KHALIL WILL BE WORSE THAN MINNI, SAYS PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000190 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, AF/E NSC FOR CHUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: KHALIL WILL BE WORSE THAN MINNI, SAYS PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 10, Presidential Advisor Abdallah Masar told CDA Fernandez that the U.S.'s alleged focus on JEM is dangerous, because Khalil Ibrahim "will be worse than Minni Minnawi." Masar stated that his National Congress Party is intent on holding elections "sooner rather than later" in 2009, and asserted that if elections are significantly postponed, so too should the South's 2011 referendum for secession also be postponed. Masar also claimed that that the SPLM is playing a angerous game by arming rebel movements in Darfur, and threatened that he could "call up thousands of fighters at a minutes notice." END SUMMARY. "IS THE U.S. STILL INTERESTED IN SUDAN?" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Presidential Advisor Masar (a Baggara Rizegat widely regarded as one of the Government's point-people for Darfur's Arab militia and janjaweed) opened the claiming that the Obama administration appears disinterested in Sudan, as President Obama has been focused on Afghanistan and Palestine. Masar asked whether the new administration will engage with Sudan the way past presidents have. CDA Fernandez explained that the new administration is certainly engaged on Sudan, and that it is only reviewing its policy to Sudan to decide what will be the essence and foundation of U.S. policy in Sudan. The CDA stated that this presents an opportunity for the GoS to present its best face to the new Administration and potentially influence U.S. policy but this has generally not happened. Sudan has not taken advantage, with few exceptions, of the opportunity to do the right thing. One opportunity, noted the CDA, was through cooperating with humanitarian agencies and NGOs operating in Sudan. The GoS could do much to change its negative perception abroad and make a positive difference to the people of Darfur. DARFUR'S ARABS - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Next, Masar stated that Darfur's Arab's should play a positive role in a stable and peaceful Darfur, and should not be dismissed simply as janjaweed or the proxy force of the GoS. CDA Fernandez agreed and said that the U.S. has attempted to reach out to Darfur's Arabs and will continue to do so. He noted that America is not against the Arab tribes of Darfur. Masar then offered to help organize meetings with prominent Arab leaders such as Abdallah Safi Nur (who heads the Nomad Development Council, organized in 2008, and also has a notorious past) and moderate Rizeigat leader Ibrahim Madibbo. TIMING OF ELECTIONS - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Masar stated that the people of Sudan are anxious for elections. Some leaders within the Government of Sudan such as First Vice President Salva Kiir and Senior Presidential Assistant Minni Minnawi rose to power, not by democratic elections, but through multiple peace agreements, and the people of Sudan want to select their leaders for themselves, stated Masar. Continuing, Masar stated that the "world only respects democratically elected leaders," and stated that it is now time for Sudan's leaders to gain that same legitimacy. Masar added that the elections scheduled for July 2009 will provide this opportunity and noted that it is important for the elections to be held on schedule and if not, "sooner rather than later." Masar replied that the CPA stipulates that elections should be held in July 2009, and that if the SPLM wants to delay elections, than so too should the referendum be delayed. The SPLM, not the NCP, is backing away from the CPA, asserted Masar. He stated that if elections are postponed until early 2010, it does not make sense for a new government to rule for only one year between the 2011 referendum. CDA Fernandez replied that it is important for the NCP and SPLM to work together and come to an agreement on the timing of elections, especially as this will influence whether the elections are free, fair, and transparent. He noted that elections which are rigged for the benefit of the NCP and disenfranchise South Sudan and the SPLM would most likely be condemned by the US. RELATIONS WITH THE SPLM AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN DARFUR - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) CDA Fernandez replied that it is important to work closely with the SPLM leadership, and most importantly First VP Salva Kiir, he is an essential figure and should not be KHARTOUM 00000190 002 OF 003 undermined by Khartoum. Masar agreed and noted