AVOIDING MYOPIA ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000189 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, IO NSC FOR CHUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: AVOIDING MYOPIA ON DARFUR REF: KHARTOUM 150 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) The solutions to Darfur are well known and the UN and international community need look no further than the many initiatives and proposals that Sudanese themselves have produced over the last five years, Umma Reform and Renewal party leader and former regime insider Mubarak al Fadil al Mahdi told polchief February 8. Al Mahdi, a direct descendent of the Sudanese prophet who now leads a branch of the Umma party, noted that what he has heard of UN/AU Mediator Bassole's framework is "weak" and pointed out that another Zaghawa agreement with the GOS won't solve Darfur's problems. Al Mahdi urged that the international community support a round-table conference on Darfur ("like the 'loya jirga' that was held in Afghanistan") that includes more than just the armed movements - specifically political parties, civil society including tribal leaders, and intellectuals, subject matter experts on issues such as land rights. Al Mahdi pointed to the "Darfur Forum" held in Libya in 2005 as an example of one of the many initiatives that has been ignored by the international community in favor of desperate, hastily-organized meetings organized by the UN or AU and "others who do not really understand Darfur." ¶2. (C) Al Mahdi said that the consensus of the 2005 Darfur Forum was that a round-table of Darfuri leaders should be convened, which would set the terms of a transitional government leading to the elections. He pointed out that all Sudanese recognize that the armed rebels in Darfur, unlike the SPLM/A in the South, have no real popular legitimacy nor capacity to govern Darfur. The role of the international community would be to pressure the Sudanese regime into accepting the idea of a true Darfur Forum with legitimate Darfuris from both outside and inside the government ("unlike the unrepresentative Sudan People's Initiative"). Al Mahdi thought that with the Sudanese regime increasingly desperate to find some sort of solution to Darfur, it might allow for such a forum in the coming year. Al Mahdi said that the armed rebels might actually be more of an obstacle than the government, "since many of them are nothing more than bandits and thieves." Therefore Al Mahdi said it would be necessary to create a new army in Darfur that would recruit fighters from the ranks of the rebels by paying them a decent wage, and disarming by force the rebels and Arab militias who refused to comply. Al Mahdi suggested that at a cost of over a billion dollars a year and limited utility, UNAMID could be dismantled and that money could go toward the salaries of the Darfuri army and the reconstruction of Darfur. ¶3. (C) Al Mahdi also provided some useful insights on the regime and the opposition parties. He said the NCP is increasingly fragile but would likely hold together for some time after the ICC indictment of President Bashir. Al Mahdi, who was previously a Presidential Assistant to President Bashir but after he left the government was detained for most of 2007 for allegedly plotting to overthrow the regime, said that four individuals run the country: President Bashir, VP Taha, Presidential Assistant Nafie, and Finance Minister al Jaz. He said that neither Nafie nor Al Jaz are "thinkers" but rather implement policy after it is agreed in the Council of Ministers or by consent between the top four. Al Mahdi said that despite the view that VP Taha has been sidelined, he remains the only serious political strategist in the regime - and that the inner circle still looks to him as the last word on what decisions to take. Al Mahdi said that since the ouster of Hassan al Turabi from the regime, there is no true political visionary in the NCP, only technocrats who follow orders handed down from the ruling clique at the top. ¶4. (C) Al Mahdi pointed out that the NCP will be weakened considerably by the current financial crisis, because its modus operandi is to buy off opposition and pay for support from tribes that are not always loyal. He claimed the financial crisis forced VP Taha to visit Saudi Arabia this week seeking a loan. On elections, Al Mahdi predicted that the NCP will win "even with Bashir as their candidate" if the international community and especially the US does not begin to directly support opposition parties. He predicted that the SPLM will not run any candidate in national elections, and that Umma National Party leader Sadiq al Mahdi will run on his own without going into any coalition. He predicted the DUP party will make a deal with the NCP on elections, and may have already struck a deal during Osman Mirghani's lengthy visit to Khartoum. KHARTOUM 00000189 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Comment: In the context of the many current initiatives on Darfur (some not so well thought-out) it is important to maintain a larger perspective on the history of the conflict and not to ignore proposals that have come from Darfuris and Sudanese themselves. A quick review of Embassy Khartoum's reporting from the last several years shows that although some of the details and personalities have changed, few of the fundamental issues have. The Umma party has deep roots in Darfur and Al Mahdi and others in the various factions of the Umma party all are keen observers of the situation in Darfur. Some of Al Mahdi's views track closely with our own, especially regarding the dangers of another narrow and unstable Zaghawa-based deal on Darfur. Al Mahdi's thoughts on a Darfur Forum that would select a transitional leadership at the state, regional, and national evel deserves close attention and has been previously suggested by post (reftel) due to the lack of capacity and popular legitimacy of the rebels in Darfur. Al Mahdi has participated in plots against previous Sudanese regimes and the current regime keeps a close eye on him. In 1976 he and the rest of the Umma party conspired with the NIF (and many who are now members of the NCP regime) in a coup attempt against then-President Nimeiry. Al Mahdi is desperate for elections funding support but there is no indication that he would do any better in a general election than Umma National Party Chairman and former Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi. If there are elections, Al Mahdi will likely be forced into an alliance with Sadiq al Mahdi, with the SPLM or could mend fences with the current regime if the price is right. End comment. FERNANDEZ