NCP OFFICIAL SYMPATHETIC BUT NONCOMMITTAL ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000213 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A A/S CARTER AND AF/SPG NSC FOR CHUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2019 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: NCP OFFICIAL SYMPATHETIC BUT NONCOMMITTAL ON EXPULSION OF USAID PARTNER HEAD REF: A. KHARTOUM 204 ¶B. KHARTOUM 210 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On February 12, CDA Fernandez met with senior NCP official Qutbi al Mahdi, who maintains a keen interest in humanitarian affairs. CDA expressed his concern that on the very same day he received a conciliatory letter from President Bashir to President Obama (reftel a),the GOS Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) expelled the Canadian head of PADCO, a major American implementing partner of USAID (reftel b). Al Mahdi listened sympathetically and suggested the expulsion was the result of a misunderstanding, but was ultimately noncommittal on the issue. Al Mahdi also offered his thoughts on the current round of Doha talks, noting that the GOS is keen to keep the door open for movements as it recognizes that a bilateral agreement with JEM will do little to resolve the crisis in Darfur. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On February 12, CDA visited senior NCP official Qutbi al Mahdi at the party's headquarters in Khartoum to seek his counsel on the surprising expulsion of the head of a major American NGO, PADCO. CDA explained that PADCO had been in a dispute with the HAC over the disposition of certain assets it utilized under USAID-funded assistance programs. These assets were the property of the USG, yet HAC officials were insisting they be turned over to the HAC following the conclusion of the program. CDA noted that the Embassy had presented a diplomatic note requesting a meeting with the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and HAC Commissioner to discuss the issue. Following the submission of the diplomatic note, the head of PADCO, who had devoted over 15 years of his career to aiding the Sudanese people, was summarily expelled without explanation, but allegedly in retaliation for "embassy interference" in the matter. CDA stated that he was at a loss to understand why this happened, noting that it appeared to be contradictory to the conciliatory letter he had received the same day as the expulsion from President Bashir to President Obama. "(HAC Commissioner) Hassabo's actions seem to speak louder than Bashir's words," he remarked. ¶3. (C) Al Mahdi listened sympathetically and agreed that the situation was a regrettable one. He noted that it was standard procedure for the HAC to take ownership of INGO equipment following the conclusion of an assistance program, and that perhaps HAC officials had not known the equipment belonged to the USG. "This is something that can be discussed. It should not be a problem," he said. CDA noted that it was for this reason the Embassy had requested a meeting with the HAC. "It's the refusal to talk that bothers me," he noted. Al Mahdi remained sympathetic but noncommittal. THOUGHTS ON DOHA -------------- ¶4. (C) Al Mahdi also offered his thoughts on the current talks between the GOS and JEM in Doha. He emphasized that despite the bilateral nature of the talks, the GOS is keen to keep the door open for other movements, and there were no preconditions for their participation. "There is of course no one person you can negotiate with to solve the problem of Darfur," he remarked. "You have to involve everyone." With that in mind, he noted that the rebels' demand for a single administrative region of Darfur would do little to solve the region's problems, because it would not rid Darfur of its complex tribal and factional tensions. Even if Darfur becomes one region, the question of who rules will remain unanswered, he said. ¶5. (C) Al Mahdi admitted that some in the GOS were skeptical about JEM's willingness to engage in serious dialogue, instead viewing their decision to go to Doha as a "tactical ploy" perhaps intended to secure the release of Khalil Ibrahim's half brother (currently on death row for his role in the May 2008 attack on Omdurman). Nevertheless, the government is engaging sincerely in the Doha talks out of the hope they will lead to peace, he said. "We need an end to this war, not for the ICC or for the international community, but for our own sake." ¶6. (C) Comment: The decision to expel the head of PADCO at a time when the GOS should be attempting to put its best foot forward with the new US Administration is truly bizarre, even for the underhanded and often insincere NCP regime but not KHARTOUM 00000213 002 OF 002 unusual given the regime's track record through the years. While the expulsion could simply be the result of an overzealous bureaucrat, it could also represent a serious lack of coordination among the regime's top officials or worse, a total breakdown in the chain of command. The NCP knows very well that humanitarian access is Darfur is a top priority, and may be testing to see whether we will engage in negotiations to improve the overall bilateral relationship, which would bring with it promises of improved humanitarian access to Darfur. In the same way that the GOS has facilitated UNAMID deployment (once having assessed that a toothless UNAMID would actually serve its own agenda in Darfur) the GOS would also be willing to improve humanitarian access for the right price. The regime is nothing if not cold and calculating in this regard. FERNANDEZ