DEVELOPMENT, AND NOT JUST EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE, IS NEEDED

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000255

DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C
NSC FOR HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT, AND NOT JUST EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE, IS NEEDED
IN DARFUR, SAYS REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER


1. (SBU) On February 23, Ibrahim Musa Madibbo, Chairman of the
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority's Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Commission, presented his institution's work to CDA
Fernandez. The stack of books in Arabic included: a study
documenting the root causes of the conflict in Darfur; an analysis
of IDP camps and proposed areas for voluntary return; and three
separate development studies on farming, water and sanitation, and
schools. Most startling is a seemingly precise accounting of
hundreds of Darfur villages destroyed during the years of the
violence.


2. (SBU) Madibbo emphasized that much of his Commission's work is
groundbreaking in its detail, scope, and timing. Now that the
preliminary studies have been completed, the Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Commission will continue to seek funding for the
implementation of its projects, stated Madibbo. Although the Arab
League, the Islamic Development Bank, and the Government of SAUDI
Arabia have all pledged significant funding on numerous occasions,
none of these institutions and states has delivered on its
promises.


3. (SBU) As an example of his work, Madibbo said his Commission has
advocated for the voluntary return of IDPS to a limited number of
rural villages. Rather than return to the over two thousand very
small villages scattered throughout all Darfur, IDPs should return
to larger, rural towns where they will receive better protection,
services, and infrastructure. Madibbo stated that this solution for
voluntary return could be considered a compromise between the forced
urbanization of the IDP camps and the unrealistic notion that all of
the IDPs will return to their original, remote, vulnerable, and
almost completely destroyed homelands. Other examples of the
Commission's work include: a proposal for aiding recent immigrants
from West Africa to return to their countries of origin;
agricultural projects for Darfur's farmers (which comprise over 80%
of Darfur's population;) and plans for the largest water project in
the history of Darfur.


4. (SBU) Madibbo stated that now is the time to start moving from
disaster relief to development. CDA Fernandez replied that the U.S.
would like to eventually move in that direction in Darfur, but that
in order for this to occur the Government of Sudan (and especially
the Humanitarian Affairs Commission) must demonstrate that it is
willing to work with the U.S. as a partner. The GoS looks at
international development and humanitarian assistance as a blank
check and complains when there is accountability and oversight of
aid and development programs. CDA Fernandez stated that the arrival
of the new USAID Director in Sudan will present the opportunity to
raise the issue of development programs with senior GOS officials
again but the regime needs to change its attitude towards the
international community and the US if it expects more partnership.



5. (SBU) Madibbo responded that there are certain officials within
the GoS who are more problematic than others. Madibbo then added
that he would personally discuss this with senior GoS officials such
as Vice President Ali Osman Taha (who he claimed holds the
humanitarian and development portfolio in Darfur, while Nafie Ali
Nafie remains in charge of Darfur negotiations.) CDA Fernandez
ended the meeting by asking Madibbo to brainstorm about a
non-controversial development pilot project that would test the
GOS's openness to a U.S. partnership and build trust between the
U.S. and GoS. Madibbo agreed to think about the issue and mentioned
the devasted Fur area of Shattay as a possibility. He then
concluded by stating that the potential ICC arrest warrant for
President Bashir remains a problem for the GOS, and "if there is a
solution you can offer, it would change our relationship 100%."


6. (SBU) COMMENT: Madibbo's Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Commission appears to be much further along in its work compared to
other TDRA commissions. (NOTE: The Compensation Commission and Land
Commission, for example, have only begun their preliminary studies
and are far away from producing or recommendations for moving
forward. END NOTE.) The interests of both the GOS and the U.S.
could potentially overlap in Darfur's development, and Madibbo's
work might provide a foundation for such cooperation. However, the
one caveat and major source of frustration remains that until the
HAC and GOS stop their harassment and obstruction of INGOs working
in Darfur, such a partnership will be impossible. While development
and painful tradeoffs about returns, land, and IDPs will eventually
have to be addressed as part of a comprehensive solution to Darfur,
this remains a regime that cannot be trusted on such sensitive
issues.

FERNANDEZ