ABYEI REFERENDUM LAW APPROVED, BUT SOUTHERN SUDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001475 SIPDIS NSC FOR MGAVIN,LETIM DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2019 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL SU SUBJECT: ABYEI REFERENDUM LAW APPROVED, BUT SOUTHERN SUDAN REFERENDUM LAW STILL CONCERNS GHAZI REF: KHARTOUM 1462 Classified By: A/CDA Mark L. Asquino, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. On December 30, the National Assembly approved the Abyei Referendum Law by a majority vote, one day after passing the Southern Sudan Referendum Law (reftel). Acting Charge d'Affaires and poloff met with Presidential Advisor Dr. Ghazi Salaheddin on December 30 prior to the announcement that the Abyei Referendum Law had passed. Dr. Ghazi predicted that the latter would be approved, although cautioning that problems would remain to be resolved even after passage. He was also confident that the Popular Consultations bill would be approved by this session of the National Assembly. Ghazi, however, was decidedly downbeat about the Southern Sudan Referendum Law approved the previous day. He warned that by passage of a version of the law that allowed the Southern Sudan Referendum in January 2011 and postponed resolution of post-2011 arrangements until six months later, there would be Southern separation accompanied by a return to civil war. End Summary. -------------- Abyei Referendum Law Passes -------------- ¶2. (C) According to Southern Sudan People's Liberation (SPLM) Head of Northern Sector Yasir Arman, the Abyei Referendum was approved by a majority vote in the morning session of the National Assembly on December 30. A dispute over Article 24 was resolved by agreement of both the SPLM and the National Congress Party (NCP) to give voting rights for self-determination to the Dinka Nygok and "other Sudanese" residents. The law does not define the term resident and therefore does not resolve the long-standing issue of the nomadic Misseriya who only spend part of the year in Abyei. Three parliament members, reportedly Misseriya tribesmen, walked out of the Assembly session, but all others remained. All SPLM members and a majority of NCP members voted for passage. 3.(C) In a December 30 meeting with Acting Charge and poloff before passage of the Abyei Referendum had been announced publicly, Presidential Advisor Dr. Ghazi Salaheddin predicted that it would be approved. He cautioned, however, that t the dilemma of how to define residency in Abyei would remain after passage of the law. He added that it would be difficult, but necessary, to set a threshold for voting rights based on the amount of time a person physically resided in Abyei. Providing a rhetorical example, he suggested that nomadic Misseriya who spent only 40% of the year in Abyei probably would not qualify to vote in the Abyei Referendum, but those who could show they were resident 80% of the year, would. He noted that this was exactly the sort of difficult decision that the special Abyei commission agreed to by the NCP and SPLM would need to make to implement the Abyei Referendum law. When asked about passage of the Popular Consultations Law for South Kordofan and Blue Nile, Ghazi said that there should be fewer problems with passage. He added that even if the National Assembly did not pass the latter law by December 31, when the session was slated to end, the session could be extended until January 11, the day before parties had to make nominations for the April elections. However, he seemed confident that the Popular Consultations Law would pass without need for such an extension. -------------- Southern Referendum Concerns -------------- ¶4. (C) Dr. Ghazi next turned to the Southern Sudan Referendum Law passed on December 29. He expressed strong concerns about the version of the law that had been passed in regard to Article 67. Ghazi noted that law as passed by the National Assembly on December 29 stipulated that resolution of post-referendum issues was not requisite for holding the referendum in January 2011, but rather must be resolved in the six month interim period following the referendum. He stated that this was a far more serious issue than Article 27 on who would be allowed to vote in the north. Ghazi said that passage of this version of the bill put no pressure on either the NCP or SPLM to solve differences on crucial post 2011 issues such as citizenship and water rights prior to the Referendum. He was dubious that there would be any incentive to resolve the issues in the six months following the latter. The result, he said ominously, would be separation and a return to war. He concluded that as a result, there would be "no unity or peace" in Sudan. The Acting Charge said that while passage of the Southern Sudan Referendum Law should be viewed as an accomplishment by both the NCP and SPLM, it was in no one's interest to have Sudan return to war. This would be a catastrophe for Sudan, Africa and the international community, which supported the CPA. He noted that the United States Government would continue to do everything it could to work with the parties to avert such a result. ¶5. (SBU) In response to a question on changes to Article 27 of the Southern Sudan Referendum Law, Dr. Ghazi provided the Acting Charge with a copy in English and Arabic of Article 27 with revisions in language. Post has sent a copy of the English version and translation of the Arabic to S/USSES. However, interpretation of the exact meaning of Article 27's revised provisions, remains ambiguous and open to interpretation. Dr. Ghazi expressed the view that despite compromises on language, those Southerners who were resident in the north (as well as their children and grandchildren) prior to January 1956, would still be discriminated against by being forced to register and vote in the south. In this regard, he said he believed that Article 27 could be successfully challenged in the courts as unconstiutional. -------------- Census, Electoral Seats and Other Issues -------------- ¶6. (C) On the issue of the unresolved NCP and SPLM differences over the 2007 census results, Ghazi was pessimistic that the two sides could reach an agreement prior to elections in April 2010. He said the adjustment in number of parliamentary seats might best be resolved after elections by Presidential decision. However, he cautioned that an increase in the number of SPLM seats, to offset census figures reducing the South's population from a third of the population to 22% was not the solution. In his view this would only lead to other regions of Sudan, including the East, demanding proportionate increases of their parties' representation in the National Assembly. Ghazi maintained that the solution should be to decrease the blocking minority to 20 percent versus the current 30 percent. He noted that this would make it more difficult for the NCP to use its mechanical majority to pass controversial legislation and hence, solve the larger issue. ¶7. (C) With regard to elections, Ghazi said he believed the results would benefit the political system by providing new people with fresh energy in elected positions. Ghazi also spoke at length and was upbeat about prospects for a normalization of relations between Sudan and Chad. His views on this subject will be reported via septel. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Dr. Ghazi's unhappiness with passage of the NCP/SPLM agreed-upon version of the Southern Sudan Referendum Law on December 29 and his ominous warning of a return to war due its passage, were surprising. During the meeting, Ghazi expressed distrust of the SPLM's willingness to conclude post-2011 arrangements by the end of the six month interim period following the January 2011 Referendum. Instead, he argued that there would now be no incentives for the SPLM to reach such agreement, and that for this reason, such resolution should have been a a pre-condition for the holding of the Southern Sudan Referendum. In this regard, Ghazi appears to have been allied with the hard-line Nafi faction who insisted on the latter, rather than the Taha faction (reftel),which sought the compromise language that resulted in passage of the Southern Sudan Referendum Law. END COMMENT. ASQUINO