SE GRATION VISIT TO EL FASHER AND EL GENEINA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001345

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S CARSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SE GRATION VISIT TO EL FASHER AND EL GENEINA,
DARFUR, NOVEMBER 20-21, 2009

Classified By: CDA Robert Whitehead, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: During the November 20-21 visit to Darfur
of U.S. Special Envoy (SE) General Scott Gration, senior
officials from the United Nations-African Union Mission in
Darfur (UNAMID) estimated that 40 percent of the problems in
Darfur are related to the troubled relationship between Chad
and Sudan. Monitoring the Chad-Sudan border would require a
change in the mandates of UNAMID and MINURCAT. The
Government of Sudan (GOS) has solidified its control over
Darfur, but scattered fighting continues between Darfuri
rebel groups and the GOS in outlying regions. In El Geneina,
UNAMID officials and humanitarian representatives bemoaned
high insecurity and the inability of the GOS to prevent
kidnappings in West Darfur. End summary.

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EL FASHER: UNAMID STRATEGY SESSIONS
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2. (SBU) In a private meeting with SE Gration and CDA
Whitehead, UNAMID Deputy Joint Special Representative (DJSR)
Mohamed Yonis noted overall mission concern for two UNAMID
staff kidnapped 85 days earlier from Zalingei, West Darfur.
He was concerned that, as UNAMID forces expanded, they were
increasingly in competition with local populations for scarce
water resources. Emphasizing that the Chad-Sudan dynamic
affects Darfur and UNAMID's success there, Yonis urged the
United States and France to push the warring neighbors to
direct talks. Yonis said that the report of the African
Union High Level Commission on Darfur (spearheaded by Thabo
Mbeki) deserved careful examination. SE Gration replied that
hybrid courts were complicated, costly and not always
effective, citing Rwanda as an example and added that he did
not know if it would be possible to duplicate a Rwanda-like
gacaca mechanism internally within Darfur. On UNAMID's role,
Yonis cited UNAMID,s success in bringing peace and security,
but SE Gration cautioned that the mission needs to pursue
actively policing and border monitoring, and not be afraid to
resort to their mandate's Chapter 7 right for access and to
impose order within the entire mission area.


3. (SBU) At a Darfur strategy session, UNAMID Section Chiefs,
including DJSR Yonis and Force Commander (FC) General Patrick
Nyamvumba (Rwanda),briefed SE Gration on the security and
political situations across the three states of Darfur.
North Darfur has seen regular clashes between the Sudanese
Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid faction (SLA/AW) and Sudan Armed
Forces (SAF) since September. In South Darfur, collateral
tribal clashes continue following the February 2009 fighting
near Muhajeriya, but overall, the GOS has solidified its
control over the state. Scattered tribal and factional
clashes have occurred in West Darfur recently, and three
international NGO workers are currently being held by unknown
kidnappers in West Darfur. Yonis noted that insecurity had
complicated the issue of voluntary return of IDPs, and added
that strong opinions in the humanitarian community further
muddied the waters. Different assessments done on the same
areas had come to different conclusions on whether many
returns were seasonal or permanent.


4. (SBU) Difficult relations between Chad and Sudan continue
to stymie UNAMID's work in bringing security to Darfur,
according to FC Nyamvumba. He estimated that 40 percent of
the "Darfur problem" is related directly to the
confrontational dynamic between the two neighbors. "A
political solution will relieve us from the impact that these
relations have on Darfur," he added. FC Nyamvumba counseled
that a successful two-pronged approach would require
immediate disbanding and disarmament of the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) and Chadian Armed Opposition Groups
(CAOGs),and international monitoring from both sides of the
border. Moudjib Djinadou, head of the UNAMID Joint Mission
Analysis Center (JMAC),reported that CAOGs have retreated
from the border into isolated areas of North Darfur (near
Mau) once controlled by SLA/AW, but a small faction remains
positioned near the border in Foro Burunga, West Darfur.
JMAC has no information that indicates that either JEM or the
CAOGs have been disarmed by their respective supporters in
N'Djamena or Khartoum.


5. (SBU) SE Gration queried if UNAMID Formed Police Units
(FPUs) and peacekeepers could establish a security buffer
outside the internally displaced persons(IDP) camps to permit
residents to emerge and resume traditional agricultural

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practices. UNAMID FPU Deputy Commander Adeyemi Ogunjemilusi
advised that the FPUs currently patrol around IDP camps, but
given that most camps are built on contested land, UNAMID
encouragement of such agricultural activities would ignite
local conflicts on property already farmed by nearby
villagers. Ogunjemilusi also added that UNAMID FPUs could
not begin joint patrols with GOS police, as that would
violate the UN's perceived neutrality in a region where the
police are frequently involved in human rights violations.
(Note: The most significant confrontation between IDPs and
GOS police occurred on August 25 at Kalma IDP camp in South
Darfur, when Central Reserve Police officers opened fire on
an IDP protest, killing 35 IDPs. GOS authorities have not
prosecuted any officers in connection with the killings. End
note.)