that while formal relations with the SPLM may be at times strained, that Kiir is a friend. He stated that the SPLM's involvement in Darfur is dangerous, though, and claimed that the SPLM is arming allies in the region. Implying that he too can exert influence over armed actors in Darfur, Masar stated, "At any point I can pick up the phone and have 1,000 fighters at my disposal." "The SPLM needs to understand that there is a difference between a conflict between the South and North, and the conflict with a few tribes along its border with Darfur," stated Masar. CDA Fernandez responded that even if this is true, the South is taking a page out of the North's book, as it has used its own proxy forces to destabilize the South, which has even included the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the past. The NCP has also bankrolled renegades such as Bona Malwal and Lam Akol to make trouble in the South. He noted that if the South implodes because of NCP machinations, "we will know whom to blame." Masar replied, "We have two languages in Sudan - the language of the government and the language of tribes, and when they (the SPLM) deal with us (the NCP) they must use the first language." Masar added that tribal peace conferences, rather than political agreements, may help defuse tension in the area near Darfur and South Sudan. KHALIL IS WORSE THAN MINNI - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Masar then asked for the U.S.'s position on Minni Minnawi, now that his Sudan Liberation Movement has lost its three strongholds in South Darfur. He stated that the Zaghawa lead all of Darfur's rebel movements, and "it is not in the interest of the United States to align solely with the Zaghawa." Masar then stated that if the Zaghawa tribe, a small minority in Darfur, continue to assert their authority overall of Darfur, that "you will have not seen how bad this fire can get." JEM's leader Khalil Ibrahim will be even worse than Minni Minnawi, and has even less support than the SLM leader. "Ibrahim is only a front for (PCP leader Hassan) Al-Turabi, and an agreement with him will do little for Darfur," stated Masar. Masar noted that he participated in the DPA talks, and hoped to see the rise of civilian Fur representatives such as Tijani Sese, and the relegation of Zaghawa (such as Minni Minnawi) to secondary positions in the military. However, Minnawi rose to power and now the Zaghawa continue to dominate the armed rebel movements and assert disproportionate control over Darfur. He asserted that a rapid deterioration in Darfur could start Africa's equivalent of World War III, as inhabitants of the region share family ties to all of Africa and the Darfur borders four important countries in Africa. "99 percent of the people of Darfur are united, Arab and African, against the Zaghawa, and they see the USG as supporting only this small group." CDA agreed that the US must change this (wrong) perception by reaching out to other African tribes such as the Fur and the Darfuri Arabs. ¶7. Masar ended the meeting stating that an ICC indictment against President Bashir could "finish" the CPA and DPA and added that "other forces - such as Al-Qaeda - could be worse than what we have now." CDA noted that the end of these agreements would be a disaster for all Sudanese, not just the weaker party. COMMENT - - - - - ¶8. (C) The subject of elections elicited the most passionate and assertive response from Masar, and indicates the regime's utter desperation for legitimacy. His comments point to the regime hoping for a deal: legitimizing NCP rule in the North in return for a smooth separation for the South in 2011. There may be other motives at play, however, and the North may seek to tie a delay in elections to a delay in the referendum. This would enable the North to continue to drain the South's oilfields and solidify its hold on the North as a whole while sowing the seeds of tribal conflict in the South. Masar implied that the alleged U.S. courtship of the Zaghawa could drive Darfur into its worst state of violence, chaos, and lawlessness. Although this is obviously a terrible exaggeration, there is real danger in pushing an exclusive agreement between another Zaghawa movement and the GoS. U.S. outreach to the Fur and Arabs at this time, and possibly a visit by a broad spectrum of their (appropriately vetted) leaders, could go a long way in showing that the U.S.'s concern for all people of Darfur, not just Zaghawa warlords like Ibrahim. Masar's final ICC threat lacked emphasis and emotion, and may signal only his desire to repeat the words of other GoS officials, as opposed to a sincere belief that KHARTOUM 00000190 003 OF 003 Sudan will disintegrate into chaos following the ICC decision. FERNANDEZ