SPLM NEGOTIATOR ARMAN ON DOHA DARFUR TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000230 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, NEA/ARP NSC FOR CHUDSON ADIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC KPKO AU UNSC SU QA SUBJECT: SPLM NEGOTIATOR ARMAN ON DOHA DARFUR TALKS REF: A. DOHA 133 ¶B. KHARTOUM 226 Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to Doha talks participant Yasser Arman, the GNU-JEM &Goodwill Agreement8 reached there potentially could re-energize the political process in Darfur, if it is enforced and if Sudan,s neighbors and other rebel factions can be engaged, but the behavior of JEM in the talks raises real concerns. Arman worried that both the NCP and JEM might seek to use the process to undermine the north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),saying that it is important for the SPLM to keep the &legitimate grievances of the Darfuris8 separate from the CPA. END SUMMARY. From a &Framework8 to &Goodwill8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Charge Fernandez called on Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) Northern Sector Chief Yasser Arman February 19, to solicit Arman,s perspectives on the GNU-JEM negotiations in Doha that on February 17 yielded an &Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence Building for the Settlement of the problem in Darfur8 (refs). Arman and Abdel Aziz Helou represented the SPLM in the five-person Government of National Unity (GNU) delegation in the Doha talks (the other three, from the NCP, being Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie, MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq and NISS chief Salah Ghosh). According to Arman, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),initially tabled a three-part proposal, including confidence building measures (e.g., a prisoner release),a declaration of intentions, and a Framework Agreement. Arman said that the distinction between the three measures was unclear and he urged JEM to put their ideas down in writing for further discussion. ¶3. (C) According to Arman, JEM returned with a draft &framework agreement8 that in fact was a detailed peace proposal that encompassed power sharing, wealth sharing, and security. Arman saw JEM's maximalist positions as worrying since it showed their real intentions to monopolize power in Darfur and, eventually, in Sudan. First, JEM proposed an autonomous Darfur and Kordofan, ruled by JEM. Second, it called for a rotating national presidency in Khartoum (between JEM and the NCP). Finally, it proposed a new peace process "interim period" of six years (ending in 2015),with national elections delayed until 2014. Arman said that, although unstated, the election delay implied that the all-important referendum on southern self-determination, scheduled for 2011 under the CPA, also would be postponed. ¶4. (C) Arguing that &this is not a framework,8 Arman said he tried to scale back the proposal to something more realistic, pressing for a cessation of hostilities. Arman said the NCP put no constructive proposals of its own on the table, but left no doubt that it wanted an agreement. Lead negotiator Nafie, usually a regime hard-liner, listened to the SPLM's views and openly shared information on advancing the talks. In the end, the parties were unable to agree on a framework and were reduced to the release of prisoners as the only concrete measure. This was clearly one of the main motivations for JEM to be there. It was clear that the NCP wanted a deal even more than JEM. A New Political Momentum? - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Arman credited Bassole and the Qataris at Doha with having accomplished more than any of their predecessors. The Qataris had the advantage of having no interests in Sudan to defend and, he added, they are humble, making no big claims for themselves. He thought the SPLM did well in dealing with both the NCP and JEM. Based on the talks, Arman said he concluded that JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim is ready to make peace, but only for a very steep price: "for the right price, anyone will make peace." The negotiations injected a new momentum into the Darfur political process, he believes, bringing the focus back to the political sphere rather than military or humanitarian issues which are only parts of a political solution. He opined that JEM is the most important and capable movement politically as well as currently being the most powerful militarily. ¶6. (C) Arman believes that the process begun at Doha can work, if it is enforced and if Sudan,s neighbors can be engaged. The Qataris need to develop a plan of action, with KHARTOUM 00000230 002 OF 002 U.S. assistance. He thought that Egypt is the most likely to come in first. CDA Fernandez agreed that, while suspicious of the Qataris, among all of Sudan,s neighbors, Egypt has the most straightforward relationship with Sudan. Arman reported that Qatar,s Emir plans to travel soon to Sudan, Chad, and Libya to work out the prisoner release. The Qataris realized that the Libyans needed to be thrown a bone and Yasser suggested that they may be offered the chance to host some Darfuri civil society meetings. He also said that Khalil Ibrahim has now agreed that he would travel to Juba to meet with South Sudan President Salva Kiir. ¶7. (C) Arman believes that to succeed the process must be expanded by bringing in the various SLM factions. The Charge commented that both SLA/MM and SLA/Unity see any gain by Khalil as their loss. Arman agreed that Khalil is seeking to establish himself as the sole representative of the Darfuri people, "he wants to be the PLO of Darfur, as in the days when the PLO was accepted as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians". Such an effort would put a straight-jacket on the peace process. He added that the biggest problem will be the intransigence of Fur leader Abdul Wahid al Nur. The Charge agreed that the Fur need to be at the table. Who will speak for them? Don,t Undermine the cPA - - - - - = - - - - , 8, ((C+ AsMa sAifQl woult&g!o!Zu"a!jVg"~taty(0 5o*cQmev'mh2*8E,3y8i09j- `u*ja4qav`jT$w"?ouQ*Q|iQ*cQX$u.QWwmQ$F/Qx+QZQ gQF&6>>hi*8fiMb$uwojqJQ2Q{dQl|b\`Xqo['E!}5hen t - - - - ¶9. (C) Arman has a healthy and well-deserved suspicion of both the NCP and JEM, commenting that they &graduated from the same school8 of deception and radicalism. JEM,s initial draft &framework,8 which proposed a JEM monopoly in Darfur and Kordofan and delaying the CPA mandated national elections and, by implication, the referendum, shows that it is perfectly willing to jettison key CPA provisions in its lust for power. And JEM alone "in charge" of Darfur is a recipe for further disasters in that troubled region. Given the prominence of JEM in the current phase of the search for peace in Darfur, the SPLM will be challenged to assist the process while protecting its own interests in the CPA. Arman was correct in his prediction that the Egyptians would need to be consulted next; we note that President Bashir and NISS Chief Ghosh traveled to Cairo February 22 for consultations with the Egyptians. MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq told CDA Fernandez February 22 that this visit was intended in part to discuss the Doha process. FERNANDEZ