KHALIL WILL BE WORSE THAN MINNI, SAYS PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000190

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, AF/E
NSC FOR CHUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: KHALIL WILL BE WORSE THAN MINNI, SAYS PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISOR

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 10, Presidential Advisor
Abdallah Masar told CDA Fernandez that the U.S.'s alleged
focus on JEM is dangerous, because Khalil Ibrahim "will be
worse than Minni Minnawi." Masar stated that his National
Congress Party is intent on holding elections "sooner rather
than later" in 2009, and asserted that if elections are
significantly postponed, so too should the South's 2011
referendum for secession also be postponed. Masar also
claimed that that the SPLM is playing a angerous game by
arming rebel movements in Darfur, and threatened that he
could "call up thousands of fighters at a minutes notice."
END SUMMARY.

"IS THE U.S. STILL INTERESTED IN SUDAN?"
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2. (C) Presidential Advisor Masar (a Baggara Rizegat widely
regarded as one of the Government's point-people for Darfur's
Arab militia and janjaweed) opened the claiming that the
Obama administration appears disinterested in Sudan, as
President Obama has been focused on Afghanistan and
Palestine. Masar asked whether the new administration will
engage with Sudan the way past presidents have. CDA
Fernandez explained that the new administration is certainly
engaged on Sudan, and that it is only reviewing its policy to
Sudan to decide what will be the essence and foundation of
U.S. policy in Sudan. The CDA stated that this presents an
opportunity for the GoS to present its best face to the new
Administration and potentially influence U.S. policy but this
has generally not happened. Sudan has not taken advantage,
with few exceptions, of the opportunity to do the right
thing. One opportunity, noted the CDA, was through
cooperating with humanitarian agencies and NGOs operating in
Sudan. The GoS could do much to change its negative
perception abroad and make a positive difference to the
people of Darfur.

DARFUR'S ARABS
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3. (C) Next, Masar stated that Darfur's Arab's should play
a positive role in a stable and peaceful Darfur, and should
not be dismissed simply as janjaweed or the proxy force of
the GoS. CDA Fernandez agreed and said that the U.S. has
attempted to reach out to Darfur's Arabs and will continue to
do so. He noted that AMERICA is not against the Arab tribes
of Darfur. Masar then offered to help organize meetings with
prominent Arab leaders such as Abdallah Safi Nur (who heads
the Nomad Development Council, organized in 2008, and also
has a notorious past) and moderate Rizeigat leader Ibrahim
Madibbo.

TIMING OF ELECTIONS
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4. (C) Masar stated that the people of Sudan are anxious
for elections. Some leaders within the Government of Sudan
such as First Vice President Salva Kiir and Senior
Presidential Assistant Minni Minnawi rose to power, not by
democratic elections, but through multiple peace agreements,
and the people of Sudan want to select their leaders for
themselves, stated Masar. Continuing, Masar stated that the
"world only respects democratically elected leaders," and
stated that it is now time for Sudan's leaders to gain that
same legitimacy. Masar added that the elections scheduled
for July 2009 will provide this opportunity and noted that it
is important for the elections to be held on schedule and if
not, "sooner rather than later." Masar replied that the CPA
stipulates that elections should be held in July 2009, and
that if the SPLM wants to delay elections, than so too should
the referendum be delayed. The SPLM, not the NCP, is backing
away from the CPA, asserted Masar. He stated that if
elections are postponed until early 2010, it does not make
sense for a new government to rule for only one year between
the 2011 referendum. CDA Fernandez replied that it is
important for the NCP and SPLM to work together and come to
an agreement on the timing of elections, especially as this
will influence whether the elections are free, fair, and
transparent. He noted that elections which are rigged for the
benefit of the NCP and disenfranchise South Sudan and the
SPLM would most likely be condemned by the US.

