Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KHARTOUM1421
2009-12-17 06:40:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SUDAN 2009 Country Report on Terrorism

Tags:  ASEC EFIN KCRM KPAO PTER KHLS AEMR SU 
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VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #1421/01 3510640
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 170640Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4903
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001421 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM
DEPT FOR S/CT - RSHORE, NCTC
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC EFIN KCRM KPAO PTER KHLS AEMR SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN 2009 Country Report on Terrorism

REF: STATE 109980

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General Assessment
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UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001421 SENSITIVE SIPDIS NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM DEPT FOR S/CT - RSHORE, NCTC ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC EFIN KCRM KPAO PTER KHLS AEMR SU SUBJECT: SUDAN 2009 Country Report on Terrorism REF: STATE 109980 -------------- General Assessment -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Sudan remains a cooperative partner in the Global War on Terror (GWOT),and the outlook for continued cooperation is positive. During the past year, the Sudanese government continued to pursue terrorist operations directly involving threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Sudan. Sudanese officials have indicated that they view their continued cooperation with the USG as important and recognize the potential benefits of U.S. training and information-sharing. While the CT relationship remains solid, hard-line Sudanese officials continue to express resentment and distrust over actions by the USG and question the benefits of continued cooperation. Their assessment reflects disappointment that Sudan's cooperation on CT has not resulted in its removal from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Despite this, there is no indication at this time that the Sudanese government will curtail its current level of CT cooperation despite bumps in the overall bilateral relationship. -------------- Safe Haven Assessment -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Al-Qaida-inspired terrorist elements, elements of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and the Lord's Resistance Army remain in Sudan. In light of the continuing hybrid UN-AU deployment to Darfur, various terrorist threats against this mission have emerged, and the Al-Qaida leadership has called for jihad against UN forces in Darfur. In the early hours of January 1, 2008, attackers in Khartoum sympathetic to Al-Qaida, calling themselves Al-Qaida in the Land Between the Two Niles, shot and fatally wounded two U.S. Embassy staff members: an American and a Sudanese employee, both of whom worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development. Sudanese authorities cooperated closely with agencies of the U.S. government in investigating this terrorist crime. Five alleged conspirators were arrested in February 2008 and put on trial for murder on August 31, 2008. On June 24, 2009 four men were sentenced to death by hanging for the killings. A fifth man received a two year prison term for providing the weapons used in the attack. At least three other men allegedly involved in planning the attack were detained but have not been charged. �
00A;¶3. (SBU) Other extremist groups also have threatened attacks against Western interests in Sudan. The July 14, 2008 request by International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo for an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on charges related to atrocities committed in Darfur has further inflamed tensions and remains outstanding. The ICC's issuance of an arrest warrant for al-Bashir on war crimes and crimes against humanity on March 4, 2009 further inflamed tensions. Therefore, the terrorist threat level remains critical in Khartoum and Darfur, and potentially other parts of Sudan. -------------- Terrorist Groups/Organizations -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Elements of designated terrorist groups remain in Sudan. With the exception of HAMAS, whose members the Sudanese government considers to be "freedom fighters" rather than terrorists, the government here does not openly support the presence of extremist elements in this country. The Sudanese government has taken steps to limit the activities of these organizations. For example, Sudanese officials have welcomed HAMAS members as representatives of the Palestinian Authority, but have limited their activities to fundraising. The Sudanese government has also worked hard to disrupt foreign fighters from using Sudan as a logistics base and transit point for Jihadists going to Iraq. However, gaps remain in the Sudanese government's knowledge of and ability to identify and capture these individuals. There is some evidence to suggest that individuals who were active participants in the Iraqi insurgency have returned to Sudan and are in a position to use their expertise to conduct attacks within Sudan or to pass on their knowledge. There is also evidence that Sudanese extremists participate in terrorist activities in Somalia, which the Sudanese government has also attempted to disrupt. ¶5. (SBU) The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony continued to operate in the region. Following Kony's repeated failure to sign a draft of the Final Peace Agreement, on December 14 the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF),with cooperation from the Government of Southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),launched Operation Lighting Thunder, attacking LRA bases along the border of Southern Sudan and the DRC. This operation destroyed the LRA base camp and scattered the LRA over the DRC, Southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR). The UPDF started withdrawing from the operation in mid-March, handing control over to the Armed Forces of the DRC. The operation was declared a success that had significantly weakened the LRA's command structure. However, the official objectives, to make Kony sign the Final Peace Agreement, or to destroy the LRA, were only partially achieved, and it is unclear how much the LRA's central command has been hurt. Few senior LRA figures were captured and Kony's whereabouts are unknown. The UN estimates that over 1,000 people have been killed, 1,500 abducted, and over 250,000 displaced in an area spanning the DRC, Sudan, and CAR since September 2008. There is no reliable information that corroborates long-standing allegations that the Government of Sudan is supporting the LRA. -------------- Foreign Government Cooperation -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Sudanese officials regularly discuss counterterrorism issues with U.S. counterparts. Sudan is generally responsive to international community concerns about counterterrorism efforts when it is in the best interest of the regime. ¶7. (SBU) Embassy Khartoum Point of Contact is Political Officer Preston Savarese. His e-mail address is savaresepr@state.gov and his telephone numbers are 249-183-774-700 (Embassy) and 249-912-178-697 (cellular phone). ASQUINO

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