SLM/MINNAWI SLAMS JEM, QATAR, AND THE MEDIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000172 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG AND AF/C ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: SLM/MINNAWI SLAMS JEM, QATAR, AND THE MEDIATION Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a February 4 meeting with Special Representative for Sudan Shortley, leaders of the Sudan Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi in Khartoum vehemently criticized the rival Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel group, Qatar's involvement in the peace process, and the work of the UN/AU Chief Mediator. MP Ali Traio claimed that JEM leaders have ties to terrorists including Osama bin Laden, participated in the jihad against South Sudan, and do not represent the people of Darfur. Shortley encouraged SLM/MM to not focus on JEM, but to determine its own position on negotiations and the movement's relationship to the GOS. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On February 4, Senior Representative Shortley, CDA Fernandez, and poloff met the following SLM/MM officials: - Ali Dausa, General Secretary SLM/MM - Abu Obeid Al Khalifa, Khartoum State Minister - Muhammad Beshier, Executive Office Director - Ali Traio, Member of Parliament, Secretary of Foreign Affairs - Abd Al-Aziz Sam, Legal Advisor - Hussein Arko Minnawi, Liaison to the SPLM - Adam Khatir Sam, Advisor to the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority - Bushara Hassan Tahir, Advisor on International Relations - Al-Fadul Al-Tijani, Secretary of Political Affairs ¶3. (C) General Secretary Ali Dausa opened the meeting recalling SLM/MM's history in Darfur. He stated that SLM/MM has attempted to transform itself from a rebel movement into a legitimate political force, and that SLM/MM's goals of justice, peace, and the fair distribution of wealth and power remain at the core of the movement. Dausa criticized the GoS's failure to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement and the GoS official responsible for Darfur (i.e. Presidential Assistant Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, though Dausa did not mention Nafie by name.) Dausa asserted that, while the Government has tried to weaken SLM/MM, his movement has shown restraint and has encouraged non-signatory rebel movements to enter the DPA. He said that SLM/MM had also engaged with Sudanese opposition political parties and Sudan's neighboring countries. ¶4. (C) MP Ali Traio then listed a litany of complaints �00A;against the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and its leader Khalil Ibrahim. Ibrahim participated in the jihad against the South, committed atrocities in this war, obstructed the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (for which he was sanctioned by the USG in May 2007) and is connected to international terrorists such as Osama bin Laden, stated Traio. As evidence of the lattermost claim, Traio stated that Khalil Ibrahim's brother, Abd Al Aziz Osher rented a home to bin Laden during his time in Khartoum in the 1990's. JEM represents a small fraction of the people of Darfur both ideologically and ethnically, and "is only fighting Chad's proxy war," added Traio. JEM's "execution" of 140 Meidob and Berti tribesmen in January 2009, its recruitment of child soldiers, and its attacks on civilians show the movement's dismal human rights record. "JEM is an unprincipled, deceptive, and inconsistent group - really a mafia," claimed Traio. As evidence of this , Traio stated that JEM bribed officials such as Sam Ibok while he was the AU's Chief Mediator of the Joint Mediation Support Team. Traio said that JEM has tried to become the only movement in Darfur, that Ibrahim does not recognize other movements, and that JEM's leaders have tried to use their January 2009 visit to Washington as evidence of blanket U.S. support for JEM. ¶5. (C) Legal Advisor Abd Al-Aziz Sam stated that SLM/MM has had limited communication with both the JMST and Qatar. He added that JEM went straight from Washington to its January 15 (crossing the border on 8 January) attack on South Darfur and that the international community and the Mediation seem to have rewarded JEM for its bad behavior which has led to thousands of new IDPs in South Darfur. Given recent visits to Qatar by PCP leader (and former NIF regime leader) Hassan Al-Turabi and its strong connections to the JEM leadership, Qatar is an inappropriate venue for discussions as "it is the venue of Khalil Ibrahim," stated Sam. Sam added that it is inappropriate to begin talks in Doha while Abdul Wahid Al-Nur and other rebel leaders refuse to participate. In order for negotiations to succeed, the Mediation needs to first map areas under rebel control, Qatar must show "deliberate KHARTOUM 00000172 002 OF 002 consultation with all stakeholders," and neighboring countries must play a larger role, according to Sam. ¶6. (C) Shortley responded saying that Qatar is only a venue for discussions, and that Chief Mediator Bassole is responsible for the peace process. Shortley encouraged SLM/MM to participate in the upcoming discussions in Doha as part of the Government of National Unity. He noted that JEM, the GoS, and the JMST have all committed to meet in Doha on February 9 to discuss an outline for a broader agreement. He stated that SLM/MM must determine its own position on negotiations and whether it will remain within the Government of National Unity or break the DPA and become a rebel movement again. A potential ICC indictment against President Bashir puts pressure on the GOS and presents a window of opportunity for progress in negotiations over the next few weeks, stated Shortley. CDA Fernandez added that SLM/MM should be actively engaged during this crucial period. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: Without any recent movement in DPA implementation despite repeated assurances from the government, and the loss of three of its strongholds within the last month to a JEM sneak attack, these SLM/MM leaders were noticeably frustrated during this meeting. Adding to this anxiety is SLM/MM's belief that the DPA (as unfulfilled as it is) could be superseded by another agreement cut with their JEM rivals. In the past, SLM/MM has always refused to attend negotiations as part of the Government of National Unity (as in the Sirte negotiations of late 2007.) As reported septel, Post learned over the weekend that Minnawi will again refuse to participate at GOS-JEM talks in Doha on December 9. Although SLM/MM remains in limbo, it is not finished and it is dangerous to leave the movement without any options. Minnawi knows fighting better than politics, he has wide-ranging relations with neighboring countries and former SLM colleagues, and now more than ever, his patience may be running short. Bassole could probably engineer some sort of special status for the reluctant Minnawi at future talks if he gives this issue adequate attention, but the US will likely have to lean on both Bassole, JEM, Minnawi and the GOS if we want this to happen - as Bassole himself is not committed to the idea and the government would prefer to frustrate Minnawi by insisting that he be included in the government delegation. End comment. ¶8. (U) Senior Representative Shortley did not see this cable prior to his departure from Sudan. FERNANDEZ