RELATIONS WITH THE SPLM AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN DARFUR
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5. (C) CDA Fernandez replied that it is important to work
closely with the SPLM leadership, and most importantly First
VP Salva Kiir, he is an essential figure and should not be

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undermined by Khartoum. Masar agreed and noted that while
formal relations with the SPLM may be at times strained, that
Kiir is a friend. He stated that the SPLM's involvement in
Darfur is dangerous, though, and claimed that the SPLM is
arming allies in the region. Implying that he too can exert
influence over armed actors in Darfur, Masar stated, "At any
point I can pick up the phone and have 1,000 fighters at my
disposal." "The SPLM needs to understand that there is a
difference between a conflict between the South and North,
and the conflict with a few tribes along its border with
Darfur," stated Masar. CDA Fernandez responded that even if
this is true, the South is taking a page out of the North's
book, as it has used its own proxy forces to destabilize the
South, which has even included the Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA) in the past. The NCP has also bankrolled renegades such
as Bona Malwal and Lam Akol to make trouble in the South. He
noted that if the South implodes because of NCP machinations,
"we will know whom to blame." Masar replied, "We have two
languages in Sudan - the language of the government and the
language of tribes, and when they (the SPLM) deal with us
(the NCP) they must use the first language." Masar added
that tribal peace conferences, rather than political
agreements, may help defuse tension in the area near Darfur
and South Sudan.

KHALIL IS WORSE THAN MINNI
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6. (C) Masar then asked for the U.S.'s position on Minni
Minnawi, now that his Sudan Liberation Movement has lost its
three strongholds in South Darfur. He stated that the
Zaghawa lead all of Darfur's rebel movements, and "it is not
in the interest of the United States to align solely with the
Zaghawa." Masar then stated that if the Zaghawa tribe, a
small minority in Darfur, continue to assert their authority
overall of Darfur, that "you will have not seen how bad this
fire can get." JEM's leader Khalil Ibrahim will be even
worse than Minni Minnawi, and has even less support than the
SLM leader. "Ibrahim is only a front for (PCP leader Hassan)
Al-Turabi, and an agreement with him will do little for
Darfur," stated Masar. Masar noted that he participated in
the DPA talks, and hoped to see the rise of civilian Fur
representatives such as Tijani Sese, and the relegation of
Zaghawa (such as Minni Minnawi) to secondary positions in the
military. However, Minnawi rose to power and now the Zaghawa
continue to dominate the armed rebel movements and assert
disproportionate control over Darfur. He asserted that a
rapid deterioration in Darfur could start Africa's equivalent
of World War III, as inhabitants of the region share family
ties to all of Africa and the Darfur borders four important
countries in Africa. "99 percent of the people of Darfur are
united, Arab and African, against the Zaghawa, and they see
the USG as supporting only this small group." CDA agreed that
the US must change this (wrong) perception by reaching out to
other African tribes such as the Fur and the Darfuri Arabs.


7. Masar ended the meeting stating that an ICC indictment
against President Bashir could "finish" the CPA and DPA and
added that "other forces - such as Al-Qaeda - could be worse
than what we have now." CDA noted that the end of these
agreements would be a disaster for all Sudanese, not just the
weaker party.

COMMENT
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8. (C) The subject of elections elicited the most passionate
and assertive response from Masar, and indicates the regime's
utter desperation for legitimacy. His comments point to the
regime hoping for a deal: legitimizing NCP rule in the North
in return for a smooth separation for the South in 2011.
There may be other motives at play, however, and the North
may seek to tie a delay in elections to a delay in the
referendum. This would enable the North to continue to drain
the South's oilfields and solidify its hold on the North as a
whole while sowing the seeds of tribal conflict in the South.
Masar implied that the alleged U.S. courtship of the Zaghawa
could drive Darfur into its worst state of violence, chaos,
and lawlessness. Although this is obviously a terrible
exaggeration, there is real danger in pushing an exclusive
agreement between another Zaghawa movement and the GoS. U.S.
outreach to the Fur and Arabs at this time, and possibly a
visit by a broad spectrum of their (appropriately vetted)
leaders, could go a long way in showing that the U.S.'s
concern for all people of Darfur, not just Zaghawa warlords
like Ibrahim. Masar's final ICC threat lacked emphasis and
emotion, and may signal only his desire to repeat the words
of other GoS officials, as opposed to a sincere belief that

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Sudan will disintegrate into chaos following the ICC
decision.
FERNANDEZ