GOS MILITARY OFFER TO COOPERATE ON SEVERAL FRONTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001288 SENSITIVE SIPDIS NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL FR CH SU SUBJECT: GOS MILITARY OFFER TO COOPERATE ON SEVERAL FRONTS REF: A) KHARTOUM 1284 B) KHARTOUM 1273 Classified By: CDA Robert E. Whitehead, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a meeting on November 14 with the Inspector General of the Sudanese Armed Forces, General Ismat Abdelraman Zaineabdeen informed Charge Whitehead that the Government of Sudan (GoS) is willing to "fully cooperate" to assist with Darfur rebel unification. Abdelraman asked for U.S. initiative to help move the Dakar Agreement forward and get signatory parties to a contact group meeting in Khartoum to approve an observation plan for the Sudan/Chad border. Abdelraman remarked that a unilateral cessation of offensive hostilities has been approved at the "highest levels" and should be announced when a United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) verification mechanism is in place. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) During a meeting with Charge and U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Peace and Security team members, Abdelraman emphasized that the international community cannot separate Sudanese relations with Chad from the peace process in Darfur. Abdelraman remarked that while Sudan had in the past fulfilled its obligations under the Tripoli Agreement to deploy forces to monitor the border, Chad had not been able to fulfill its commitments. -------------- - DAKAR GROUP AGREEMENT READY FOR IMPLEMENTATION -------------- - ¶3. (C) Abdelraman reviewed the Dakar agreement and its agreement that seven countries would place observers at ten or twelve points on the Sudan/Chad border to monitor opposition groups on both sides and help prevent illegal cross border activities such as arms smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. In addition to Sudan and Chad, the other five observer countries include Gabon, Eritrea, Senegal, Libya and the Democratic Republic of Congo. According to Abdelraman, the agreement established a contact group to meet and review the arrangements and included Qatar along with the seven countries providing military observers. The parties have already identified the ten border points at which seven observers will be stationed, one from each country. The GoS has suggested adding two other locations to the list, contingent on contact group approval, which would total 84 observers on the ground. The twin observer headquarters will be in Geneina, West Darfur and Abeche, Chad. In addition each border post would include a Sudanese/Chadian joint monitoring force. ¶4. (C) According to Abdelraman, the contact group is supposed to meet next in Khartoum although a date has not yet been set. The GoS is hopeful the meeting will take place soon, said Abdelraman but some contact group members have been hesitant to set a date. He observed that a contingent of Eritrean troops has been in Geneina, West Darfur for over a year now but they have not been allowed to cross the border into Chad to carry out their mission. Abdelraman sees the observers' mission as searching and verifying the locations of Sudanese and Chadian opposition forces in an agreed military zone on each side of the border. The depth of the zone has not yet been mutually agreed upon. -------------- U.S. ADVOCACY NEEDED TO PUSH PROCESS FORWARD -------------- ¶5. (C) Abdelraman stated that the United States could help by encouraging the French to work with the members of the Dakar contact group, with which France has experience, to set a date and attend the meeting to approve the observation plan. In addition, Abdelraman recalled that France had promised assistance in the form of transport, food and logistics when Sudan signed a trilateral agreement with Chad and the Central African Republic. The United States could urge France to fulfill its commitments to that agreement, Abdelraman said. He did not specify what commitments this would be but rather used it as an example of an agreement where France committed assets that could support the Dakar process. According to Abdelraman, the GoS does not see a role for UNAMID in the Dakar agreement at this time. Abdelraman did seem amenable to UNAMID forces helping with logistics and movement of observer troops once they are on the ground, but he did not KHARTOUM 00001288 002 OF 002 think that UNAMID should not play a role in the agreement. Finally, Abdelraman expressed concern about the 20 million USD needed to finance the intiative. Despite lingering Sudanese suspicion about Libyan intentions, Abdelraman still views them as a part of the contact group and would like to see U.S. pressure on Libya to attend the contact group meeting in Khartoum. While Abdelraman recognizes the Libyan role as important, he remarked that "Libya always fails to fulfill promises for assets and assistance". -------------- GOS SUPPORTIVE OF REBEL CONFERENCE -------------- ¶6. (C) Abdelraman emphasized that the GoS is supportive of a rebel conference since the GoS "doesn't want fragmented movements" that are hard to negotiate with. Abdelraman expressed concern that a U.S. effort to organize a rebel conference inside Darfur might be taken by the Libyans as an effort to undermine the Libyans desire to bring the rebel leaders to Kofra for a conference. Despite this concern, Abdelraman said he did not trust Libyan motives and would prefer the U.S. efforts. According to Abdelraman, the GoS is "ready to cooperate fully" to support such a conference. -------------- -------------- UNILATERAL CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE HOSTILITIES APPROVED -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) A unilateral cessation of offensive hostilities has been approved at the "highest levels" Abdelraman said. The GoS is still waiting for an opportune time to announce it before the opening of negotiations in Doha. Asked about verification and compliance, Abdelraman said there was a role for UNAMID in monitoring the initiative. Abdelraman indicated that the GoS is ready to cooperate in organizing the mechanism as soon as the UNAMID role is clear. The CDA pointed out that the Sudanese military must stop limiting UNAMID access to large parts of Darfur if its monitoring role is to be useful. Abdelraman responded that the U.S. message on this issue was clearly understood. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Abdelraman said the right things and offered to do some of them. We were very interested in his statements on a UNAMID role in monitoring the cessation of offensive operations, likely in return for greater SAF cooperation with UNAMID operations. His comments on supporting increased rebel cohesion in advance of the Doha talks was also welcome, although he seemed more enthusiastic about the conference than his GoS colleagues (ref A). Abdelraman was active in the Abeche, N'Djamena and Abuja negotiations; has been active in Doha; and knows the file well. WHITEHEAD