REGIME IS CORNERED, SAYS NCP FUR INTELLECTUAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000198 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E, AF/C NSC FOR CHUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SUBJECT: REGIME IS CORNERED, SAYS NCP FUR INTELLECTUAL Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Miscalculations in dealing with the SPLM, Darfur rebels and Northern opposition parties have left the NCP severely weakened and unable to take decisive action, Fur intellectual and NCP member Dr. Faroug Ahmed Adam told CDA Fernandez and poloff in a meeting on February 10. The irony is that the NCP was always more concerned about external threats, he said. Adam also asserted that the crisis in Darfur cannot be solved without strong leadership from the USG, P-3 and regional actors including Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia. He urged the international community to convene talks among rebel groups--without the government--to defuse factional tensions in advance of future peace talks. He expressed concern that while some in the NCP view the current Doha talks between the GOS and JEM as the first step to a broader ceasefire arrangement, others want to subvert it to create another failed Darfur Peace agreement, exchanging Minnawi for Khalil Ibrahim. He expressed concern that bringing more Islamists in the government could exacerbate North-South tensions post-2011, and also urged the SPLM to play a constructive role in Darfur instead of attempting to leverage the conflict in pursuit of its own objectives. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On February 10, CDA met with Dr. Faroug Ahmed Adam, a respected NCP intellectual and member of the Fur tribe. Adam stated that the NCP regime is in a critical position, facing internal threats on three fronts: the South, North, and the West (Darfur). With regard to the South, he noted that NCP powerbrokers had hoped that they could subvert the CPA and "engulf" the Southerners, but this clearly had not happened so they were not dragging their feet to prevent further CPA implementation, especially on larger issues which could strengthen the hand of the GOSS/SPLM. In the North, the NCP underestimated the popular support of traditional Northern opposition parties such as Umma and DUP, and predicted their demise prematurely, he said. They thought that they could buy off dynastic figures such as Umma,s Sadig al Mahdi and DUP,s Mohamed Mirghani quickly and cheaply, but they are facing resistance. They did indeed bribed these leaders, but they don,t stay bought. The NCP also discovered that these political dinosaurs still have more political clout than the NCP expected. In Darfur, the regime thought it could bribe, buy-off and otherwise manipulate the rebels to weaken and eventually destroy them, but this too has backfired and created an environment of chaos beyond the regime,s full control. ¶4. (SBU) As a result of its inability to deal adequately with these political pressures, the NCP is weakened to the point where it can not make decisions or fully carry out policies, said Adam. This has been further exacerbated by the looming specter of the ICC, which will unite them in the short term but in time will most certainly divide the NCP. Adam remarked that some forward-leaning NCP thinkers have raised the question of whether it is worth sacrificing the country for the good of the President. Up until now their pleas have fallen on deaf ears, he said, but that may change with time. Either way, he said, eventually the regime will recognize that "someone will have to pay for the crimes of Darfur." He noted that some in the ruling elite know that they eventually are going to have to choose between Bashir and the NCP and the NCP and Sudan. ¶5. (SBU) It is not enough to have justice without peace, said Adam, and he argued that an inter-rebel dialogue was needed before any potential peace talks with the government. Only the international community and specifically the USG has the potential to make this happen, he said. He urged that the USG appoint a full-time "heavyweight" Special Envoy who could work with the P-3 and other regional powers, including Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, to facilitate such a gathering between JEM, SLA/Minnawi, SLA/Unity, and SLA/Abdul Wahid. Respected "Godfather" figures such as former Darfur Governor Ahmed Diraige and Dr. Sharif Harir ought also to be in attendance to bring some sort of basic accord amongst the rebel movements, prior to negotiations with the government, he said. He also noted that in order not to repeat the mistakes of Abuja, a so called "popular consultation" amongst Darfuri IDPs, tribal leaders and other civil society groups should take place before, not after, peace talks. ¶6. (SBU) With regard to the impending talks in Doha between JEM and the GOS, Adam expressed concern that while some in KHARTOUM 00000198 002 OF 002 the NCP sincerely view the talks as the first step to a broader ceasefire arrangement, others clearly want to subvert it to create another failed Darfur Peace agreement, exchanging Minnawi for Khalil Ibrahim and merely buying time. He remarked that "Minni is still more popular than Khalil," as a result of the latter,s ideological background, and noted that some skeptics have even anointed the impending Doha talks "an Islamist reconciliation." "There are very concrete grounds for a dialogue between the two Islamist groups," said Adam, noting that the NCP could offer to release Khalil,s half-brother (detained since JEM,s May 2008 attack on Omdurman) and recently detained PCP leader Hassan al Turabi as part of any "package deal." ¶7. (SBU) The prospect of an Islamist dtente in the North would further ensure Southern secession in 2011, said Adam, who also worried that it could escalate tensions along the North-South 1956 border and bring a new ideological bent to the age-old competition for oil and water resources between the North and South in a "Savanna War" worse than past Sudanese conflicts. In such a nightmare scenario, "you could have jihadists from all over the Muslim world coming to fight the Christians," he said. With regard to the SPLM/A, Adam urged that they proceed to play a constructive role in Darfur, rather than continuing to leverage the conflict for their own short-term political gain. He also outlined a doomsday scenario for Darfur in which political and factional conflict deteriorates into apocalyptic tribal conflict. "You could have a three-sided proxy war in which Darfur,s Arab tribes are supported by the NCP, the Zaghawa rebel movements backed by Chad, and the African tribes backed by the SPLA," he said. In such a dire potential scenario, Darfur,s fragile institutions, such as local police, break up along ethnic lines. He noted that most of the rank and file of SAF in Darfur is still "African" with Arab officers, the regular police is largely African with special police and border guard units mostly filled with unruly janjaweed militia. ¶8. (C) Comment: As a loyal NCP member but proud member of the Fur tribe, Adam was unusually candid about his party,s miscalculations and weaknesses in dealing with a convergence of many long-standing challenges. That that the NCP may be incapable of dealing with these crises reveals the urgent need for greater international engagement to prevent political implosion in Sudan. While we agree that the NCP is under unprecedented pressure, though, its capacity for mischief and appetite for brutality remains. Adam,s concern over the Doha talks is well founded, as another failed peace accord with a militarily strong but politically weak Zaghawa movement will do little, if anything, to improve the situation on the ground - unless JEM is willing to commit to a ceasefire not only with the government but also with other rebel groups including SLM/Minnawi. However, a "show" agreement with no implementation could cause the situation in Darfur to worsen by heightening factional and tribal tensions, fueled by a near universal resentment of JEM and (Zaghawa Islamist) Khalil Ibrahim. While a ceasefire remains an imperative short-term goal, lasting peace in Darfur will not come without the participation of the Fur tribe. In future talks, the involvement of revered figures such as Ahmed Diraige (and another Fur ex-Governor, Tijani Sese) could bring legitimacy to the peace process and should be given serious attention. End comment. FERNANDEZ