SPLA AFFAIRS MINISTER SAYS RENEWED CONFLICT WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000233 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E NSC FOR CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC SOCI KPKO UNSC SU SUBJECT: SPLA AFFAIRS MINISTER SAYS RENEWED CONFLICT WITH THE NORTH "NEARLY INEVITABLE," THOUGH SIGNS IN KHARTOUM DO NOT YET POINT TO OPEN CONFLICT REF: A. KHARTOUM 224 ¶B. KHATOUM 185 Classified By: Charge d'Affairs alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a meeting with ConGen staff on February 17, Nhial Deng Nhial, the newly installed Minister for SPLA Affairs, termed renewed conflict with the North &nearly inevitable,8 emphasized the need to disarm local civilian populations in the South in order to put a stop to increasing inter and intra tribal violence, and discussed how budget shortfalls due to the falling price of oil will force him to cut back on SPLA expenditures and programs. Nhial,s comments are alarmist given that the North does not show an apparent, immediate appetite for renewed open conflict, and Bashir himself plans to visit Juba next week. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Asked his view on the state of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),Minister Nhial stated his strong belief that the agreement will soon &hit a brick wall.8 Given what he termed NCP manipulation to undermine the CPA, Nhial asserted that room for maneuver on the agreement &is becoming increasingly restricted,8 and that a return to conflict was possible at almost any time. He cited the lack of progress on nearly all aspects of the implementation of the CPA as reasons, including the Abyei Road Map Agreement, the census, revenue sharing (despite a just concluded agreement to pay arrears ) ref. A),and NCP complicity in promoting discord in the South. He said the GOSS would need US support to help deal with renewed conflict, if and when it comes, particularly in the area of air defense. &We can handle the SAF on the ground,8 the Minister said, &but we need assistance in preventing the North from using its air power against us.8 Nhial stated his confidence in the SPLA stemmed partly from the fact that Bashir has limited qualified manpower in the SAF due to a series of purges of his most qualified officers and troops. Nihal added that the purges were conducted to strengthen Bashir,s hand politically with the army, but that they had weakened the army itself. ¶3. (SBU) The best way to avoid a return to conflict, Nhial said, &is to convince Bashir that a military option is off the table.8 The reason he signed the CPA in the first place was to guarantee continued access to the oil fields on the North ) South border and to cut his losses in the field, losses that were being suffered by the very class of people Bashir depends upon for his political support. If Bashir is convinced he does not have a military option, those same concerns will keep him for resuming armed conflict. ¶4. (SBU) Turning to what appears to be an increasing trend in inter and intra tribal violence in the South, Nhial admitted that there are ethnic stresses in Southern Sudan that must be addressed. He also stated his belief, however, that the NCP is fighting a proxy war in the South and does all it can to encourage this violence and instability. &We must lessen opportunities for conflict,8 he said, which included the need to disarm the civilian population. The easy access to guns meant that every dispute between neighbors had the potential to become deadly. &If we don,t do something, we could soon have no go, areas across the South.8 To disarm local populations may sometimes require force, Nhial said, but it was necessary to insure peace and security in Southern Sudan. ¶5. (SBU) Nhial admitted that the budget crisis facing the GOSS due to the falling worldwide price of oil (ref. B) was having an impact on the SPLA. He said that he had already scrapped some plans, although he declined to mention any specific cuts. On a related note, Nhial said the budget shortfalls likely meant that the SPLA would not be making another arms purchases any time soon. They probably just could not afford it. ¶6. (C) Comment: Nhial,s comments that general fighting could break out at any time are alarmist given that the North currently shows no appetite for open conflict on a major scale, just agreed to financial concessions favorable to the South and that President Bashir himself is planning a trip to Juba next week. However, there are certainly signs that Khartoum continues to arm tribes that are sympathetic to its KHARTOUM 00000233 002 OF 002 point of view, both in Darfur and along the 1-1-56 border, and Khartoum has always meddled in tribal disputes to strengthen its hand. It is this kind of indirect, proxy conflict, relying on spreading cash and weapons to promote unrest, which is most attractive to Khartoum rather than outright, naked Northern aggression against South Sudan. Certainly there are specific regions, such as Abyei or Southern Kordofan, where the possibility of violence, stoked by the NCP, is very high but this is somewhat different than an all-out war between the two peace partners. More than anything, the financial crisis has placed increased stress on the GOSS and especially the SPLA, which faces the possibility of not being able to pay already ill-disciplined troops this year due to losses in revenue transfers following the international drop in the price in oil. This more than any other immediate factor must concern the SPLA Affairs Minister. FERNANDEZ