TWO REPORTS ANALYZE SOUTH SUDAN'S BUDGET CRISIS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000330 DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E, EEB/IFD DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN DEPT PLS PASS TREASURY FOR OIA, USED IMF, AND USED WORLD BANK ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN ENRG EAID PREL PGOV SOCI SU SUBJECT: TWO REPORTS ANALYZE SOUTH SUDAN'S BUDGET CRISIS REF: A. KHARTOUM 185 ¶B. KHARTOUM 224 ¶C. KHARTOUM 298 ¶1. This is an action request - see para. 13. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: According to two independent analyses, the GoSS can expect to receive no more than 3/4, and possibly as little as 1/2, of the Sudanese Pounds (SDG) 3.658 billion revenues anticipated in its 2009 budget. Transfers from the Government of National Unity (GNU) in January fell well below even these levels on a monthly basis, although they increased in February. The GoSS seems still not to have come to terms with the gravity of its situation and has been tinkering with short-term fixes, rather than debating fundamental policy corrections. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (SBU) Post has received two analytical papers that shed additional light on the fiscal challenge facing the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) in the coming year (refs. A and B). Both analyze the GoSS 2009 budget in light of current information on likely revenues and examine possible responses. Although differing somewhat in specifics, both the Joint Donor Team (JDT) in Juba and World Bank staff (please protect) agree that the GoSS budget as adopted seriously overestimates anticipated revenues in 2009. ¶4. (U) 2009 GoSS Budget - - - - - - - - - (Note: SDG 1:US$2.2) Total Expenditures SDG 3.607 billion Of which: Salaries SDG 1.846 billion (51 percent) Operating Expenses SDG 0.846 billion Capital SDG 0.860 billion Total Revenues SDG 3.658 billion Of which: Oil revenues (based on SDG 3.402 billion (93 percent) US$50/bbl forecast) Non-oil SDG 0.245 billion ¶5. (SBU) Both GoSS and GNU budget-revenue estimates are based on forecasted international oil (Brent crude) prices of US$50/bbl. However, as both studies note, world prices are unlikely to move above US$45/bbl during the coming year, and may average less than that. Sudan's Nile blend crude normally sells at a US$5/bbl discount below Brent. The lower quality Dar blend sells at a discount of US$20-30/bbl below Brent. Compounding this decline in prices, Nile blend makes up a declining proportion of Sudan's ;exports and this trend is likely to continue. ¶6. (SBU) Both the JDT and the World Bank forecast that GoSS 2009 revenues will be significantly less than the budget assumes. The JDT estimates that the GoSS is likely to achieve only 2/3 of its 2009 revenue goals. The World Bank analysis lays out several possible scenarios. In the best case (oil prices remain at current levels,) GoSS revenues will reach 3/4 of its budget target. In the worst case, (oil prices fall further, GNU fails to pay existing arrears, and GoSS fails to collect its anticipated level of non-oil revenues,) it would collect only 1/2 of its anticipated revenues. ¶7. (SBU) The programmed GoSS revenues translate to SDG 282 million on a monthly basis. However, in early 2009 the GoSS share of revenues fell significantly below this. In January the GoSS received only an alarming SDG 84 million in revenue transfers from the GNU Ministry of Finance, and by February 5 only SDG 101 million for 2009, only half of what is required just to pay salaries. (Note: Later in February, transfers reportedly picked up, indicating that the very low January numbers may have been an anomaly. End note.) The GoSS responded to this revenue drop by temporarily suspending salary payments. ¶8. (SBU) The JDT notes that the GoSS's financial dilemma is either contributing to, or is further complicated by, other factors. The foreign exchange (fx) reserves of both the Central Bank of Sudan in Khartoum and the Bank of Southern Sudan are rapidly dwindling, and by late February had fallen to the value of one-two months of imports. In addition, poor harvests in Kenya and Uganda are raising the cost of food imports to the south. The shortages of both revenues and fx limit the GoSS's ability to respond. ¶9. (SBU) Norwegian Embassy oil advisor Anders Hannevik believes that neither the GNU in Khartoum nor the GoSS yet fully comprehend KHARTOUM 00000330 002 OF 002 the gravity of their situations. Hannevik told econoff that his recent conversations with GoSS officials in Juba indicated that they regard the current budget as "tight," when in fact it is overly optimistic. Hannevik reported that all of the discussion in the GoSS he heard revolved around possible short-term expenditure or revenue fixes, rather than fundamental policy changes required to address the long-term problem. In addition, Hannevik said that Southerners in general appeared to be in a state of denial about the nature of the situation, with many attributing the decline in the GoSS revenue transfers from the GNU to NCP "economic warfare" against them, rather than to depressed world oil prices. He added that many southerners told them that if worse-comes-to-worst, they expect the United States to "bail them out." ¶10. (SBU) Although agreeing on the nature of the problem, the two studies suggest differing responses. The JDT agrees with Hannevik that the severity of the crisis is not well understood even within the GoSS itself, and it urges that Southern leadership clearly communicate the gravity of the situation and the need for additional austerity measures. It specifically recommends that the GoSS first postpone infrastructure investments (estimated saving of SDG 45.5 million,) then reduce capital expenditures more broadly (SDG 11 million),cut operating costs by 10-15 percent (SDG 20.5 million, and make across-the-board salary cuts (SDG 41-61 million). ¶11. (SBU) In contrast, the World Bank counsels against any cuts in capital spending, as well as avoiding the non-payment of salaries, as the GoSS did during the severe January revenue short-fall. Rather, it argues for a 25 percent across-the-board cut in operating expenditures, with greater cuts or elimination of programs deemed less effective. It estimates that this could save SDG 274 million. In addition, it recommends that the GoSS use the crisis to enact a comprehensive salary reform, including selective salary cuts and workforce reductions, starting by purging the roles of "ghost workers." ¶12. (SBU) COMMENT: The global economic crisis is confronting both the GNU and the GoSS with similar challenges, but while in the North they are certainly serious, in the South they are acute, given the latter's almost total dependence on (falling) oil revenues. Like the GNU, the GoSS has bought social peace through government spending in the South by giving potentially restive populations employment and salaries. Therefore, any of the remedies being proposed will be extremely sensitive, politically. It will be important for the U.S. to encourage the GoSS to think hard, and in longer terms, about how it will deal with its budget crisis. END COMMENT ¶13. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests guidance on how to respond to GoSS President Salva Kiir's appeal (ref. C) that the U.S. finance an emergency "reserve fund for the South," as well as what measures we might advocate to the GoSS to put its financial house in order. The GOSS will likely face a major crisis later this year, and we need to give them early and clear advice, as well as being clear about what support we can and cannot provide to help them with this crisis. FERNANDEZ