission structure, and would ultimately report to him as Force Commander, he said. ¶10. (SBU) Agwai noted that there were two critical equipment requirements for such an arrangement, namely military transport KHARTOUM 00000390 003 OF 004 helicopters (as UNAMID's current fleet of helicopters are limited in the scope of their usage due to contractual agreements); and surveillance helos. He added that UNAMID does not need fixed wing aircraft, because it has these already and can adopt them as necessary. Should a Cessation of Hostilities take shape, he said, UNAMID must also learn from past mistakes and be guarded in its provision of limited non-military assistance to the armed movements. He noted that he would advise against letting CFC members stay on the UNAMID compound or paying them a salary, noting how in the past, under AMIS, the latter only encouraged fragmentation of rebel factions to receive more money. Agwai said he would limit such provisions to food, water and per diem. ¶11. (SBU) With regard to the situation on the ground, Agwai noted that the INGO expulsion has put pressure on UNAMID to provide humanitarian services, noting that IDPs may become increasingly frustrated with UNAMID if they don't see it meeting their needs. He emphasized that UNAMID is keen to use "soft power" to build and improve its relations with actors on the ground, most notably IDPs. "That is our main contingency plan: to continue to engage with local populations and IDPs, as well as with the government," he said. SLM/MINNAWI WARNS OF FAMINE IN DAR ZAGHAWA -------------- ¶12. (SBU) On March 16, CDA met with representatives of SLM/Minnawi, including Acting Wali and Minister of Social Affairs Dr. Ismail Hussein Hashim, Secretary General for SLA/MM in North Darfur Mohamed Yousif Adam, and North Darfur Legislative Council member Ahmed Hassan Bahar at TDRA Headquarters in El Fasher. Following his trip to Zam Zam with CDA earlier that day (reftel),a worried Dr. Hashim commented that he had traveled to the camp two weeks prior and "the situation has become much more grave." He noted he had not been to other Zaghawa encampments in Dar es Salaam and Shangil Tobay "but these are likely as bad as Zam Zam." He asserted that JEM was responsible for the current influx of displaced Zaghawa to the North due to its January 2009 aggression in Muhajeriya which triggered the regime's counterattack and the current IDP exodus. "SLM/Minnawi withdrew from the area to prevent further bloodshed, and people are fleeing because the government is targeting them for supporting SLM/Minnawi," he said. He also noted that the HAC was using food distribution as a political weapon, delivering shipments to areas in which Zaghawa have fled such as Wadaa while withholding them from Zamzam. ¶13. (SBU) SLA/Minnawi's Humanitarian Coordinator told CDA that that he is expected a famine in the parched area of Dar Zaghawa (in the far north of North Darfur state) this year. SAF military operations in the area prevent local inhabitants from farming, he said, adding to the existing problem of desertification and limited rainfall in an area that includes some of Darfur's harshest terrain. Humanitarians have not been able to travel to areas in Dar Zaghawa such as Karnoi, Muzbat and Furawiya, he said, because they claim they need permits and clearances. However, "there is no problem of security on the ground," said Hashim, and urged CDA for USAID to come and make an assessment. (Note: In a meeting with OCHA on March 17, OCHA representatives also noted a problem with the dam at Um Barro in Dar Zaghawa, which is in need of repair before the rainy season so that it may hold water. End Note.) SLM/Minnawi representatives also appealed to CDA to help resolve the problem of compensation for farmers upon whose land new arrivals at Zam Zam have settled, arguing that a "food for land" program involving US donated WFP food items, would likely be acceptable to the farmers. Without making any promises, CDA promised to look into the issue. NGOS "NERVOUS AND VULNERABLE" -------------- ¶14. (SBU) On March 17, CDA attended the OCHA inter-agency meeting for North Darfur, attended by representatives of several remaining NGOs including ICRC, IOM, Partner Aid, Goal, and Malteser International. In addition to discussing the urgent humanitarian needs of Zam Zam and other camps in North Darfur (reftel),the NGO representatives told CDA about the pervasive feelings of uneasiness following the kidnapping of three MSF workers in Saraf Omra and the surge in compound break-ins in North Darfur, including a fifth attempted on MSF properties this month. "We feel as if someone is trying to tell us something," said one, noting the MSF kidnapping, break-ins at compounds, intimidation and regime vilification campaign while another noted that "we need more than just verbal assurances for our protection and security. We saw on March 4 that HAC assurances meant nothing - that afternoon security officials were driving around in OXFAM vehicles." They also lamented that since the expulsions, there has been a change in perception of their operations amongst local populations. "We feel that they are buying KHARTOUM 00000390 004 OF 004 into the government's rhetoric that Western NGOs are 'spies and thieves,'" they said. NGOs are being urged to hire local armed guards who could both protect or intimidate them. CDA assured the NGO representatives that the USG was pushing - when we can reach them - at every level for the GOS to act responsibly and change its tone towards humanitarians. ¶15. (SBU) Comment: As noted in Reftel, it is important to maintain a practical focus on humanitarian needs and how best to address them through the UN and remaining NGOs as an uncertain and already difficult situation slowly deteriorates. Post strongly recommends quiet but forceful engagement with both the GOS and the UN about how to ensure that IDPs are receiving water and food in the short term while the longer-term delivery options are negotiated. And given what little impact UNAMID is having on the security situation on the ground, any resources it can mobilize to assist with humanitarian relief ought to be utilized immediately. UNAMID's MMT proposal is actually a promising idea, but will likely take many months to implement (not that a cessation of hostilities is in any way imminent). Nonetheless if the MMT is put into practice first, it could facilitate a negotiation of a cessation of hostilities and even a ceasefire. UNAMID should be pushed strongly to implement this proposal. Upon the team's return to Darfur, CDA immediately applied for another permit to travel to Darfur and the Embassy was informed that this and other officers' requests were denied. Another CDA request for travel to Dongola (in Northern Sudan) was also denied "as payback for the Darfur trip," but at the end of the week, MFA officials signaled a possible change of heart and asked that the Embassy "return on Sunday (March 22) with your requests." FERNANDEZ