JEM ON THE MOVE IN NORTH DARFUR?

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000028 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG AND AF/C NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2019 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: JEM ON THE MOVE IN NORTH DARFUR? REF: A. 08 KHARTOUM 1841 ¶B. 08 KHARTOUM 1793 ¶C. 08 KHARTOUM 1790 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) UNAMID reported on January 8 that JEM had moved approximately 200 vehicles into the vicinity of Mellit, North Darfur over the course of the previous week. The vehicles were reportedly spotted in an area called Daba Tuga, 20 kilometers northwest of Mellit (60 kilometers north of El Fasher). During the same timeframe, JEM contacts complained to emboffs that the SAF bombed their new positions around Mellit on three successive days between January 5 and 8. UNAMID said it had also received reports of SAF bombing, but had not confirmed this information with an assessment mission of its own. JEM spokesman Ahmed Adam Hussein, in Washington for meetings with USG officials at the time, issued a press release January 7 complaining about the bombings. ¶2. (C) Subsequently, UNAMID reported on January 11 that "at least 100" JEM vehicles had moved into the vicinity of Dar es Salaam, a town kilometers southeast of El Fasher. SLM leader Minni Minnawi confirmed he had also heard reports of JEM movements into Dar es Salaam during a phone conversation with CDA Fernandez January 10. Minnawi noted that his forces control the area around Dar es Salaam, and vowed that he would fight JEM if necessary to protect his territory. He complained that JEM is as extreme and intolerant as the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) of President Bashir. Minnawi speculated that JEM may be positioning itself to take advantage of any uncertainty created by an ICC arrest warrant for Bashir in the coming weeks. ¶3. (C) Comment: During the past two months there have been continuous rumors of an impending JEM attack on locations inside or outside of Darfur. UNMIS spent weeks in early December conducting over-flights attempting to confirm rumors that JEM had entered Southern Kordofan with a large group of vehicles. The GOS itself reported that JEM had crossed into Darfur from Chad with fresh vehicles (refs B and C). While it is virtually impossible to reliably confirm JEM locations and actual troop/vehicle strength, it is worth following these latest reports for several reasons. We note that in May 2008, several successive days of SAF bombing of JEM locations in North Darfur preceded the JEM attack on Omdurman. At the time there was an outcry from the international community in response to the bombing campaign, especially when the SAF bombed a school that had been funded by the US-based Darfur Diaries organization. A week later when JEM attacked Omdurman it became clear that the SAF had in fact been tracking JEM across North Darfur and was attempting to destroy the column of rebel vehicles advancing toward Kordofan and Omdurman. While we do not anticipate that JEM actually wishes to take control of any large towns in Darfur or elsewhere (it certainly does not have the capacity to secure and administer the towns effectively,) it is possible that JEM wishes to weaken and/or embarrass the NCP regime prior to or following an announcement by the ICC of an arrest warrant against President Bashir. Another possibility is that JEM wishes to project strength while engaged in negotiations. JEM has been the most engaged of all the rebel movements in discussions with UN/AU Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole, largely due to Bassole's determination that JEM is the strongest rebel group and also the most capable of engaging in political discussions. This latest reported move by JEM may be a way of demonstrating its capacity for a large-scale attack to strengthen its hand. We find the alleged sightings of "hundreds of vehicles" in multiple locations a little difficult to believe, but worth reporting nonetheless. End comment. FERNANDEZ