6. (SBU) SE Gration suggested the establishment of a Darfur
policing force that recruits officers from the IDP camps, and
provides security in camps where GOS police cannot enter
without causing significant unrest. DJSR Yonis and FPU
Commander Adeyemi noted that this idea would solve the
problem that UNAMID faces in being solely responsible for
security in some camps. DJSR Yonis said UNAMID could explore
how it would interact and assist with the composition of such
a force. However, they noted that the GOS Ministry of the
Interior would need to approve such a concept. The Ministry
not only oversees the regular uniformed police, but also
controls the Central Reserve Police, which act as its own
security force.

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EL GENEINA: CHALLENGES AND KIDNAPPINGS
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7. (C) In El Geneina, West Darfur, UNAMID Sector West
Commander General Balla Keita (Senegal) briefed SE Gration on
the challenges his mission faces in West Darfur. Currently
operating with only 3.5 active peacekeeping battalions
instead of the mandated six, his forces can attend only to
the most pressing gaps in security, and cannot cover all
sector areas on the ground. Gen. Keita added that the GOS's
inability to provide proper security in West Darfur compounds
UNAMID's limitations because UNAMID has been unable to bring
qualified staff from UNMIS and the other states of Darfur to
El Geneina. Each peacekeeping company team site only
conducts one overnight patrol per month because of the
limited numbers of peacekeepers available, and the lack of
water available restricts long-range patrols in some areas.
Gen. Keita also noted that the SAF has increased its presence
in West Darfur, which has corresponded to an increase in the
presence of small arms in Sector West. He confided to SE
that another major challenge is the quality, mind-set and
training of his troops. Keita said that MI-35 attack
helicopters sought by UNAMID could be of use if a contingent
came under attack but would actually be most useful as a
means of reinforcing outposts rapidly.


8. (SBU) At a formal briefing for SE Gration in Sector West
HQ in El Geneina on November 21, UNAMID officials agreed that
the use of UN forces to monitor the Chad-Sudan border was
vital, but could only occur if the UN Security Council
revised the mandates of both UNAMID and the UN Mission to the
Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)to perform such
tasks. Gen. Keita advised that the solution is for both
missions to form a joint operations center in El Geneina;
currently, there is only a three-person UNAMID liaison team
based in MINURCAT HQ in Abeche, Chad, but that liaison team
reports directly to El Fasher and has no direct
communications with the El Geneina Sector West HQ. Musse Id,
the acting head of office of West Darfur, pointed out that
responsibility for arranging such interaction lies in the UN
Security Council. "Now we feel like we have nothing to do
with each other, despite that we deal with the same problem,"
Id said. "There is no overarching strategy to permit a
cross-border relationship and achieve cross-border
objectives."


9. (C) At the same meeting, directors of UN humanitarian
agencies uniformly voiced their fear of armed kidnappers in
West Darfur, which threatened to undermine humanitarian
coverage. Renault Wanrooji, head of the Office for
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),West Darfur,
whose vehicle was seized by armed gunmen during a failed
kidnapping attempt two weeks earlier inside El Geneina said,
"We are already talking about the red line." Sally Hydock,

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head of office for the World Food Program (WFP) in El
Geneina, noted that security has increased for IDPs in West
Darfur, but paradoxically, international humanitarian workers
have had to retreat from their operations due to the
insecurity. Assorted humanitarian representatives all agreed
that the GOS is showing "no real commitment" to improving
safety and security. Representatives from UNICEF, WFP and
OCHA all confirmed that in recent months, local GOS police
and security forces had warned them to stay in their
compounds due to the presence of armed gunmen in the vicinity
seeking to kidnap them. Gen. Keita echoed the sentiments of
the humanitarians by adding, "The government thinks
humanitarians are too close to the IDPs. The government
would be very happy not having them around in Darfur. They
will always try to control the humanitarian workers through
fear."


10. (SBU) Comment: UNAMID senior leadership remains highly
supportive of USSES initiatives in Darfur. DJSR Yonis and
Gens. Nyamvumba and Keita spoke frankly about the limitations
and challenges of their operations in Darfur, and expressed
gratitude that SE Gration will continue supporting the hybrid
mission in Darfur. UNAMID, especially the Sector West force
in El Geneina, has improved greatly in coverage and
efficiency over the last year, and has the operational
willingness to begin monitoring the Chad-Sudan border. End
comment.
WHITEHEAD